Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

368. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, October 23, 1957—2 p.m.

1192. At 4 p.m. October 22 I saw Prime Minister Menderes for purpose exchange views on Syrian situation called for by Deptel 1285.² Minister State Zorlu and Foreign Office Secretary General Esenbel were present as was General Mead.³ Menderes and Zorlu were worn down from hectic campaigning for election October 27. Menderes had spoken for 2 hours in Ankara speech just before conversation with Mead and me. Day before he spoke for 2 and ½ hours in Istanbul. His voice was affected. I have never seen Zorlu so tired. Nevertheless the 3 gave careful attention to what Mead and I had to say. Menderes states he was not up to date and was glad learn recent developments from me.

I set forth my presentation along lines laid down Deptel 1285. From time to time Menderes would interrupt me for short discussions of points. When I finished I summarized my understanding of what the 3 (Esenbel, Zorlu, Menderes) had said. They indicated their approval. Here are the principal points I mentioned in my summary:

1. GOT wants an exchange of views as requested by Washington.

2. Turks consider that the danger is greater than ever in Syria and must be even more closely watched.

3. GOT will not make any move without closest consultation with Washington.

4. GOT particularly wants closest consultation with Washington with respect tactics of handling Syro-Sov charges in UN.

Comments: Turks did not go into motives of Syro-Sov charges but our conversation made it entirely clear Turks consider Syria as acting under Soviet guidance. Russia’s age-old desire to reach warm water is sufficient motivation in Turkish minds for any USSR anti-Turk move.⁴

The conversation also made abundantly clear to me that Turks realize that Syrian situation is so great concern other Arab States. Menderes and Zorlu showed themselves fully aware of ticklish situation now facing Turks. I believe we can be assured that in light of recent developments Turks are not going to take any action which enemies to Turkey could use support Syria-Sov charges in UN.

Prime Minister showed GOT’s interest in Arab feeling by stressing satisfaction which his Government has in getting in close touch with King Saud. He intimated that both President Bayar and he might if invited go separately to see Saud after next Sunday’s election. Zorlu should be there October 23. Turkey will try take advantage Saud’s offer mediation and to use that off in UN debate on Syrian charges.

Have no doubt GOT intends stay in closest touch with USA not only on UN debate and tactics but also on ME situation generally. Menderes said he would be giving full personal attention these matters after elections.

Warren

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–2357. Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. Major General Armistead D. Mead was designated as an officer for consultation with the Turkish Government regarding matters of military assistance.

4. In telegram 788, October 19, Ambassador Thompson reported from Moscow that the Soviets were “genuinely concerned” about preventing the overthrow of the Syrian Government. The Ambassador expressed doubt that Soviet interests in Syria were in themselves of “sufficient importance” to warrant the risks involved in recent Soviet actions. Thompson noted that among Soviet objectives in the Middle East were the desire for expansion toward the Persian Gulf and a desire to break the “chain of US alliances” around the Soviet Union. The Ambassador added:

   “The key to both these objectives would appear to be Turkey, which has received considerable Soviet attention in recent months. In addition to the blatant carrot and stick approach to Turkey it seems likely that recent Rumanian proposal for a Balkan Pact may have had as its primary objective the political isolation of Turkey. I suspect Soviets have hoped that their blustering attitude would cause US to waver in support of Turkey with consequent softening up of Turkey for direct Soviet approach to the country. While their actions could be explained as preparation for an attack on Turkey I consider this most unlikely.” (Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/ 10–1957)