Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

116. Minutes of a Meeting, Secretary of State Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, May 28, 1957, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, May 28, 1957, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• Secretary of State
• Ambassador David K.E. Bruce
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
• Mr. Robert R. Bowie, S/P
• Mr. John N. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
• Mr. J.J. Reinstein, GER
• Federal Republic of Germany
• Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
• Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano
• Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler
• Professor Wilhelm Grewe
• Interpreters:
• Mr. Weber
• Mrs. Lejins

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

The Secretary said that we had the impression that the Soviets may be sincerely interested in a disarmament agreement. The reason, he believed, was that the burden of the present rate of armament on their economy was something which they would like to lighten. We are ourselves, with our strong industrial economy, finding it a considerable burden to devote ten per cent of our gross national product to armaments. The Soviets perhaps find it difficult to keep up with us, considering the fact that their gross national product is perhaps one-third of ours. We also think that they are concerned lest the possession of atomic weapons spread generally and are particularly concerned that some of the satellites might come into possession of atomic weapons and consequently exercise greater independence. The Soviets have recently shown greater interest in the treaty to establish an international atomic energy agency to exercise controls which would assure that atomic materials will be used only for peaceful purposes. In London they have exhibited considerable interest in what is called there the “fourth country problem”.

The Secretary said that he himself would not place any particular confidence in what the Soviets say merely because they say it, but when what they say coincides with their self-interest, one can place some reliance on it. This is particularly true when our free world interest lies in the same direction. We had therefore concluded it was worthwhile to probe further as to what the Soviets would or would not do. The Secretary said it is basic that we would not do anything on the basis of a Soviet undertaking unless it can be controlled. We are alert to the fact that there is always a tendency on the part of the democracies to disarm, if there is the slightest excuse for doing so. We hope at least we would not follow the pattern which has happened so many times in our history, of limiting our armaments without reciprocal limitations, with the result that aggression follows.

The Secretary said he had had considerable international experience in his lifetime and he well realized the tendency of people to put faith in treaties which sound well, which are signed by people with well-known names, and which have seals and red ribbons on them. We were determined to seek an agreement which is not a trap. We had had very considerable discussion during the last few days in particular about the subject of disarmament. There had been meetings in the State Department under his chairmanship, at which the Defense Department, the Armed Services, the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies of the government concerned had participated. The conclusions resulting from these meetings had been taken to the President on the previous Saturday and had been approved by the President.² The Secretary said he wished the Chancellor to know that there was nothing in our position which was not fully approved by the Defense Department, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Secretary personally.

The Secretary said that one conclusion we had come to was that the aspects of the disarmament problem which particularly touched on Western Europe ought to be dealt with by more full participation of the Western European powers than is presently the case. We had received word that the other Western Powers which are active in the London disarmament negotiations, that is, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, this morning had agreed with this point of view. It would probably be presented at a meeting of the NATO Council which we hoped would be held on the following day. The Secretary said we hoped that out of this discussion would come some program which would insure that the Western European countries and SACEUR would have a more active voice in the disarmament question and that responsibility would not devolve solely on the Four Western Powers involved in the London discussions.

The Secretary said he had thus far confined himself to a discussion of procedural matters. He now wished to take up the following questions of substance: (1) inspection and controls; (2) nuclear weapons; and (3) conventional weapons.

The Secretary said that as far as inspection and controls were concerned, the United States adheres to the position originally put forth by the President at Geneva.³ This was that we would be ready to have aerial inspection and ground controls, either fixed or mobile, over all of the continental United States (and Canada, as well, if this were agreeable to the Canadian Government), if the U.S.S.R. would agree to the same arrangement for its territory. If, as we believe, the Soviets would reject this, we face the problem of what alternative arrangement could be made. It seemed to us that the alternative must then be a series of stages in which a beginning would be made where the problems were least difficult, with a gradual extension as circumstances permit. The Soviets had suggested an aerial inspection and ground control system over a slice of eastern Soviet territories in Siberia as against a slice of the United States including all of the United States west of the Mississippi. The Secretary said that our military people could see little advantage in inspection of only such a slice of the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, there would be great political difficulty for us in equating such a substantial part of the United States with even a substantial slice of Siberia, even if the areas were comparable on an acreage basis. While we have not arrived at any fixed conclusions and while there is considerable flexibility in our position, and we intend to probe Soviet intentions, it may be that the only feasible thing which can be done at present is to start on an experimental basis in areas relatively free from the political complications which the Secretary had referred to, that is, principally in the Arctic areas. The Secretary said he wished to repeat that our ideas were flexible and not fixed, but that our thinking was developing along these lines.

The Secretary then turned to the subject of nuclear armaments. He said our suggestions have as their central purpose the suspension of the development and growth of nuclear weapons, at least for a period during which it could be ascertained whether nuclear weapons could be brought under control. It would be our suggestion that, after a date to be fixed, those countries which have nuclear weapons should agree not to use any further fissionable materials to produce weapons and that during this stage at least nations which do not have nuclear weapons should agree not to manufacture them. The Secretary said that an agreement not to put new fissionable material into weapons is the kind of an agreement which our experts tell us can be controlled. It would not be possible to account for past production of fissionable materials, but it could be determined whether new production was devoted to peaceful purposes.

The Secretary said we would also propose that nations which have fissionable materials at the agreed date should agree to take certain amounts out of their weapons stockpile and put them into a stockpile for peaceful purposes. Thus we might start initially in a modest way to check future fissionable materials production for military purposes and also to make some inroad in the stockpile already devoted to military purposes. The Secretary said he had alluded to the fact that we would propose that nations not possessing nuclear weapons might forego their production to see how this experiment goes. However, he wished to make it clear that we would not agree to withhold such weapons from our Allies if their importation were necessary to repel aggression. In other words, our proposals would not extend to what might be called a NATO stockpile, where U.S. weapons could be stored subject to the possibility of transfer to its Allies if the need for their use should arise, nor would our proposals preclude the training of our Allies in the use of nuclear weapons.

The Secretary said that we still feel that the suspension of nuclear tests should be coupled with some form of nuclear control. He said we had given most conscientious and thorough study to the problem. We were convinced, on the one hand, that the testing of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, if kept within certain limits, would not be injurious to human life. On the other hand, we were concerned over the possibility that the continuity of developing and testing weapons would be irrevocably interrupted by a suspension of tests while the Soviet development program would continue to go forward. This opened up the possibility of a Soviet breakthrough in this area because the Soviets would continue with their preparations while our whole establishment would be broken up and our scientists scattered.

With respect to conventional weapons, the Secretary said that our proposals in the first stage are based on the concept of a reduction of forces by the U.S.S.R. and the United States to a level of armaments consistent with armed forces of 2,500,000 men. There might have to be some comparable ceilings for other Western powers which have a substantial military potential, although it is likely that U.K. forces will be below the ceiling before it can be agreed upon. Such countries as the Federal Republic, which are just beginning their build-up, would not be required to reduce their forces, but would be asked to accept some ceiling such as that established in the Brussels Treaty.⁴

The Secretary said he had referred to a level of armaments compatible with a certain number of men in the armed services. He said he thought that the number of men in the armed services at any one time is a most dangerous and elusive concept. He remarked that in the Brussels Treaty, the approach is that certain levels of forces are fixed, but the effective limitation is on the armaments appropriate to the number of forces. Armaments involve a less elusive and more definite concept than numbers of men, since men can be moved in and out of the military services if there are arms for them. The Secretary said we would think it appropriate that there be some reduction in armaments at the time when the agreed level is arrived at between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Secretary said this involved difficult problems in comparing weapons. This was particularly difficult when it came to dealing with a country like the U.S.S.R., which we knew from experience always cheats on its agreements.

The Secretary said that he did not attach great importance to the reductions which might be made in forces at the first stage. Reductions at the second stage, which would be of more significance, would be dependent on two things. One was the settlement of some of the major political issues in the world, such as the reunification of Germany. The second would be the establishment of roving, mobile controls within the Soviet Union. While it would be difficult to make such controls 100 per cent effective in such a vast country as the U.S.S.R., some risks might be incurred if there had been a settlement of some of the major political problems. The Secretary said there was one other area he should mention, that is, guided missiles and outer space missiles. It is our thought that a commission might be established to study how to insure that the use of outer space missiles would be exclusively for peaceful purposes. We think this is a suitable area for study but not for agreement at this time.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he was very grateful for the explanation which the Secretary had given. In his response he wished to go into some of these matters in some detail. However, before doing so, he wished to ask one question. When the Secretary had spoken of a first step, did he mean that this would deal only with aerial inspection or would it deal with other matters?

The Secretary said that we were thinking of aerial inspection plus ground controls in the inspected area, together with the establishment of an inspection system of atomic plants which would make it possible to control an agreement that future production would be used only for peaceful purposes. The establishment of controls in atomic plants would require about two years, so that it would take that period of time to bring into force the agreement to use future production of fissionable materials only for peaceful purposes. Initial steps in aerial inspection and ground controls could be brought into force, we hope, in a few months’ time. In addition, there would be a reduction of conventional forces as between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which would come into force in about twelve months.

In response to a further question from the Chancellor, the Secretary said he wished to make clear that, in our opinion, a first stage Treaty should include the following matters:

1. Aerial and ground inspection in some areas, perhaps not of great significance, primarily to make sure that controls of this character can be implemented.

2. An agreement to abstain from future productions of nuclear weapons, both on the part of nations which have such weapons and on the part of nations which do not have them.

3. A reduction of the forces of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to a level of 2,500,000. He remarked that he did not attach great military importance to this aspect of the Treaty.

The Secretary said a first stage Treaty involves all of these arrangements, although they would come into force at different times depending on the time required to set up protective controls which might be as much as two years in respect to some matters.

The Chancellor asked whether there would be an armament stop in this period.

The Secretary said there would not be.

The Chancellor asked whether, therefore, during this time, and until there was an effective control, the development of armament could go on.

The Secretary said this was correct except as regards the limit of 2,500,000 men in the U.S. and Soviet forces. The Chancellor remarked this was probably not of great significance and the Secretary said our Forces would probably be at that level at any rate. The whole modern trend is toward reduction in the number of men as the effectiveness of weapons increases.

The Chancellor said that in the first part of the Secretary’s statement he had spoken of countries belonging to the Soviet Union. He asked whether this would cover Red China.

The Secretary said that we did not contemplate that, as part of the first stage, controls would be established over Red China. We did contemplate the inclusion in the Treaty of a provision under which if military developments and activities in Red China made it desirable, the U.S. could call off the arrangement. It was intended to approach the matter in that form in order to avoid the political problem of recognizing and dealing with Red China. The problem would be dealt with negatively rather than positively, so to speak.

After referring to his notes, the Chancellor said that the statement by the Secretary to which he had referred was that the U.S. would be prepared to agree to the inspection of the entire continental area of the U.S. if the U.S.S.R. would subject all its territory to inspection. Did this statement cover Red China, he asked.

The Secretary responded that it related only to the Soviet Union.

The Chancellor asked whether the satellites would be covered. The Secretary said they would not. He recalled that the original proposal made by the President at Geneva covered only the territory of the U.S.S.R. He said that our military authorities felt that if inspection were extended to the whole of the U.S.S.R. and not merely to a part which would be sealed off from the rest, we would gain greatly. He said the fact of the matter was that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, there is little that the U.S.S.R. cannot learn. It is possible to buy at most book stores maps and pictures of military establishments in the U.S. It is possible to fly over most of the U.S. except for six restricted areas. Anyone can hire a Piper Cub and photograph anything except in theory in these restricted areas. In fact, one can fly high enough to get most of these areas.

The Secretary said that an agreement enabling us to fly over the U.S.S.R. would give us much and would add very little to Soviet knowledge. For this reason, he believed it was certain that the U.S.S.R. would continue to reject our proposal. The Secretary said that we actually see no military disadvantage in agreeing to inspection of part of the U.S. in exchange for the right to inspect part of Siberia. We would gain from such an arrangement. However, it raised the political difficulty of equating part of the U.S. for part of Siberia.

The Chancellor said that, while his information was perhaps not correct, he had understood that the U.S. had such an inspection over the U.S.S.R. Two and one-half years ago he had received a visit from high ranking American officers who had showed him apparatus which they said they could use by flying in the air stream over the Soviet Union. They also showed him pictures which had been taken.

The Secretary said he wished this were true. While we had some useful pictures, they were only of a small part of the U.S.S.R. It was not feasible at the present time, whether through over-flights or through use of balloons to cover all of the U.S.S.R.

The Chancellor said that he did not wish to go into these technical details but would like to make some general remarks. He said he thought he agreed freely that the U.S., as the leading power of the Western world, should make every effort to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on disarmament. The question of timing, however, was of very great importance. That is, when one should go to the U.S.S.R. with a generous proposal. The Chancellor said that he was sorry to say that he could see no sign of the Russians wishing to come to an agreement with the West. He recalled the talks which he had with Bulganin and Khrushchev at Moscow in 1955.⁵ He and Von Brentano had had a lengthy discussion of a very frank character with them. They had been told that the Soviets found it very difficult to meet the demands of their population, to rearm at the rate necessary to keep pace with the U.S., and to meet the demands of Red China. The Soviets had asked the Germans to help them with Red China. They had not said anything about disarmament. What they had said was that they were afraid of the U.S., and also, perhaps for reasons of politeness, that they were afraid of the Germans. The principal point which they had made was that they were afraid of the U.S. and that they found it necessary to keep up with the U.S. in the arms field.

The Chancellor said that the Germans had, of course, rejected the Soviet proposal. He thought that the important thing was that the Soviets had not said anything about disarmament. The Chancellor said, that in looking back to October 1955, that he thought he should frankly say that the power of the U.S.S.R. had increased. There were several factors involved. The first was that the power of the West had diminished. This was due in part to difficulties between the U.S. and the British and French. In the second place, the U.K. had, to some extent left the framework of NATO. The Soviet Union on the other hand had crushed the revolt in Hungary and managed to keep Poland under control and had extended its influence in the Middle East. The Chancellor said that he did not wish to say that the Soviet Union was stronger than the U.S., but he did think the power of the Soviets had increased relatively.

The Chancellor said that this was a subject on which one could not furnish proof. One theory was as good as another. However, he thought that one should consider what the results might be of unsuccessful negotiations. The will of some countries to resist the Soviets would diminish. The Soviets would believe that if proposals had been made to them and rejected, other proposals would be made. The essential question was whether the Soviets had given up their goal of world domination. He personally did not believe that they had.

The Chancellor said that, as he remarked at the beginning, this was a situation in which a solution must be found without war. If the United States believed that the time had come that the Soviets were prepared to give up their aim to dominate the world, the other countries of the free world must accept this view. However, taking such a decision placed a great responsibility on the United States, perhaps a greater responsibility than had ever been placed upon any American Administration. If the negotiations failed and there were a loss of confidence in the United States, the United States would have lost everything that it had been working for for a period of years. The Chancellor said that this was a question of such seriousness that he felt it desirable to be completely frank in discussing it.

The Chancellor said that the proposal raises particular problems for Germany. The Secretary had said we must avoid anything which would perpetuate the continued division of Germany. He had also said that responsibility must devolve on other countries and that NATO would be consulted regarding disarmament on Wednesday. It would be impossible for the NATO Ambassadors to be in a position to comment on proposals at a meeting on Wednesday without having consulted their governments.

With specific regard to Germany, the Chancellor referred to the discussions which had taken place in the morning meeting⁶ and particularly to the point he had made that the German elections would be of decisive importance to the entire Western world. He said that if the proposals to be made at London could be used for propaganda purposes and if it could be portrayed that steps were being taken in the disarmament field without laying a basis for political settlements, this would have a very serious effect on the German elections. He said he frankly could see no chance for the Government.

The Secretary said that he was glad that the Chancellor had asked these questions. In the first place, the Chancellor had asked whether we thought the Soviets had renounced their desire to rule the world. His answer was that they had not. However, there was more than one way to winning the domination of the world. It might be possible that the Soviets might be willing to renounce the effort to dominate the world by military forces if they thought they could achieve it by other means.

The Secretary said that if the West, and particularly the United States, were not willing to deal in any way with the problem of disarmament, we would have undermined the confidence of many peoples in the Western governments, and particularly in the United States Government. The Secretary said the Chancellor had spoken of a possible loss of confidence in the United States. He thought that confidence in the United States, to the extent that it exists, rests, not only on the fact that we are strong, but on the belief of other people that we are sincerely devoted to peace and freedom and that we want to find ways of lightening the burden of armaments on mankind.

The Secretary said that the first phase of steps we are considering are certainly of such a character that they will in no way limit and will in fact increase the military strength of the United States. We have some chance of finding out through aerial inspection something about the Soviet Union that we do not know in exchange for something that they know. In the nuclear field, we propose that materials should not be used for weapons at a time when our stockpile is larger, perhaps several times larger, than that of the Soviets. We do not propose to diminish our weapons stockpile, nor to abandon the bases from which we could stage an attack on the U.S.S.R., if necessary. In other words, our proposals would leave us in a position of superiority.

The Secretary said that he did not believe that such an initial step would be interpreted as giving up our superiority or endanger any part of the free world. On the contrary, it would freeze our superiority.

The Secretary said that he thought that anything less than this in the first stage would be interpreted throughout the world and indeed in the United States as a trend toward militarism which was not appropriate to a free and Christian people.

The Secretary said that the Chancellor had referred to the NATO meeting on Wednesday. He felt he must have failed to make his point clear. It had never entered his mind that the NATO representatives would express views at the meeting on Wednesday. The purpose of the meeting was to tell the NATO countries our view that they should organize themselves to take a greater role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. When the disarmament discussions touched on issues such as German reunification and the situation in the satellites, we felt that the NATO countries should have the opportunity and, indeed, the responsibility of participating. We had in mind a greater degree of participation than is gained by an occasional report to NATO, an occasional discussion with an Ambassador in London or a meeting such as the one which he was having with the Chancellor. Although his meeting with the Chancellor was highly useful and afforded him an opportunity to give the Chancellor our thoughts to a degree which few people in the United States Government knew them, it was, nevertheless, more or less accidental and would probably not be repeated within the next few months. The whole purpose of our approach to NATO was to propose to the NATO countries that they organize themselves to participate effectively in the disarmament problem. The Secretary said he personally believed that their countries should have continuous representation in London somewhat similar to the representation the Germans had had at the Geneva Conference in 1955.

Herr von Brentano said he wished to ask a question. The Chancellor had indicated, and there was no need to stress, that the Germans were interested in a relaxation of tension. However, he was somewhat concerned as to how Germany would be affected by the proposals. As he understood it, the proposals would comprehend inspection, limits on nuclear weapons and some limitations on conventional forces. He asked whether he could assume that the proposals would cover Europe.

The Secretary said that the United States did not assume this. We did not think that the first phase of the effort should touch Europe in any way. We further felt that before anything was done affecting Europe, the European countries should organize themselves so that they could participate effectively and accept greater responsibility in this area. He said that we did not wish to be in a position of simply telling the Europeans what was being done. We wish them to decide for themselves what should be done. He said the United States could not think for Germany, but that Germany should think for itself and participate in the development of such a program. The Secretary said that our thinking was at this time there should be no over-flights in Europe, no ground controls in Europe and no limitation of conventional forces in Europe. These should be left until we come to the second stage, which would be based upon European participation. He indicated that he felt that participation was particularly necessary in the case of Germany, the Benelux countries and possibly Italy. If the European countries involved wanted Europe dealt with in the first stage, we would have no objection. However, it was not part of our proposal.

Herr von Brentano said that he was still somewhat concerned about what the Secretary had said. If he understood it correctly, an attempt would be made to reach a comprehensive agreement on disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was psychologically impossible for an agreement to be reached between the larger countries without affecting the smaller countries. One could not limit the armament of the larger powers without limiting the armament of the smaller powers. As he understood the proposal, it would mean that Britain would in fact leave WEU. It would mean the implicit confirmation of the division of Germany. This would create great problems in Germany. He said he wished to raise these problems, not because he was a German, but because of the importance of the German problem to all countries. If the feeling developed in Germany—that the division of Germany had been accepted and that an agreement on disarmament would be based on the division of Germany, the reaction would be very bad and might affect other countries, as well.

The Secretary said that he thought that to describe what we proposed as a comprehensive agreement was going far beyond what was actually contemplated. All that was contemplated was what he had already outlined involving the inspection of areas remote from Europe. It did not involve areas where the problem of freezing the political situation was an issue. It touched on the problem of disarmament only by proposing that the atomic stockpiles of the United States and the U.S.S.R. be frozen at their present levels. This would involve the Soviets conceding U.S. superiority in this field and abandonment of the Soviet effort to catch up with the United States. The proposed reduction of conventional forces to 2,500,000 had been put forward a long time ago. It had no substantive significance.

The Secretary said Herr von Brentano had spoken of the United Kingdom leaving WEU. He could not see any connection between these proposals and the Brussels Pact. The Brussels Pact would not be affected, nor would NATO, nor would the United Kingdom forces in Germany, nor would our ability to meet a Soviet attack.

The Secretary said that none of these substantive proposals were new. The proposal for reciprocal aerial inspection had been made by the President at Geneva. The proposal of a cut-off date for the production of nuclear weapons had been made at least six months ago. The limitation of 2,500,000 men had been made a long time ago. The only new thing was that we did not think the arrangements should apply to Europe until there had been a settlement of the political problems in Europe. In other words, we were cutting back our proposals until the conditions described by Herr von Brentano could be dealt with. We did not wish to go into these problems until Germany was in a position to deal with these matters.

Herr von Brentano said he did not wish to be misunderstood. He acknowledged the accuracy of what the Secretary had said. On the other hand, he did not wish to have the impression created that there would be relaxation of tension separate from the settlement of political problems. This was why the Germans had suggested that it be stated that, because there were new negotiations in prospect, it was desirable to solve the political problems. This was why they wished to propose a future Four Power conference. This would make it clear that there was a connection between the disarmament negotiations and the solution of the German problem.

The Secretary said we would have no objection to making clear in any way that in our view a comprehensive disarmament agreement was not possible without a solution of some of the major political problems, such as the reunification of Germany. Our own working papers reflect this. The essence of the decision which we had just made, which he had thought would be pleasing to the Germans, was that it was not possible to have the degree of disarmament which had been previously discussed without European participation. The political responsibility was too great for us to bear.

The Secretary said that as far as inspection was concerned, we were proposing to do it only on an experimental basis. We did not even wish it to apply to the European area without full German and other European participation in the decision. He remarked that it was Governor Stassen’s opinion that the Soviets would not be willing to accept real inspection and ground controls unless they cover Europe. If this were so, the question would then be up to the Germans and their European colleagues to decide. We would not urge them. The Secretary said he himself had thought we were purporting to speak in London for other countries to too great an extent without having a mandate to do so. We did not wish to do so any longer.

The Chancellor said he wished to ask a question. The Secretary said he had not answered all of Herr von Brentano’s questions. The Chancellor said perhaps his question would in fact deal with these unanswered questions. The Secretary had spoken of agreements regarding three matters, air and ground inspection, nuclear weapons and conventional forces. His question was to what extent such a proposal would affect American participation in NATO. The Secretary said, not at all. The Chancellor said the agreement would be a very good agreement in this case.

Herr von Brentano referred to the German suggestion regarding a Four Power conference and requested the Secretary’s views. The Secretary said he thought that the proposal was an interesting one but that he doubted that it could be made in the communiqué. He did not think we could confront our Allies with a statement on this subject before they had been consulted.

The Secretary said that, in point of fact, the same proposal had been made by some people in our own government recently and we had been considering it during the last ten days. He found it interesting that the Germans had made the same proposal. The Secretary said that while he felt the proposal had some merit, he was afraid it might operate as an enticement to the Soviets to accept things in the disarmament agreement on the basis of the feeling that they would gain more than we would out of a Four Power conference. He thought we would need to weigh very carefully what we would gain from such a conference. He was not sure we had gained very much out of the Geneva conferences. He was not sure what we would gain out of another Four Power conference. On the other hand, he thought some way should and could be found to link a comprehensive disarmament agreement with the reunification of Germany.

The Secretary said he wished to point out that what the Soviets want most out of a disarmament agreement was not comprehended in what we were now proposing to do. For a long time the Soviets had pressed in particular for three things. One was the liquidation of all foreign bases. This was not touched in any way. The second was the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. This was not touched in any way either. The third was the liquidation of NATO and WEU. This was not touched in any way. The Secretary said that, in other words, the things which the Soviets really want, even inspection in Europe, would not be touched in our proposals. It was implicit in our proposals that the extension of these arrangements would be dependent on the solution of some of the major political problems, notably the reunification of Germany.

The Secretary said that he was not certain whether we could usefully add a Four Power conference to these proposals. If he hesitated, there were two reasons for doing so. One was the need for consulting our allies. The other was whether such a conference would in fact be an asset to us. He thought that we could make it clear that there could not be an effective general disarmament plan unless there were reunification. As far as a possible Four Power conference was concerned, we would, of course, give great weight to German views.

The Chancellor said that he would like to think this entire matter over.

The Secretary said he hoped that the Chancellor would take the time to think it over. He was satisfied it was the kind of policy which the Chancellor would want us to adopt. He wished to make clear again that what we were considering was a very limited agreement and not a comprehensive agreement, that it need not apply to Germany or to Europe, and that from the standpoint of procedure, we proposed to bring Europe and particularly Germany into the discussion of the problem. These were the only new points. Everything else was old.

1. Source: Department of State, conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinstein on June 3.
2. See vol. XX, pp. 513 ff.
3. For text of the President’s “Open Skies” proposal, see the vol. V, pp. 447–456.
4. For text of the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, concluded at Brussels on March 17, 1948, among the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, see Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1948, pp. 600–602.
5. See vol. V, pp. 573 ff.
6. See Documents 113–115.