121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1
365. Secretary and British Ambassador discussed Cyprus August 1.2 Makins stressed following: 1. British seriously intend bring tripartite talks to successful conclusion but doubt Greeks equally prepared discuss matter constructively. Hope we will urge Greeks this end. 2. British believe there is evidence Stephanopoulos and Kannelopoulos thought U.S. favored or was sympathetic inscription GA agenda, hope they can be disabused this score. 3. In Greece anti-British propaganda re Cyprus continuing at high level despite Greek assurances it would be toned down. U.K. would appreciate our pointing out to Greeks forcefully as possible this does not help final solution.
FYI Secretary inquired whether British have plan for Cyprus. Makins answered he had no information. End FYI.
You are requested make forceful presentation points contained paragraph 1 above. Manner presentation your discretion, but re point 3 suggest discussion radio broadcasts to Cyprus.[Page 276]
You should also point out that continuing demonstrations and disorders in Cyprus will have effect prejudicing Greek position in tripartite talks. By sponsoring Cyprus cause in international forum and claiming right speak for Cypriots with UK, Greece has implicitly assumed some responsibility for Cypriot behavior. Greek Government protestations it has no power influence Cypriots cannot be accepted at face value. This is two way street. If Greek Government policies can be influenced by pressures from Cypriots and ethnarchy it also has responsibility exert influence on population Cyprus through all means available.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–855. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Baxter. Repeated to London and USUN and pouched to Ankara and Nicosia.↩
- The full text of the memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Makins is ibid., 747C.00/8–155.↩
- In telegram 345, August 11, Ambassador Cannon informed the Department that, with the exception of point 2 in telegram 365, he had covered the substance of the Department’s instructions to Stephanopoulos in a discussion on August 2. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister had several “interesting” things to say. Among them, Cannon noted, was Stephanopoulos’ fear that the Turks might prove “obdurate”, his inquiry as to the likelihood of the United States sending an observer to the proposed conference, and the Foreign Minister’s belief that a conference was the “only first step” toward a solution. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1155)↩