358. Memorandum of Discussion at the 328th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington June 26, 19571
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3.]
4. US Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5510/1; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1486, 1560, 1624, and 1682; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain US Aid Programs”, dated December 5, 1956; NSC 5708; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “US Policy Toward Turkey”, dated March 11 and May 24, 1957; NSC 5708/12)
Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of NSC 5708/1 (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting), and [Page 718] called special attention to the only paragraph in dispute—paragraph 28, reading as follows:
“28. During FY 1957 and FY 1958, continue to support Turkish force levels of 20 8/3 divisions, 64 combatant ships, and 21 air force squadrons. The total military aid program for Turkey for the period FY 1957–60 should provide for such advanced weapons as the Honest John, the Nike, and the F–100, for appropriate conventional equipment, and for recurring maintenance costs. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements. [In such review, consideration should also be given to the role of Turkish forces under the Baghdad Pact.]3
He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the third and fourth sentences of the paragraph, on the ground that these sentences had been put into the policy paper to satisfy a requirement (NSC Action No. 1682) to query General Norstad as to the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey in phase with availability of advanced weapons to the Turkish armed forces. Mr. Cutler pointed out that General Norstad had been queried by the Joint Chiefs, and had reported to them his view that it was neither practicable nor desirable at this time, from the military, political or psychological point of view, to initiate a proposal for reducing NATO-approved Turkish force levels. Nevertheless, Mr. Cutler expressed the opinion that it would be sensible to leave in paragraph 28 a portion of the third sentence, reading “in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements.” He then asked Admiral Radford to comment on this suggestion.
Admiral Radford pointed out that he had not been present at the previous Council discussion of the Turkish policy paper, but that Mr. Cutler’s suggestion was all right with him. Secretary Wilson shared this view, and pointed out that he did not agree with the advice that General Norstad had given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford said that it would be very difficult at the present time to initiate any reduction in the NATO-approved Turkish force levels, but he had no objection to leaving in paragraph 28 the phraseology suggested by Mr. Cutler. Secretary Wilson expressed great anxiety about the expenses which were being incurred in Turkey and in similar areas by the Department of Defense.
[Page 719]Admiral Radford then expressed great doubt as to whether it was necessary to include the detailed description of the advanced weapons which, according to the text of paragraph 28, we would be supplying to the Turks. It seemed questionable to Admiral Radford whether NSC papers should go into such detailed specifications. It was accordingly agreed to remove from paragraph 28 the specific reference to modern weapons, and to substitute general language therefor.
Secretary Wilson expressed agreement with Admiral Radford’s position, and the President, looking around at the members of the Council, predicted that some day they would all come to believe him when he said that NSC policy reports acted upon by the National Security Council should not be transmitted in their verbatim form to the subordinates of the members of the Council or to our diplomatic establishments abroad.
After further discussion by Secretary Wilson and other members of the Council, Mr. Cutler suggested that paragraph 28, including the portions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete, should remain in the policy paper. The President agreed to this suggestion, and made inquiry as to the size and character of over-all US assistance to Turkey. He said he wished the relevant facts in the case in order to write a personal letter to General Norstad. In the ensuing discussion, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford pointed out with emphasis that despite the costs, our assistance to Turkey was certainly one of the better bargains for our money. The President said he did not doubt this, but that Turkey, a poor country, could get along better with a smaller and more efficient force. Mr. Cutler requested Admiral Radford to supply him with the facts requested by the President for his use in writing to General Norstad.
It was agreed to delete the final sentence of paragraph 28, as proposed by the Bureau of the Budget.
The National Security Council:4
- a.
- Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5708/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1682–b; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including their comments on General Norstad’s recommendations regarding a possible reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 24, 1957.
- b.
- Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5708/1, subject to the revision of paragraph 28
to read as follows:
“28. During FY 1958, continue to support Turkish force levels of 20 8/3 divisions, 64 combatant ships, and 21 air force squadrons. The total military aid program for Turkey for the period FY 1957–60 should provide for appropriate advanced weapons, for appropriate conventional equipment, and for recurring maintenance costs. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements.”
Note: NSC 5708/1, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5708/2 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the US Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.
[Here follows item 5.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 27.↩
- For text of NSC Action No. 1682, see footnote 4, Document 353. The memorandum of May 24 transmitted the views of the JCS on NSC 5701. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5708 Memoranda) NSC 5708/1 is identical to NSC 5708/2 (Document 359), except for paragraph 28, which is discussed above. The remaining actions and documents are identified in footnote 2, Document 353.↩
- Brackets in the source text. A footnote following the brackets on the source text reads: “Budget proposes deletion.”↩
- Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1741. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)↩