37. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1
SUBJECT
- OCB Ad Hoc Committee on Anti-STALIN Campaign
The OCB Ad Hoc Committee has drawn up two papers—an intelligence round-up on the anti-STALIN campaign and general US policy paper2—which have been circulated to the OCB Board Assistants. The Committee is now meeting daily and will currently submit brief papers covering (1) latest developments (2) comments thereon (3) agreed courses of action and recommendations.
The first such paper is submitted herewith.
New Developments
Kommunist, Party theoretical journal, has an editorial (text unavailable) criticizing stagnating effects of STALIN’s role on party organs. Red Star, Army organ, has accused STALIN of underestimating Lenin’s military genius. Reports still conflict on whether violence took place in Georgia, but confirm that demonstrations did occur.
The attack on cult of personality apparently produced criticism of Ulbricht, but he appears to have weathered the storm. Party leadership elsewhere in the orbit does not seem to be affected.
In Yugoslavia, the text of the Borba article of March 20 has just been received and appears to be the most complete, and probably authoritative statement, of Soviet charges against STALIN. (Tab A).3
General Comments
While the Pravda March 28 editorial significantly did not mention Khrushchev’s speech, it apparently sought to curb extreme interpretations of that speech. By dividing the STALIN era into good and bad periods it tried to create as smooth a possible transition to [Page 86] the new approach and to placate those communists both within and outside Russia who may have been shocked by Khrushchev’s harsh denunciation.
The Borba editorial fails to credit STALIN with any “good period”. It refers to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan as the leaders of the Soviet communist party, perhaps indicating they are the ones the Yugoslavs primarily look to as against other leaders who may hold different views.
There has been a different tempo of acceptance of the new line by the communist parties outside of Russia. This has occurred faster in the parties in Poland and East Germany.
Agreed Courses of Action
For the time being US overt propaganda should continue to be pitched on a minor key. The anti-STALIN campaign is following its own course, very much to our advantage. If the communists could show that the US was gloating over their present embarrassment, they might be able to close ranks and also discredit the US with some Socialist elements who would dislike a sensational “capitalist” victory.
While continuing to promote the destruction of communist credibility, as provided in general guidance, US media should endeavor to delay as long as possible the closing of the gap between the new communist line and the old.
US media can point out the inconsistency between the Pravda and Borba editorials, emphasizing the former did not tell the whole story.
Doubt and criticism can also be stimulated by asking hypothetical questions of a kind probably in the minds of many communists.
Opportunities for creating confusion within foreign communist parties, and particularly in France and Italy, should be exploited by indirect means, as is now being done, rather than by direct US intervention, which would be counter-productive.
[Page 87]Guidance has been furnished to USIA on the Secretary’s press statement of April 3 (Tab B).4
- Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, STALIN I. Secret. Copies were sent to Sohm, Comstock, and Stoessel for William Jackson. Attached to the source text was a brief note from Beam to Murphy, also dated April 3, in which Beam wrote that this memorandum was the result of two meetings of the committee and explained that the “budget is rather meager since we only include recommendations which have been agreed upon between all of us.”↩
- One of these references is presumably to Document 35, since there is a previous draft of this paper dated March 27 and headed “Intelligence Paper prepared for OCB Working Group,” Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Soviet and Related Problems. The general U.S. policy paper referred to has not been further identified.↩
- Not printed.↩
-
See footnote 2, supra.
According to the preliminary notes prepared by Richards on the OCB meeting of April 4, the following occurred:
“The work of the working group on the Anti-STALIN campaign was discussed at some length. It was generally agreed that the working group was serving a useful purpose and it was agreed to accept the following recommendations as to the handling of the reports:
- “‘(1) That the OCB Working Group continue to meet to appraise new developments and to advise the policy officers of State;
- “‘(2) That the Chairman of the Working Group (Mr. Beam) be charged with the responsibility of seeing that working group papers are brought to the attention of top policy officers in the Department; and,
- “‘(3) That after the Working Group paper has been acted upon at the policy level in State, appropriate guidance immediately be sent through normal channels to USIA.’” (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, OCB Preliminary Notes)