NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 238th Council meeting on February
24, 1955,2 adopted the statement
of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5510, subject to the amendments thereto which are set
forth in NSC Action No. 1338–b.3
The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes
NSC 36/2 and NSC 109.4
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON TURKEY
General Considerations
1. Turkey is of particular political and strategic importance to the
United States because:
- a.
- It has a world outlook closely corresponding to that of
the US and is thus a natural ally.
- b.
- It is the most stable and anti-Soviet country in the
Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern area, thus making
possible multiple security agreements of great value.
- c.
- It is located astride the water passage from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean. It also commands the most direct land
route from the USSR to the Suez. Turkey borders the Soviet
Union and Bulgaria, and lies within striking distance of
important targets within [Page 621] Communist borders. It has granted the
US important military facility rights.
- d.
- Its armed forces are strong, patriotic, well-disciplined,
and determined to resist infringement of Turkish rights or
territory.
2. Turkey is a target for Soviet ambitions. In 1945 the USSR
presented claims to two eastern provinces of Turkey (Kars and
Ardahan) and in 1946 proposed a new regime for the Straits to be
established only by Turkey and other Black Sea powers, with joint
defense of the waterways by Turkey and the USSR. Turkey consistently
and firmly rejected these claims. Although Soviet aggressive demands
have recently been toned down, there is no reason to suppose that
Soviet objectives have changed. However, a direct attack upon Turkey
by armed forces of the USSR, or its satellite Bulgaria, is unlikely
unless the USSR is prepared to risk general war.
3. Turkey is consistently endeavoring to broaden and strengthen its
ties with Western Europe and the United States, and has made great
progress. It has taken a firm stand in the UN against Soviet acts of aggression and obstruction
and is participating in other international organizations (NATO, Council of Europe, OEEC, EPU) in cooperation with the US and Western European
countries. Turkey is extremely sensitive to its national security
problem and alert to the need for collective defense. In 1939
Turkey, the U.K., and France signed a Treaty of Mutual
Assistance6 which, at Turkish
insistence, was recently reaffirmed by the U.K. and France. Turkey,
with US support, pushed its candidacy for membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which it entered on February 18,
1952.
4. On February 28, 1953, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia concluded a
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, confirming the close economic
and diplomatic collaboration which had been developing between the
three countries and providing for contingent military planning.7 On August 9, 1954, after consultation by the Turks
and Greeks with the North Atlantic Council, this agreement was
supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance8 which provides that aggression against one would be
considered aggression against all, and that in such an event the
Governments would take the measures they deemed necessary, including
the use of armed force, to counter aggression. Although Yugoslavia
is committed only in the event of an attack on Turkey or Greece, it
has committed itself to consult [Page 622] with Turkey and Greece in case of an attack on
another NATO country. Despite the
lack of a formal link of Yugoslavia with the NATO system, for all practical
purposes a good defensive system for the Southeastern European area
is being added to the NATO defense
system. There has been some discussion of Italy’s eventual
participation in the Turkish-Greek-Yugoslav Alliance. The basis has
therefore been laid from which a continuous Western defense system
from Northern Europe to Asia Minor might ultimately develop.
5. On April 2, 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement
providing for continuing consultation on mutual security
problems.9 This agreement, overtly originating in the region
but given impetus by US encouragement, provides for accession by
other states in the area. It may, therefore, eventually serve
substantially the same purposes as were envisaged in the still-born
Middle East Defense Organization sponsored by the UK, France, and
the US and strongly supported by Turkey.10 In that event, Turkey will become of
even more importance as a link between formal collective security
arrangements of the Western world and the Middle East. Turkey has in
fact been playing a leading role in seeking Middle East defense
arrangements, particularly expansion of the agreement with Pakistan.
A recent step looking toward the development of a northern tier was
a statement by Turkey and Iraq on January 13 [12], 1955, of their intention to negotiate a security
alliance.11
6. Turkey is undergoing one of the most successful social, political
and intellectual revolutions of modern times. Turkey desires to
become a fully modern state based on western cultural ideas and has
been developing democratic forms of government and institutions.
From an inefficient, tyrannical and theocratic state, it has reached
a point where, in some respects, it can well serve as an example of
peaceful evolution for other underdeveloped areas.
7. From FY 1947 through FY 1954 the US expended $704.3 million
in military aid to Turkey; from April 1, 1948 through FY 1954 the US expended $262 million in
economic and technical assistance to Turkey. With this aid Turkey
has undertaken major programs to modernize its military
establishment and to develop its economy. Expenditure estimates for
the FY 1955 aid program total about
$348 million ($258 million military aid; $90.3 million economic and
technical assistance).
[Page 623]
8. Although the Turkish armed forces have made great progress,
present plans for building up Turkey’s armed forces in accordance
with US interests will require continued substantial US assistance
over a period of years. During FYs
1950–54 the US allocated one billion dollars for expenditure in
those and following years on a program to build up the Turkish Army,
Navy and Air Force. In June 1954 the Prime Minister of Turkey
submitted a proposal to the Director of FOA for the partial conversion of the Turkish Army by
1958 to modified US Tables of Organization and Equipment along lines
desired by NATO planners and the
Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. The cost of this partial
conversion, estimated by the Joint Military Mission for Aid to
Turkey at approximately $800 million, would be additional to the
billion dollar program referred to above. By an aide-mémoire dated
June 4, 1954,12
the US Government indicated to the Prime Minister that the US was
prepared, subject to certain caveats, for FY 1955 to “increase the presently approved military
assistance program by an amount to meet one-fourth of the unfunded
US screened requirements of the Turkish armed forces to achieve
NATO goals,” but there has been
no common agreement between the countries as to the amount and rate
of this increase. Nevertheless, the Turks consider that the US
Government has made a firm commitment and, based chiefly upon the
US-Turkish conversations, have in mind as implicit in the commitment
the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey $800 million four-year
program. While the qualitative improvement of the Turkish Army along
these lines would seem to be desirable from a strictly military
point of view, implementation of such a program is open to question
at the moment because of the lack of available US funds when global
military assistance commitments are taken into account, and because
of the impact of such a program on Turkish economy and the
questionable ability of the Turkish armed forces to convert to
greater mechanization so rapidly.
9. Based on current estimates, the maximum new
money which can be made available for the Fiscal Years 1955 and 1956
would be something less than $300 million, and may be substantially
lower, as compared with the over $600 million which would be
required if the material called for by the $800 million augmentation
plan were to be delivered by the end of FY 1958. The Department of Defense estimates that the
funds required for the Turkish augmentation program can be found
only at the expense of other military or economic assistance
programs under already-approved policies, or by supplemental
appropriations.
[Page 624]
10. If, however, the proposed augmented program were completed
(assuming the US provides the necessary military maintenance dollar
costs, which are estimated at $80–100 million per year), the
continuing annual cost of maintaining Turkey’s converted forces
($610 million)13 would be, commencing
about CY 1959, about double the total
Turkish defense budget of CY 1953
($366 million).13
Expenditures of this magnitude by Turkey from her own resources
beginning in CY 1959 are unlikely.
Consequently, there would be required a considerably higher level of
US economic assistance than the $70 million currently programmed. It
is estimated that total US aid, military and economic, might run as
high as $200 million per year. In connection with the ability of the
Turkish armed forces rapidly to absorb an augmented program, there
are indications that the Turks will have increasing difficulty in
maintaining equipment because of inadequate numbers of trained
technical personnel and insufficient warehousing and maintenance
facilities, as well as the general low level of experience in
logistics management. Correction of these deficiencies will require
considerable effort.
11. The Turks have attempted to carry out an economic revolution
comparable to their social and political revolution, but their
eagerness to modernize the country, combined with their unhesitating
acceptance of military force goals suggested for them by NATO and the United States, has
brought serious economic difficulties. In the early post-war years
considerable economic progress was made and productivity increased
substantially, in large part as a result of US aid and a succession
of good crop years. However, Turkey has increasingly lived beyond
its means; with the result that in the last two years foreign
exchange resources have been exhausted, a burdensome external debt
has been accumulated, and inflation has developed internally.
Imports have been stimulated by foreign firms seeking markets, by
importers’ hopes for quick profits spurred by the rising price
level, and under the assumption that there would be a continuing US
support of the Turkish economy. By and large, exports are no longer
competitive in world markets, domestic private capital can no longer
be successfully channeled into the most productive uses, and foreign
investors are now unwilling to risk much long-term capital in
Turkey, even though the Government has passed legislation highly
favorable to private enterprise and foreign capital. In the last six
months Turkey’s situation has been aggravated still further by a
serious crop failure which has compelled Turkey, recently an
exporter of wheat, to import cereals. At the same time, [Page 625] European suppliers are
becoming less anxious to extend further commercial credits. Thus,
the time appears to be approaching when Turkish imports may decline
as suppliers cease to ship until paid in cash.
12. The restoration of economic stability in Turkey and the
maintenance of a sound economic development program will require
either curtailment of the total rate of investment or the level of
military expenditures, or both, unless the gap is met by additional
aid from abroad.14 Most, if not all, of the
adjustment needed to restore stability at the present level of US
military and economic aid and the present level of Turkish defense
spending could be obtained through fiscal and financial measures
which would reduce investment and curtail credit but still allow a
reasonable rate of economic progress. The problem is that the
Turkish Government, while it has made some gestures in the direction
of controlling inflationary pressures, has been reluctant to
recognize the seriousness of the situation and to accept reasonable
limitations on the rate of economic development. The Turkish
Government has already turned to the United States in an attempt to
obtain additional aid, and Turkish officials have taken the position
that the US is committed to extend Turkey a $300 million loan. The
US has made no such commitment. In this situation we must expect
continued difficulty in persuading the Turkish Government to take
the necessary actions. In view of Turkey’s special position as a
staunch ally which has consistently withstood Soviet threats, the US
must consider carefully the effect of pressures and actions that
would offend Turkish pride and adversely affect this basic
US-Turkish relationship.
Objectives
13. a. Continuance of Turkey’s independence, territorial integrity,
identification with the free world, and will and ability to resist
Communist invasion or subversion.
b. Turkish armed forces capable of repelling attack by a Soviet
satellite or of providing maximum practical resistance to direct
Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense.
c. Access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources
and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further
strengthening of the free world.
d. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and in strengthening free world regional security
arrangements in the Balkans and [Page 626] furthering the development of such
arrangements in the Middle and Near East.
e. Improved relations between Turkey and the Arab States.
f. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which, with maximum
Turkish efforts, can support an increasingly greater share of its
defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at
realistic levels.
Courses of Action
14. Encourage such continued development of democratic ideas and
institutions in Turkey as would help to insure Turkey’s
identification of interest with the western European and other free
nations of the world.
15. Cooperate with Turkey as a full and equal member of the western
European alliance of free peoples.
16. Encourage Turkey to participate in appropriate regional security
agreements, so as to bring selected neighboring states into regional
defense pacts aimed at resisting communist penetration of the area.
Such agreements should provide for (a) integrated Southeastern
European defense, (b) extension of security planning to include not
only Pakistan, but also other selected states to the south and east
of Turkey whose participation would be important to the defense of
the Middle East and South Asia.
17. Continue a program of substantial military aid to Turkey which,
when coupled with maximum Turkish effort, will serve the following
military objectives:
- a.
- To implement existing military facilities agreements and
assure the availability of Turkish facilities to the US and
its allies in case of hostilities.
- b.
- In accordance with NATO-approved goals as accepted by the US, to
achieve and maintain Turkish forces in a state of combat
readiness, in order to be able to repel an attack by a
Soviet satellite or to provide maximum practical resistance
to direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied
defense.
18. Reassess, in connection with the semi-annual reviews of military
assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1:
- a.
- Financial and force level implications for Turkey arising
from its growing network of security arrangements.
- b.
- The resulting effect on US support for Turkey.
19. Expedite, in so far as practicable, deliveries under the FY 1950–1954 military assistance program
in accordance with the US commitment to Turkey.
[Page 627]
20. With respect to the commitment made by the US to Turkey for
FY 1955:15
- a.
- Determine by April 1, 1955, as part of the review of
military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, the nature of such
commitment and action with respect thereto in the common
interests of both countries, taking into consideration:
- (1)
- The amount of mutual security funds and equipment
that can be made available without seriously
affecting other country programs.
- (2)
- The extent of the ability of the Turkish armed
forces to absorb the increased military
assistance.
- (3)
- The necessity for not seriously harming the
Turkish economy.
- b.
- Further action on such four-year program should be subject
to a reassessment based on the combined US–UK–Turkey
military staff talks and on the USRO (Holcombe) study now in preparation.16
21. As an exception pursuant to NSC
5501, para. 55–b, be prepared to purchase from Turkey chrome for
long-term strategic stockpile as part of a program to assist Turkey
to meet its minimum essential civilian and military
requirements.
22. a. In dealing with the impending economic crisis, rely primarily
upon Turkey’s taking the necessary fiscal and financial measures,
and in particular to limit the rate of its economic development to
that consistent with a viable economy.
b. Pending the completion of the studies now underway, continue to
provide economic and technical assistance at approximately existing
levels, but do not agree under present circumstances to extend a
long-term loan to Turkey.
c. Upon determination of the extent of US military assistance
pursuant to para. 20 above and upon adoption by Turkey of the
necessary fiscal and financial measures (subpara, a above), provide
economic assistance based on the amount required to permit Turkey to
fulfill its military program as approved by the US, while still
allowing Turkey to carry out a reasonable economic development
program.
23. Continue to encourage Turkey to improve the climate for
investment in Turkey of both foreign and domestic private
capital.
[Page 628]
24. Extend appropriate encouragement to Turkey in its efforts to
exert such influence in the Arab world as might eventually have a
stabilizing influence on the Arab States.
[Here follow Annex A, a copy of the Aide-Mémoire of June 4, 1954; a
Financial Appendix; and a Staff Study comprising two parts: Part I,
“The Strategic Importance of Turkey,” and Part II, “Economic
Problems and Prospects.”]
