207. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
Dear Cabot : As you know, the problem of Cyprus has been under intensive discussion in diplomatic channels, and I thought it would be useful to review briefly what has been happening before the Assembly convenes.
If present plans materialize, Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece should arrive in New York on November 102 for the opening of the Assembly’s regular session. Foreign Minister Averoff arrived on the eighth. Karamanlis originally planned to remain until about November 19. He is very anxious, however, to call on the President while here and will stay on after the 19th if necessary to suit the President’s schedule. The Department hopes that the President will be able to see him and has sent a memorandum to the White House requesting an appointment.
One of the reasons for Karamanlis’ decision to head his delegation is to strengthen himself at home by enhancing his prestige [Page 429] internationally. He will undoubtedly make a speech during the general debate. He evidently is confident that the Greek request for inscription of the Cyprus question will succeed, and he therefore intends to follow a moderate course here. He apparently thinks that British policy in the Middle East area is so unpopular that he can safely demonstrate restraint in his public pronouncements at the UN with respect to Cyprus and still be sure of sufficient support for inscription. He also will probably want to make some general statements on the world situation …. Further, the Greek Government, which refrained from participating in the Suez conferences, now has informed us that it will support our efforts to seek a peaceful settlement through the UN. The Greeks are interested in sending a contingent to the international police force.
If these are Karamanlis’ intentions, you will probably wish to encourage him. The Department has already suggested to Ambassador Allen in Athens that Karamanlis be urged to follow a moderate course in his statements at New York. (Deptel 1643 to Athens, repeated info to USUN.)3
If we can get this sort of restraint from Karamanlis, and from British and Turkish delegates as well, it should help a great deal, both to get the delay we are hoping for in substantive debate on Cyprus until late in the session and also to help in bringing about some progress in the interim toward a settlement of the Cyprus question through other channels. You are acquainted with our recent efforts. Surprisingly there has been very little leakage. We think things are going fairly well, in spite of the setback caused by British rejection of proposals advanced privately through us by the Greek Government. We do not know what the effects of the recent Middle East developments4 will be on the British position, but Karamanlis has indicated much discouragement to Ambassador Allen over their present attitude.
On the other hand, there are grounds for optimism in indications from both Greek and Turkish leaders that they are increasingly aware of the fact that a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question is dependent in large part on direct Greek-Turk contacts and improved relations between them. I refer particularly to Athens 1632 and Ankara 1015.5 Previously the Greeks have tried to ignore the Turks and pretend that a solution depended entirely on the British. Ambassador Allen has reported that he has made progress with both Averoff and Karamanlis in convincing them of the need for such [Page 430] direct contacts. (Athens 15266) He hopes that we will continue the process of so convincing Karamanlis and Averoff while they are in the United States. We certainly subscribe to this suggestion, and hope there may be occasion for such talks during the Assembly session.
Karamanlis also wants to talk about general economic aid problems and has asked if appropriate Washington officials might come to New York to discuss this subject. (Athens Telegram 16497) If he raises this with you, you might indicate that this is being arranged.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1356. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Laingen on November 9.↩
- Apparently no change was made here in the language drafted on November 9.↩
- Dated November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2956)↩
- Presumably a reference to the October 29 Israeli attack in Sinai and resulting British and French military operations against Egypt.↩
- Neither printed, but see footnote 2, Document 205.↩
- Dated November 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–256)↩
- Dated November 8. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–856)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩