Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 22, 1956¹

Washington, June 22, 1956

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• EUR—Mr. Elbrick
• NEA—Mr. Rountree

During a meeting between the Secretary and Ambassador Makins on June 22, in the course of which various other subjects were discussed, the Ambassador raised the question of Cyprus. He referred to the meeting which Mr. Coulson had had with the Secretary on June 19 when Mr. Coulson presented the draft text of a proposed British announcement which already was under discussion with the Turks. (The Secretary had at that time made certain observations concerning the British proposal but said that he wished to consider the matter further before expressing his considered judgment. Mr. Coulson called on Mr. Allen, in the Secretary’s absence, on June 20² and was informed of the Department’s reaction to the suggestions which had been put forth by the British. Ambassador Makins wished to pursue this discussion with the Secretary.)

The Ambassador said that the British thus far had received no answer from the Turks, although there were indications that the Turks would be most reluctant to acquiesce in the proposals. He said that, as he understood it, three reservations had been expressed by the Department: (1) upon the wisdom of the “built-in veto” which the Turks would have over the implementation of the self-determination feature of the proposal after the expiration of a ten-year period of self-government; (2) upon the British view that the plan should not be discussed with the Greeks before it was made public; and (3) regarding the arrangements for assuring an elected majority in the Parliament under the proposed Constitution.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that it was extremely difficult to evaluate the Turkish position since, on the whole, they were extremely inarticulate and often failed to make a case for themselves. It appeared, however, that the Turks felt that the safeguards incorporated in the plan were inadequate for their purposes.

The Secretary observed that the principal objection to the British proposal, as he saw it, was the provision that settlement of the question of self-determination would depend upon a British-Greek-Turkish treaty, even in advance of NATO consideration of the problem. He said that at present the Turks would have no legal basis to obstruct a settlement, but that under the terms of the proposals, if they were accepted by the Greeks and Turks, they would know that they would have the legal power to stall the implementation of the self-determination feature. Thus, the British would be depriving themselves of their present sole legal responsibility in the matter and would bring about a divided authority which might cause trouble in future years.

The comment was made to the British Ambassador that, aside from the question of the Turkish attitude, it might be conceivable that the situation in ten years would be such as to render it inadvisable for the Greeks themselves to have the veto power implicit in the proposals. The plan as now worded would, for example, effectively preclude the establishment of Cyprus independence under dominion status or as part of the Commonwealth if the political situation in Greece or the attitudes of the Cypriots themselves in the years ahead should render it otherwise feasible to consider a solution along those lines. The Secretary remarked that the British goal was highly commendable, that he fully appreciated the difficulties confronting the British Government in trying to work out a solution to this enormously complicated problem, and that he knew the proposals put forward had been formulated in good faith and in an earnest effort to find some satisfactory course. He was, nevertheless, seriously concerned over the possible implications.

The Ambassador commented that he thought neither the Greeks nor the Turks could effectively block implementation of the plan at the expiration of the ten-year period in view of the fact that they could not withstand the international pressures for a just solution. He remarked, in this connection, that NATO itself would be seized with the problem and would apply pressures against the Greeks and the Turks to undertake the proposed treaty.

The Secretary commented that neither the Greeks nor the Turks were nearly as sensitive to international pressures as the United States or Great Britain; he doubted that it would be safe to rely upon this as an assurance that the treaty would be concluded. He pointed out that, according to his understanding of the proposals, the matter would not be referred to NATO in the absence of the treaty itself; thus it would be difficult to envisage a situation in which NATO could effectively pressure the Greeks and Turks to come to an agreement.

The Ambassador said that while some difficulties might be involved in concluding the treaty, a ten-year period was provided for an introduction of a constitution and the establishment and refinement of self-government. That in itself would be a great gain. He indicated, in response to the Secretary’s question, that the self-government aspects of the proposals could go forward in the absence of a Greek-Turkish agreement either to undertake a treaty for the defense of Cyprus, or an agreement on the part of the Greeks and Turks not to raise the question of self-determination during the ten-year period mentioned in the proposals. The Secretary observed that he had not understood the proposed statement to indicate that to be the case.

Responding to further questions by the Secretary, the Ambassador expressed his understanding that Greek and Turkish agreement was not needed to put into motion the self-government provisions, but that they merely had to “acquiesce.” The Secretary asked what the situation would be, for example, if two years following the institution of self-government, the Greeks should press the question of self-determination and ask that this matter be inscribed on the agenda of the UN. The Ambassador’s reply was that the British would naturally oppose inscription, but he was not clear as to the effect such Greek action would have upon the time schedule for carrying out the self-determination feature of the plan.

The Secretary said that he assumed the primary question which had been put to him was whether we would urge the Turks to accept the British proposals. The Ambassador responded that it was whether we would use our influence with the Turks in this matter and persuade them to acquiesce in the proposals. The Secretary said that he frankly had grave reservations about the merits of the proposals. He believed that confusion would be compounded if an arrangement were concluded whereby the concurrence of both Greece and Turkey would be needed before any determination were made on self-determination, rather than maintaining a situation in which the UK would retain its present rights. He thought that under the plan both Greece and Turkey would be given legal rights which they do not now possess, and that this would greatly decrease the flexibility of the British in disposing of the problem. He repeated that he appreciated the great effort which the British were making and realized that, from the British viewpoint, they had proposed a considerable step forward. From his viewpoint, however, he frankly doubted that the plan would work.

At this point, the British Ambassador commented with a smile that he was inclined to say “What would you have us do?” The Secretary, also jokingly, replied, “While you may be inclined to do so, you have not asked the question.” The Ambassador responded that he did not have instructions to put this question to us.

The Secretary summed up his position by saying that he did not think it was a good idea to diffuse the present role of the British and create a situation in which three powers, rather than one, would have legal authority for agreeing to any course of action. He felt that even if Greece and Turkey should accept the present plan, which appeared unlikely, it would create a situation which ten years hence would be more insoluble than that existing at the present time. He expressed considerable doubt that, even if Turkey should acquiesce, the Greek Government would do so. In the circumstances, he questioned the wisdom of the US undertaking to persuade the Turks to accept the plan.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–2256. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.
2. The highlights of the Department’s reaction to the latest British proposals on Cyprus were transmitted to London in telegram 7694, June 21. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–2156) Among the Department’s objections to the proposal was the statement that no move in the direction of self-determination should be made before the conclusion of a British-Turkish-Greek defense treaty. This condition, the Department argued, would be interpreted by Greece as an attempt to give Turkey a “built-in veto” with which to block any progress toward self-determination.