Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

80. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 28, 1957—6 p.m.

850. Pass Defense. Although as stated in Embtel 844² evidence still inconclusive on reasons for replacement of Zhukov as Defense Minister or significance of change for his personal standing in top party and governmental echelons, recent emphasis in military press on role of party as leader and organizer of Soviet Armed Forces may reflect one of issues over which there was disagreement in top Soviet circles. Beginning with Red Star editorial on October 16 which contended that “in leadership of Communist Party is main source of strength of our armed forces” and claimed that Soviet Army and Navy were “indebted” for World War II victories to Communist Party, military press has repeatedly referred to guidance and supervision of party over military (Weeka 42 and 43). On October 25 and 26 subject was treated especially heavily; Soviet Fleet editorial 25th entitled “In Leadership of Party is Source of Power of Soviet Army and Fleet,” Red Star editorial 26 dealt with same subject as did Soviet Aviation article on same day. Pravda editorial today (only newspaper published on Monday) which entitled “Indivisible Unity of Party and People” repeats theme that “because of leadership of Communist Party and its Central Committee Soviet people and their Armed Forces won …³ victory in fatherland war.”

Theme of party supervision of military, of course, is not new. However, quantity of [garble] subject since mid-October has been stepped up impressively and apparently is not due solely to propaganda preparations for forthcoming celebration. This evident from recent treatment in military press of subject of improving “party-political work” in armed forces, particularly in Soviet Fleet editorial of 26th. Attributing to party leadership “chief source” of might of Soviet Armed Forces, editorial stated that in solving problems facing Soviet Armed Forces “important role belongs to military councils, political organs and party organizations along with one-man commanders.” Editorial then stated that “instructions” to party organizations in armed forces (which Party Central Committee issued last April although they first mentioned in press in May) “obliged political organs and party organizations … to delve actively into all sides of military preparation, military discipline and indoctrination of personnel, to uncover on basis of criticism and self-criticism all shortcomings in instruction and indoctrination of troops, to assist commanders to adopt in time measures for eliminating defects hindering improvement of military preparedness of units, ships and subunits.” Nevertheless, this editorial and one in Soviet Aviation on 25th stipulated that “orders and instructions of commanders” were not to be criticized, which had been made clear last May when military press first discussed Central Committee’s “instructions.” That there were differences in views, however, over scope of responsibility of political workers in Armed Forces was apparent in remarks of Soviet Fleet editorial that some party organizations were “weakly” studying problems affecting military training and discipline of troops because of “harmful” opinion that political workers should “not deal with questions of military preparation.” This was also apparent in editorial’s remarks that “there still are individual Communists who evaluate criticism of defects in instruction and indoctrination of troops as undermining their authority, interference in service functions of commander. This is mistaken, Philistine understanding of criticism.”

From above it would appear that there has been considerable difference of opinion over extent of supervision political organs and party organizations would exercise over activities of military commanders and their troops. Obviously line cannot be sharply drawn between criticism of orders of commanders and criticism of training and indoctrination of troops.

Presumably military commanders would be inclined to interpret latter criticism as criticism of their “orders” while party officials would tend to interpret criticism of commanders’ orders as criticism of troop training. Thus while principle of one-man command presumably basis for organizing structure of Soviet military system, it in great danger of being vitiated by party interference. This could have been one of principal issues over which there were differences.

One paragraph in Soviet Fleet editorial of 26th may have been pointedly directed at Zhukov. It emphasized how a Communist must be “modest”, must not “exalt personal self,” and must not only teach masses but must be able to learn from them. Paragraph then asserted “Each member and candidate member of party, no matter what post he occupies, must have these valuable qualities”. This is remindful of Pravda July 3 assertion immediately prior to announcement of action against “anti-party group” that there is no one in party, regardless of how high his post, who is above party criticism.

In respect to Zhukov, of interest American correspondents report original TASS announcement night of 26th said he was met by “high Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry officials.” However, this fact was omitted from simple, inconspicuous statement of his return published on last or next-to-last page of all principal Moscow newspapers, including military ones. This obvious effort to play down return of Zhukov in marked contrast to Pravda first page announcement today that Aristov and Supreme Soviet Delegation had returned from visit to China and northern Vietnam. (Embassy officer who observed arrival of Aristov delegation yesterday at Vnukovo noted unusual amount of security personnel guarding reception party headed by Mikoyan.)

Also of interest that American correspondents on 27th were permitted to send out stories speculating that Zhukov has been downgraded, although day before censors cut out all references to possibility his replacement as Defense Minister indicated decline in his personal standing.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/10–2857. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. Telegram 844, October 27, contained Thompson’s speculation on the significance of Zhukov’s ouster, with the caveat that there was little information yet available on which to base an interpretation. (Ibid., 761.13/10–2757)
3. All ellipses are in the source text.