Office of the Historian

348. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 10, 1956, 11:45 a.m.1

Washington, November 10, 1956, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Defense of Turkey
[Page 693]

PARTICIPANTS

  • Defense:
    • Admiral Radford
    • Lt. Gen. Fox
    • Captain Wagner
    • Colonel Twitchell
  • State:
    • Mr. Murphy, G
    • Mr. Elbrick, EUR
    • Mr. Berry, NEA
    • Mr. Wolf, RA
    • Mr. Bennett, G

Following a consideration of problems involved in U.S. support for the UN Middle East operation,2 the subject of Turkish defense was discussed. Admiral Radford expressed his serious concern over the airdefense of Turkey, particularly in view of recent reports of Soviet overflights.3 He admitted that he had no confirmed information regarding overflights but said that he is convinced that the Soviets are now operating into Syria, either across Turkey or Iran. He said that, in view of the seriousness of the situation, there is great need for the U.S. to find out what is actually going on there. Turkish radar equipment is entirely inadequate, and there is now no capability in the area to intercept the type of Soviet aircraft which would be involved in an overflight. As emphasized in a previous conversation, the Admiral and the JCS would like to make arrangements to put U.S. Air Force interceptors into the Adana Base.

Mr. Murphy replied that it really comes down to a question of judgment as to whether we should approach the Turks at this time on the question of undertaking additional USAF operations in Turkey. After taking all the factors into consideration, the Department does not believe that such action would be desirable at the present time. It is a question of judgment, and the Department’s judgment is against doing it now.

Admiral Radford went on to point out that the Turks themselves have handed over to NATO responsibility for the air defense of Turkey. Under existing arrangements the Turkish general staff theoretically could not send Turkish planes up to intercept hostile aircraft; orders would have to come from the NATO commander in the area, who happens to be an American. Mr. Wolf expressed the [Page 694] belief that the NATO Council would be greatly concerned over the prospect of NATO assuming responsibility for the territorial defense of individual member states to the exclusion of national responsibility and authority. Admiral Radford responded that without such a NATO system we could not expect to have effective air defense in Turkey or in a number of other places.

Mr. Murphy said that he found it hard to understand why other members of NATO, such as Norway, Belgium or Portugal, would object to NATO taking over the command function if, as in the present case with Turkey, a NATO member had requested the organization to do it. Mr. Wolf pointed out that the concern on the part of other nations is based on their fear of triggering action which might be based on some local situation rather than on a NATO-wide issue. He suggested that the best way to handle the matter, if we believe it necessary to put extra equipment into Turkey, would be to have SACEUR come forward with a requirements study and then make arrangements with Turkey on the basis of that study.

Admiral Radford reiterated that the Turks have shown themselves entirely inadequate in radar operations. They have some F–84 aircraft which are not suitable for intercepting late-model Soviet equipment. Radar with higher and wider coverage, as well as up-to-date interceptor aircraft, is needed if there is to be an adequate defense for Turkey and other areas in the Middle East. Mr. Gray called attention to the fact that Secretary Wilson wants a Presidential decision on the matter of the introduction of additional equipment into Turkey, irrespective of State and Defense positions on the problem.

In a discussion of Turkish concern over reported overflights it was agreed that State and Defense do not accept the Turkish point of view that overflights in themselves call into play Article 5 of NATO.4 Mr. Murphy, with the concurrence of Admiral Radford, asserted that overflights of the U.S. would not in themselves be considered to constitute a casus belli. We would handle the matter on the basis of a violation of our air space.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/11–1056. Secret. Drafted by Bennett.↩
  2. Reference is to the creation of a U.N. Emergency Force and its role in the Suez Canal crisis.↩
  3. In telegram 1055, November 8, Warren informed the Department that Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes had called him to the Foreign Office that morning to convey information that, according to General Gruenther and the Turkish military attaché in Washington, there had been reports of Russian overflights of Turkish territory. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5461/11–856) On November 9, the Department informed the Embassy in Ankara that U.S. intelligence sources had no information to verify reports of Soviet overflights. A possible explanation for the reports, the Department continued, was the possibility that MIG–15’s have been seen in Syria “leading to presumption that they came via Turkey.” (Telegram 1058 from Ankara, November 9; ibid., 782.546/11–856)↩
  4. Article 5 deals with the subject of armed attack against any or all of the NATO member states and the reaction of the NATO members. The article stipulated, among other things, that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”↩