84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
895. Having secured the domination of the police by the liquidation of Beria, of the government bureaucracy by the elimination of the “anti-party group,” and now of the armed forces by the disgrace of Zhukov,2 the Communist Party under the strong hand of Khrushchev has clearly established its supremacy over all the other elements of power in the Soviet system. This victory has not been achieved without cost. The morale of the armed forces will certainly suffer although how much will depend upon whether other military [Page 179] leaders are involved and the extent to which party intervention in military affairs will offend and discourage the professional officer corps. The roster of top military officers who lined up to kick the fallen hero appears to be virtually complete but many of them cannot escape responsibility if only by virtue of their silence in the face of Zhukov’s alleged misdeeds and we would expect further changes in the military leadership to be quietly made in due course. The respect and esteem in which Zhukov was held by the public at large will add to the doubts and uneasiness of the public in general and while this may not be able effectively to express itself, it will make more difficult Khrushchev’s efforts to increase the efficiency of the Soviet system by evoking enthusiasm and belief of the people in the system. The extent to which the leadership and propaganda apparatus has been employed in stating the regime’s case indicates the seriousness with which the question of public opinion is regarded. This was also apparent in the charge the CC resolution made that Zhukov’s role in World War II was being exaggerated and in Konev’s Pravda article which minimized Zhukov’s wartime exploits and pointed up his shortcomings. At the same time Konev supplied support for the claim that a personality cult was being developed around Zhukov, citing as one of the facts the painting of him on a white charger overlooking the burning Reichstag which was hung at his order in the Museum of the Soviet Army. This and the quotation in the Pravda editorial from Zhukov’s recantation accepting the Party’s charges as just are intended to undermine the basis of Zhukov’s appeal to the masses and to reduce the area of latent opposition the anti-Zhukov move may engender.
Perhaps the most striking point in the decree of the Central Committee is the statement that Zhukov “showed himself an unsound political figure, inclined to adventurism, both in his understanding of the most important tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as well as in the direction of the Ministry of Defense.” This lends credence to the view that Zhukov opposed Khrushchev in the field of Foreign Affairs. The Syrian problem would certainly seem to be the most likely issue despite the strong statements made on this subject by Zhukov in Albania. There are of course other possibilities. For example, his prolonged stay in Albania may have been accounted for by his taking a hand in the Yugoslav-Albania problem. We have also been disturbed by the possibility that recent developments in Berlin and the recognition of East Germany by Yugoslavia3 might presage a more aggressive Soviet policy in that area. The Syrian policy seems a more likely issue, however, since from his many statements on this question we know that Khrushchev [Page 180] was personally involved in building up the crisis and it is in this area that the Soviet armed forces would be most handicapped in conducting limited military operations should the issue be forced. Whatever the immediate incident that may have precipitated a showdown, however, the basic factor was clearly the Party’s concern that its control over the military was not secure. This rivalry between the party and the armed forces as institutions rather than a personal fear on the part of Khrushchev that his leadership of the Party was threatened by Zhukov was, in my opinion, the issue.
The removal of Zhukov leaves no strong figure in the Presidium, with the possible exception of the ubiquitous Mikoyan, who could be expected to exert a strong restraining influence on Khrushchev’s impetuousness. This development can only be deplored from our point of view. For the time being however, Khrushchev’s sensitivity to public opinion and the knowledge that by moving so quickly on so many fronts he has created a formidable latent opposition, may have a sobering influence. The charge against Zhukov of developing a cult of personality may for the time being act as a check on a similar build-up of Khrushchev, the logic of the Soviet system and his own personality, however, appear to be pushing Khrushchev toward one-man dictatorship but whether he can successfully carry out this role remains to be seen.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/11–357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome.↩
- On November 2, the Central Committee of the CPSU announced a resolution ousting Zhukov from the Party Presidium and the Central Committee. Publication of the resolution in Pravda on November 3 was accompanied by a long editorial by Deputy Defense Minister Konev disparaging Zhukov’s abilities as a military theorist and strategist. Within a few days, virtually all top marshals, with the notable exception of Vasilevsky, were identified as supporting the Central Committee action.↩
- Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with East Germany on October 15.↩