Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

299. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) and the Ambassador to Greece (Cannon) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, August 21, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Greece: Extraterritoriality

Background

You will recall at our last meeting on this subject that we agreed to send a suggested draft to Embassy Athens. This was done on July 25, 1956 (Deptel 303—Tab A²). On August 1 the Chargé (Ray Thurston) replied (Embtel 393—Tab B³) that after an exploratory talk with the Foreign Minister he was convinced that the Greek Government would not agree to the suggested draft since it was very similar to one which had been previously rejected. Thurston then submitted a draft of his own which met some of Defense’s earlier objections and which he thought the Greek Foreign Minister might accept.

A telegram of August 6 from the Embassy (No. 455—Tab C⁴) and a letter of August 7 from Ray Thurston to Ambassador Cannon (Tab D⁵) indicate that the Karamanlis Government is under heavier and heavier pressure on this question. It is Ambassador Cannon’s considered view that if agreement is reached soon, we can count on Greek good will in the interpretation of the agreement, but that each week’s delay means an abatement of that good will since the Government is under heavy pressure from public opinion which will continue to move steadily against us so long as the question remains unsettled.

The question has now been an open source of US-Greek friction for two and a half years and it has been under negotiation for seven months. It is our judgment that the Department should now take the position that for the good of US-Greek relations it should not be allowed to drag on any longer. In reaching this conclusion it is recognized, as was pointed out at some length in Deptel 303 (Tab A), that amendment of the existing agreement along the lines desired by the Greek Government could possibly have an unfavorable effect on our current SOF negotiations with Germany, where we are endeavoring to reach a waiver agreement based on the Netherlands formula. Our Embassy in Athens points out (Tab B) that the Greek Government could hardly be expected to be persuaded by our problem in Germany to take political risks of its own in trying to sell an unpopular agreement to the Greek public.

Negotiations have reached the point where over-insistence on exact wording may cause serious Greek resentment and cause the Greek Government to interpret any agreement so narrowly as to be contrary to our interests.

Mr. Allen Dulles shares our view that it is in the interests of our relations with Greece to reach agreement rapidly and ranking officers of the Agency have discussed the matter with Mr. Gray.

We should like to propose that we seek firm and prompt agreement with Defense to instruct Embassy Athens along the following lines:

Recommendation

The Embassy would be empowered to make three proposals to the Greek Government, each proposal to be put forward without any reference to the following proposal:

1. The Thurston draft (Embtel 393—Tab B) as amended by Defense with the approval of State. Although Thurston’s last telegram has been in for three weeks and we have requested Defense’s comments, there have so far been none. However it can be assumed that they will want to propose some changes in the Thurston draft.

2. If the Thurston draft as amended by Defense proves completely unacceptable to the Greek Government, the Embassy would then propose Thurston’s draft without amendment.

3. Finally, if neither of these proposals is acceptable, the Embassy would propose that the privileges and immunities of our forces in Greece be governed by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement already in force. In present circumstances it is believed that the Greek Government would be willing to interpret this agreement in a way which would be at least as favorable to our interests as would be the case if it were possible to reach agreement on the proposals now under consideration. These proposals constitute agreements supplementary to the existing NATO SOF, but if narrowly interpreted would probably give less protection than NATO SOF alone interpreted in a friendly manner.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/8–2156. Secret. Drafted by Wood.
2. Telegram 303 to Athens, July 25, not printed. (Ibid.,711.56381/7–1156)
3. Telegram 393 from Athens, August 1, not printed. (Ibid.,711.56381/8–156)
4. Telegram 455 from Athens, August 6, not printed. (Ibid.,747C.00/8–656)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., NEA/GTI Files: Lot 59 D 36, Extraterritoriality 1956)