7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commisioner in Germany1
1953. Subject concurrence Defense and Attorney General Department is considering recommending President authorize mass parole Japanese war criminals in US custody. Plan contemplates simultanenous release on parole to Japanese Government of all prisoners for whom Japanese Government has recommended clemency or parole. Japanese Government would establish terms and conditions parole in each case. Once authorization obtained, release would take place at time when maximum political benefit would be secured. Expect result would be immediate parole all 264 war criminals still confined US custody except seven as to whom no recommendations for clemency or parole have been received. Prisoners convicted by International Military Tribunal for Far East can be released only upon decision majority governments represented on Tribunal, but US would indicate it favors parole these prisoners also.
Your views urgently requested re potential repercussions this action in Germany, including probable demand for similar parole German war criminals, and political consequences such parole if granted. Without consulting British and French, can you estimate what their reaction likely to be? Defense will not be approached here pending receipt your comments.
There is much pressure on US to release the Japanese in near future when it might be politically most effective. It would be difficult retain Germans after that has been done. We should in any event consider it awkward to maintain prisons in an allied Germany after Federal Republic obtains sovereignty (Spandau an exception). We are considering most suitable means meeting this situation in view of fact that we have relative freedom of action before Settlement Convention goes into effect. Concerned however lest any step this time might have adverse effect on French ratification.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 694.0026/1–1555. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted in GPA, cleared with Robertson, and approved in EUR.↩
- In telegram
2083 from Bonn, January 22, the High Commissioner’s Office replied
that mass parole of Japanese war criminals would have an unfortunate
effect in Germany, creating demands for immediate release of German
war criminals and destroying the parole and clemency system, thus
necessitating a general amnesty because the German Government could
not administer a parole system. (Ibid.,
662.0026/1–2255) Telegram 1526 to Tokyo, February 4, repeated to
Bonn, reads in entirety as follows:
“Secretary decided January 27 against mass parole Japanese war criminals. Decided seek approval President to delegating final authority re Japanese war criminals to Clemency and Parole Board.” (Ibid., 694.0026/2–255)
No documentation regarding the Secretary’s decision has been found; however, in a joint memorandum to Dulles, January 23, Merchant and Robertson listed (in addition to questions connected with Germany) the following reasons against immediate parole: 1) parole would seem to be an admission by the United States that the trials had been a mistake; 2) important U.S. allies who had strongly opposed efforts to expedite release of Japanese war criminals would be embarassed in their relations with Japan; 3) Japan should be required to fulfill her obligation undertaken in the peace treaty to carry out sentences imposed by the Allied Powers; and 4) the possibility existed of adverse reaction in the United States. (Ibid.,FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Japan)
In a letter to Dulles, March 29, Secretary Wilson concurred for the Department of Defense in delegating final authority on paroles to the Clemency and Parole Board, provided the Board would continue to make its decisions unanimously. (Ibid., Central Files, 694.0026/3–2955) On May 16, the new procedure was established by the President in Executive Order 10613. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1955, p. 998.
↩