82. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State1
1631. For Cumming from Bohlen. Reference: Deptel 1376.2 As you know, I have refrained since I have been here from commenting in most cases on Soviet developments, in part because I profoundly believe that our people in Moscow on the spot are in the best position to do so without views being submitted from all quarters of the globe. In addition, while I have not lost my interest I have lost touch with Soviet developments on a day-to-day basis. However, in this particular case I am very glad to give you my comments, primarily because, particularly after Geneva, I had considerable opportunities for informal talks with Zhukov and formed, insofar as it is possible with any Soviet official, some rather definite conclusions as to his character and cast of mind.
I shall, therefore, start with this aspect of the matter which will help to explain my subsequent remarks. Zhukov in my opinion [Page 175] above all is a Soviet patriot. He is a Bolshevik and as Hungary showed he is capable of ruthless and even brutal action if he feels the interests of the Soviet Union are involved. Ideologically, while not questioning the general premises of Marxism and Leninism, I would say his interest in this field, and hence in communism in other countries, is distinctly subordinate to his preoccupation with the security of the Soviet Union and by analogy of the whole Communist bloc.
On military matters from several conversations I am convinced that he is extremely sober and realistic in his evaluation of modern warfare and I would imagine has an extremely accurate comprehension of the correlation of forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although primarily and principally a military man, he is at the same time a party member and has been since 1918. I am reasonably certain that he has no personal political ambitions and seriously doubt if he ever had any intention of making Soviet Armed Forces supreme as against the party. For these reasons I cannot see him engaged in the intrigues of power struggle for his own advancement. However, given his preoccupation of the effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces he would in my opinion fearlessly and bluntly resist any attempt to re-establish political commissar system in the form that existed under Stalin. He would probably be prepared to work closely with the political sections of the Red Army in the indoctrination of troops in ideology and in support of current Soviet policies, but would oppose the reinstitution of a system of Party spies and informers in the officer corps of the armed forces. His chief reason I would imagine would certainly not be any basic hostility to the party as such but rather his conviction based on past experience that any such system would be demoralizing to the officer corps and would reduce the military efficiency of the forces. It is entirely possible, therefore, that his dismissal arose from his opposition to attempts by Khrushchev and party people to reintroduce a full blown political commissar system in the Soviet Armed Forces. However, given the timing of this crisis I am inclined to believe that other elements, possibly more important to us, may have entered the picture. If it had been a purely internal matter in the traditional party/military jockeying on the subject of political commissars, it would hardly seem wise for either side to press it to a crisis at a time when international tension in the Middle East and U.S./USSR confrontation is probably more acute than at any time since Korea. If this crisis should explode into war dismissal of the most respected and competent military leader who in addition enjoys great personal popularity would be an act of unparalleled folly by Khrushchev and company. Even if Soviet intention is to score a diplomatic triumph in the Middle East it would certainly have been [Page 176] wiser for the same reason to have awaited the end of this particular crisis.
Accordingly, I am inclined to the view that a difference of opinion as to Soviet foreign military policy is likewise involved. Given Zhukov’s temperament and realism I believe it a safe bet that he views with concern, if not with real alarm, Khrushchev’s reckless threats and saber rattling. With a more professional understanding of the present correlation of military forces in the world he may have been constantly opposed Khrushchev in the development of his Middle East policy and the risks that it most certainly involves. In my opinion, therefore, the latter consideration, possibly in conjunction with a latent dispute between party control and military efficiency, is a most likely explanation of the present crisis.
I entirely agree that the idea of Zhukov’s promotion is untenable and have thought so from the moment his release from Defense duty was announced. If promotion had been in the cards standard Soviet practice would have been to announce his promotion and his departure from Defense as a consequence.
If information concerning a CC meeting is accurate (although according to the evening press here Khrushchev denied it at Turkish reception), this would appear to indicate Khrushchev and his supporters have encountered real opposition to the demotion and possible elimination of Marshal Zhukov. Khrushchev’s remark that Zhukov would receive a new position according to his experience and qualifications is of course meaningless as to the nature of any new job he may have. It, however, may be an indication that because of opposition in the Army and even within the party Zhukov cannot just be dismissed out of hand and he may have to be given some face-saving job.
There is yet no indication that I have seen as to whether Zhukov is to be likewise removed from the Presidium which is of course a key point. If present crisis, however, results in total elimination of Marshal Zhukov from high Soviet councils I think it is a most disturbing development as I can see no one in the immediate entourage of Khrushchev who would be either in a position or have sufficient courage to act as a sober restraining factor on Khrushchev’s tendency to gamble.
If you see no objection I would appreciate this being repeated to Moscow for Tommy.3