Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

55. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956¹

Washington, June 28, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would like to comment first on the reaction outside the Soviet bloc to the publication of Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and the subsequent developments relating thereto. There had been rather dramatic speeches by Togliatti and Nenni in Rome, followed by statements in behalf of the Communist Parties of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others. In addition, Pravda in Moscow has published the statement by Dennis, head of the Communist Party, USA, as reported in the N Y. Daily Worker of June 18, 1956. Mr. Dulles thought it remarkable that the Kremlin leaders should have selected the U.S. Communist Party criticism as the springboard for their first public reaction to the publication of the Khrushchev speech. He predicted that the Pravda statement would presently be followed by other significant statements on this subject from official Kremlin sources. All the above-mentioned reports had contained criticism of the current leadership of the Soviet Union. The chief question posed in all these statements was this: How did such gross inequities creep into the Soviet system of government when all the present Soviet leaders surrounded Stalin at this very time? To illustrate his point Mr. Dulles cited several instances in which this question had been posed, particularly the manner in which it had been posed by the Dennis statement in the Daily Worker. Mr. Dulles emphasized that while these statements were all critical in some degree of the present Soviet leaders, an attempt was generally made in these statements to maintain the link between the local Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as distinct from the current Soviet leadership.

In further elaboration of his general point, Mr. Dulles stated that Nenni was having a “field day” at the expense of the Kremlin. His objective appeared to be to formulate an agreement for the creation of a popular front government in Italy or at least to bring about the so-called “opening to the left”. This objective has alarmed Togliatti.

The basic question which emerges from all this current confusion is the question as to what the Kremlin is actually driving at. Are these developments simply the result of confusion in the Kremlin, or are they the result of a deliberate design? Mr. Dulles said this was a difficult question to answer, but he believed that the men in the Kremlin certainly never intended that Khrushchev’s speech should produce such far-reaching results as it had in fact produced. On the other hand, we must take into account the possibility that the speech was deliberately designed to confer a semblance of respectability and independence on the Communist Parties in countries outside the Soviet bloc, with the ultimate objective of producing popular front governments in these countries. Even if this proves to be the case, Mr. Dulles pointed out the serious implications of any attack on a dictatorship and its leaders. Whatever the ultimate purpose of the Kremlin, what has actually happened may well impair the Soviet leadership in the end.

Mr. Allen Dulles then asked Secretary Dulles whether he perceived any objection to his reading a summary of a cable from Ambassador Bohlen² describing the conduct of Khrushchev at the reception in the Kremlin given to General Twining and the leaders of other Air Force delegations. Secretary Dulles replied that he was only concerned that the fact that this information had come from Ambassador Bohlen be kept within the walls of the room. Accordingly, Mr. Allen proceeded to describe the ineptness, discourtesy, and general misconduct of Khrushchev at this reception, emphasizing in particular the obvious disgust of the other Soviet leaders with Khrushchev’s behavior. This, said Mr. Dulles, at least indicated that the present leaders of the Soviet Union were not very happy, and that they had a lot of serious problems on their hands. It might well be possible for the United States to exploit these problems to its own advantage.

When Mr. Allen Dulles had concluded his observations. Secretary Dulles stated his belief that Khrushchev was the most dangerous person to lead the Soviet Union since the October Revolution. He was not a coldly calculating person, but rather one who reacted emotionally. He was obviously intoxicated much of the time, and could be expected to commit irrational acts. The previous Soviet leaders had been for the most part the chess-playing type. Khrushchev was the first top authority in the USSR who was essentially emotional and perfectly capable of acting without a calculation of the consequences of his action. Stalin always calculated the results of a proposed action. Bad as he was, you at least knew what you were up against in dealing with him. In fact, Stalin’s only serious blunder was the Korean war, and this could readily be forgiven him in view of the fact that the U.S. Administration at the time had given every possible indication that the United States was indifferent to what happened in Korea. All in all, said Secretary Dulles, he would be glad indeed to see Khrushchev go, and there was evidently considerable feeling in the governing circles in the USSR that he ought to be fired. Unhappily there was no easy means to get rid of him. Death or violence were about the only recourse.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that a special meeting of the Supreme Soviet had been called in Moscow for the middle of July. It was possible that something would happen at this meeting along the lines Secretary Dulles had been talking about.

Secretary Dulles said that in addition to the cable from Ambassador Bohlen just summarized by the Director of Central Intelligence, a later cable from the Ambassador had arrived in the State Department.³ It described the reception at the Kremlin given for the Shah of Iran. Notable were reflections by Marshal Zhukov on the behavior of Khrushchev at the previously mentioned reception for the Air Force delegations. Of great interest also was Zhukov’s statement that U.S. estimates of the production of Soviet aircraft and submarines were much too high.

The Vice President inquired as to what line the United States should take with respect to the apparently growing independence of the Communist Parties in countries outside the Soviet bloc. Are we to regard this phenomenon as a calculated effort to confer respectability on these national Communist Parties, or are we to take it as evidence of confusion and weakness in the Soviet leadership and in their control of national Communist Parties? Mr. Allen Dulles replied that it was impossible to give a clear answer to the Vice President’s question as yet. The issue was still the subject of vigorous argument. Nevertheless, one line that we seemed safe in playing up was that there was obvious confusion in the USSR.

Governor Stassen commented that in his opinion there was a good possibility that all these statements critical of the current Soviet leadership were part of a central plan devised by Moscow. If this was indeed the case, the Soviet objective would be to position themselves more effectively for the newly developing phase of economic, political and psychological warfare against the free world. It seemed quite possible to Governor Stassen that Khrushchev sometimes pretended to be drunk and that his indiscretions might well be deliberate. At the same time, Governor Stassen emphasized that the Soviet leaders are unleashing forces that no one, not even these leaders themselves, could be sure would not get out of control. In any event, both possibilities deserved careful study, for the United States must not permit itself to be caught flat-footed, whichever possibility proved to be the fact.

Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there was still about a 50–50 division of opinion among the CIA experts as to which of these two possibilities was correct. Mr. Dulles added that he himself personally inclined to believe that the Soviet leaders were in fact now engaged in making the best of a bad situation.

Secretary Dulles said that he agreed with Mr. Allen Dulles’ opinion. He warned, however, that this did not mean that the Soviet leaders could not ultimately snatch a victory from their current difficulties. Secretary Dulles then paid a warm tribute to the success of the Director of Central Intelligence in obtaining a copy of Khrushchev’s secret speech and having the contents of it published. Secretary Dulles described this as the greatest feat by American Intelligence in a number of years.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that the problem posed by these developments in the Soviet Union could be described as follows: The Kremlin leaders, being generally recognized as evil men, had in past years generally been ostracized by civilized people. Since we agree that these leaders are evil men, should our objective be to try to maintain them in a state of ostracism; or, alternatively, ought we try to induce them to shed their evil ways, even though we realize that in doing so they will gradually cease to be ostracized?

Citing his statements in his press conference yesterday,⁴ Secretary Dulles said that he preferred the course of action of trying to induce the rulers of the Soviet Union to shed their wicked ways.

As for what had happened as a consequence of the Khrushchev speech, Secretary Dulles said he was quite sure that the Soviet leaders had never planned to have events happen as they did. On the other hand, since developments had followed the course that we have seen, the Soviet leaders are now trying to make the best of it. Certainly we do not want to assist them in this endeavor. On the other hand, the United States certainly cannot take the position that developments since the Khrushchev speech are meaningless, that nothing whatsoever has happened in the Kremlin, and that no changes are taking place in the USSR. As a matter of fact, the allies of the United States go much further than we do in accepting the reality of the changes which are occurring in the USSR. The United States will be in real danger of isolation from its allies if it refuses to accept the possibility of some real changes in Soviet practices.

Basic to the whole situation in the USSR, Secretary Dulles insisted that it was impossible to run a dictatorship like the Soviet dictatorship without having recourse to terrorism and iron discipline such as Stalin had consistently employed. Stalin was no mere sadist; he employed terror methods simply because he realized that it was essential to instill terror in order to rule the people of the USSR. Nevertheless, continued Secretary Dulles, the people of a dictatorship will not go on accepting terrorism unless it is accompanied by a series of victories for the government which employs the terror. If you go for a period of five years without a significant victory, as was now the case in the USSR, the people will simply no longer endure to be governed by terrorism. This is a lesson that history teaches about all dictatorships, and history is the best guide as to what is now occurring in the Soviet Union. Hitler illustrated the same phenomenon in his own career.

Secretary Dulles warned that all this did not mean that the United States would not now have to face up to another very grave problem—namely, the problem of preventing the creation of popular fronts, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, in many countries of the world. Happily, even this danger was not at present as great as it had been, for instance, six months ago. The recent disillusioning visit of the French Socialists to Moscow,⁵ and the reaction of the Labour Party leaders to the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to London,⁶ had marked distinct setbacks to the Soviet objective of winning over the Socialists to cooperation with the Communist Parties. There was, after all, a basic cleavage between the Communist and the Socialist Parties, and that cleavage had become increasingly apparent since the contacts of the last six months between Socialist and Communist leaders. Accordingly, the likelihood of a rapprochement between these two parties was now less than it was six months ago, although, of course, the Soviets would keep on trying.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that we were too inclined generally to believe that nothing ever happened with respect to Soviet policy and action except as the infallible result of carefully laid Soviet plans. To ascribe such infallibility to the Kremlin was an error. Indeed, part of what had happened in recent months in the Soviet Union had happened because we ourselves in the U.S. Government had planned it that way.

Governor Stassen then turned to Secretary Dulles and said that his earlier remarks should not be taken as an indication of a belief that no significant changes had occurred in the Soviet Union and that the policies of the Secretary of State and the President had not likewise had a great deal to do with the effecting of these changes. In his earlier remarks, said Governor Stassen, he had only wished to suggest the possibility that the events transpiring in the Soviet Union may be the result of a general policy directive agreed upon in advance by the Kremlin leaders.

Mr. Allen Dulles said he had one last thought to inject into the discussion—namely, that Marshal Tito may have played a role in what had been happening since the Khrushchev speech. He reminded the Council that Togliatti had paid a visit to Tito just before the latter had started on his trip to Moscow. It was quite possible that on this occasion Tito may have urged upon Togliatti a greater and more independent role for the national Communist Parties, both in the satellites and in the free world.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on June 29.
2. Telegram 2915 from Moscow, June 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5861/6–2556)
3. Telegram 2920 from Moscow, June 26. (Ibid., 700.5861/6–2656)
4. A transcript of the Secretary’s news conference on June 27 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1956, pp. 47–53.
5. A 12-member French Socialist Party delegation visited the Soviet Union April 28–May 14.
6. On April 23, a group of British Laborites submitted to Khrushchev and Bulganin an inquiry about Socialists imprisoned in Communist countries.