Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

292. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Gray)¹

Washington, November 25, 1955.

Dear Mr. Gray: Your letter of September 29, 1955² addressed to the Secretary on the subject of modification of United States base arrangements in Greece has received careful consideration in the Department of State, and it is hoped that it will be possible to send a mutually acceptable instruction to our Embassy at Athens with a minimum of delay. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hoover feel that every effort should be made to reach promptly a mutually satisfactory agreement along the lines which follow.

There is no doubt that we should seek to retain the maximum measure of United States jurisdiction in criminal cases involving members of the United States forces in Greece which is concomitant with our over-all interests. It is also agreed that the provision regarding the status of our forces under the present Military Facilities Agreement with Greece is causing serious difficulties to the friendly Greek Government and should be renegotiated. The basic remaining question to be determined is the maximum amount of criminal jurisdiction that can be retained. What is this maximum? Present agreements between the United States and Greece can be abrogated by Greece. The question of “extraterritoriality” for United States forces has become a major cause of difficulty in our relations with Greece at a time when these relations have already been strained over the Cyprus question.³ It is not only exploited by the communist press, but is a sore point with people of every political hue. The present friendly Karamanlis government is in effect a “caretaker” government which has announced elections for the early spring. It is anxious to subdue the anti-American emotions in Greece, and to begin rebuilding Greek-Turkish relations. It deserves our full support. In negotiating changes in our Base Agreement, the Karamanlis government must accomplish tangible results or seriously jeopardize its popular support. On November 9 the Embassy reported that the Greek Government had made it clear that it desired to start negotiations very soon (Embassy telegram 1211⁴). Karamanlis has also indicated that if prompt agreement on a revision were not reached, he might have to make a public declaration and perhaps introduce a bill into the Greek Parliament.

In order to determine, then, what is the maximum measure of criminal jurisdiction that may be retained, it is our conviction that our Embassy at Athens should be instructed to carry on its negotiations on the following basis. First, the Embassy would seek agreement along the lines you propose: the elimination of all reference to “extraterritorial” rights, the application of NATO Status of Forces Agreement arrangements for matters arising under civil jurisdiction (i.e. return of civil jurisdiction to Greece) and the retention of United States jurisdiction in criminal cases which under the NATO formula would fall under Greek jurisdiction. It would be further agreed that if the Greek authorities so requested, and if the United States authorities agreed, a criminal case could be tried in a Greek court. Our Embassy in Athens would be instructed to seek agreement on this basis through firm and vigorous negotiation.

However, if after every proper effort had been made, agreement with the Greek Government could not be reached, the Embassy would then seek permission to start the second phase of the negotiations. In this phase the Embassy would offer to put criminal jurisdiction on the same general basis as our agreements with other NATO countries, i.e. Greece would retain primary criminal jurisdiction, but would waive such jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance.

We believe that this method of negotiation would be the best and most practical way of determining the maximum amount of jurisdiction which the United States can retain in criminal cases.

The proposed instruction which has been prepared in the Department of State does not place members of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Greece on the same status as members of the Embassy staff. This is chiefly due to the relatively large size of the Advisory Group as compared to the Embassy. As of October 1, 1955 there were a total of 174 Americans on the Embassy staff compared to 261 officers and enlisted men on the staff of the Advisory Group, of whom 154 were enlisted men. There would be no objection to placing all the members of the Advisory Group on the same status as the Embassy when the number of officers and enlisted men has been considerably reduced. This is provided for in the proposed instruction. This is done in other countries where the Advisory Groups are relatively small. For the present the principal officers of the Advisory Group should be given diplomatic status, and the remaining personnel should be on the same status as other military personnel in Greece.

We are anxious to remove this source of irritation between the United States and Greece, on which our Embassy has urged renegotiation for over sixteen months, as rapidly as possible. We therefore hope that agreement can promptly be reached between appropriate officers of the Department of Defense and the Department of State to send instructions based on the method outlined above. We also believe that the two Departments must reach an understanding in advance of sending out the instructions to the effect that if agreement with the Greek Government can not be reached, the two Departments will promptly authorize Embassy Athens to proceed with the second set of proposals. I believe that an effort to maintain the first position as the only basis for negotiation might well cause the Greek Government to insist on strict adherence to the Status of Forces Agreement of NATO SOF. In view of the approaching Greek elections, instructions along the above lines should, if possible, be sent forward to Athens within the next week.

I recommend that the two Departments should promptly reach agreement on the basis outlined above.

Sincerely yours,

Robert D. Murphy

⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/9–2955. Secret. Drafted on November 14 by Ben Dixon, Acting Political-Military Adviser to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and by Chalmers Wood.
2. See footnote 3, Document 282.
3. On November 23, in a memorandum to Murphy requesting approval of the letter to Gray, George Allen presented the Department’s position on the question of extraterritoriality and the renegotiation of the US-Greek Military Facilities Agreement, signed in Athens on October 13, 1953. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/ 11–2355) For text of the agreement, see 4 UST (pt. 2) 2868.
4. Document 290.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.