Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

46. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 31, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, August 31, 1955, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Purpose of Mission to Washington; official discussions with Secretary; US–Japan relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Ichiro Kono, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
• Nobusuke Kishi, Secretary General of the Democratic Party
• Takizo Matsumoto, Deputy Cabinet Secretary
• Mr. W. J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
• Ambassador John M. Allison
• Mr. R. J. G. McClurkin, Director, NA
• Mr. Richard Lamb, American Embassy, Tokyo

Mr. Kono, Mr. Kishi and Mr. Matsumoto called on Mr. Sebald at their request at 10 a.m. on August 31. The meeting lasted just over one hour; Mr. Kishi, who had another appointment and had to leave early, did most of the talking for the first part of the meeting. Mr. Kono entered into the discussion only after Mr. Kishi’s departure.

Mr. Kishi opened the discussion by outlining the purpose of the visit: to discuss fully and frankly the future of US–Japan relations. The official meetings with the Secretary on August 29 and 30 had been extremely useful. However, he and Mr. Kono hoped that they could now take off their coats and speak with Mr. Sebald somewhat more frankly on an unofficial basis. They wished to know US views regarding Japan, our opinions and hopes for Japan’s future. But at the same time they wished to make clear to us Japan’s own views and hopes.

Mr. Sebald said that he was delighted at the opportunity to speak with Japanese leaders on an unofficial basis. It was of course necessary for us to confer with the official representative of Japan, but he was sure such unofficial meetings as the present one could be most valuable in improving our mutual understanding. Mr. Sebald said that, while he had nothing particular to say at the moment regarding US “requests” of Japan, he did wish to ask some questions regarding Japan’s internal political situation. Actually Japan’s complicated internal political situation created a serious problem for the US in connection with the present Washington meetings. For instance, even if it were possible to reach a complete meeting of minds on various issues in US–Japan relations, we frankly did not know how long the present government would last, or whether it represented the Japanese people. We simply could not foresee the Japanese political future. However, he did have the impression that the Japanese conservatives, instead of closing their ranks and forming a strong government, were divided into factions and were fighting among themselves. Unless the conservatives could get together he feared that the Socialists would come to power. If this happened Japan would rapidly go down hill. Moreover, as the Secretary had said in an earlier meeting, it would be impossible to carry out essential projects, e.g., establishment of a strong military force and enactment of adequate security measures, unless there is strong leadership in Japan, with power in the hands of a strong government supported by a working Diet majority.

With regard to Japan’s internal situation, Mr. Kishi said that he personally disagreed with the Foreign Minister as to the extent of the Communist threat. He felt that in discussions with the Secretary yesterday the Foreign Minister had greatly exaggerated the danger. The threat could certainly not be ignored, but it was not as serious as the Foreign Mininster had depicted it. The basic problem in combatting communism in Japan was to create a strong union of the conservative forces. Mr. Kono, Bukichi Miki² and Kishi himself, were working hard to achieve a conservative union. He could make no definite promise as to when the goal might be achieved; however, Japanese public opinion was strongly in favor of a union of the conservative forces, and with public support he was confident that they would be successful. In this connection Mr. Kishi took pains to point out that he had accompanied the Foreign Minister to Washington at Prime Minister Hatoyama’s specific request. Mr. Hatoyama had wished him to make clear that the viewpoints being expressed were those of all conservatives, not merely the Foreign Minister alone, and that they would be essentially the same no matter who was Prime Minister of Japan. In an earlier meeting the Secretary had mentioned that many missions appeared to have been sent to Washington to strengthen the hand of one political leader or group against rival forces at home. This certainly was not true of the present mission. Mr. Sebald said that Mr. Kishi’s comments were most reassuring.

Mr. Kishi said that he would like to express his own views as to Japan’s basic problems which were perhaps somewhat different from those of the Foreign Minister. He believed that Japan’s number one problem was the stabilization of her economy; without economic stability as a basis there was little point in talking of fighting communism, conservative unification or a possible new alliance with the US. Mr. Kishi felt that the purpose of the present meeting should not be to ask for a new treaty or to discuss other abstract matters, but to exchange views frankly and concretely as to what the US and Japan could do to their mutual advantage, principally in the economic sphere, concerning which Mr. Kishi as former Minister of Commerce and Industry felt he could speak with some authority. In the official meeting today the Japanese delegation intended to take up the matter of economic planning for Japan, specifically the six-year economic plan which the Government had prepared. Mr. Kishi emphasized that he was thinking not in terms of a controlled economy on the socialist pattern, but rather a planned economy, and he hoped the blueprint to be presented would help clarify Japan’s economic situation and prospects. Though there had been a marked improvement in the Japanese economy in the 10 years since the war, basic problems remain to be solved—for example, the tremendous population pressure, the possibility of expanding Japan’s markets in Southeast Asia, possible increase of trade with Communist China. It would not be possible for Japan to achieve the goals of the six-year economic plan without the understanding and active cooperation of the United States, and without United States investments and technical assistance. As an example, Mr. Kishi cited the problem created by the expansion of Japan’s productive facilities to meet United States requirements in the Korean war. These industries now lacked orders and were facing serious financial difficulties. However, Japan wished to retain these industrial facilities for her own use, possibly under government ownership and management. The United States could assist Japan in maintaining these facilities through OSP orders to provide military equipment for countries of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Sebald observed that Mr. Kishi’s proposal regarding OSP orders was well worth exploring, though there were many technical problems involved. He went on to say that one of the cardinal points of United States policy toward Japan was to assist Japan in every possible way to achieve a viable economy. The United States had made great efforts to bring about Japan’s accession to GATT and had assisted in a great many other ways. One of the difficulties, of course, was that these problems were not solely economic but had political implications as well.

Mr. Kishi said that before leaving he wished to summarize his views as to the three major sources of friction between Japan and the United States and the means of eliminating them. The first of these was that arising from the existence of numerous United States bases and the presence of large numbers of American troops in Japan. The way to solve this problem, Mr. Kishi believed, was for Japan to increase her own military strength as rapidly as possible in order to bring about the withdrawal of United States ground forces in Japan. The second problem centered around the annual haggling over Japan’s defense budget and Japan’s contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan. These negotiations created the unfortunate impression that Japan could not form her own budget without United States consent. Mr. Kishi believed that the general principles outlined by the Secretary in yesterday’s session offered an excellent means of overcoming this problem. The third major irritant was the fact that numbers of Japanese war criminals were still held in detention ten years after the end of the war. Mr. Kishi hoped that the United States would take a “bold stand” and settle this problem once and for all. Mr. Kishi remarked that he and the Foreign Minister had spent some time in Sugamo Prison and could not but be emotionally concerned in obtaining the release of those still in prison as soon as possible.

Following Mr. Kishi’s departure Mr. Matsumoto said that Mr. Kono, Mr. Kishi and himself did not wish to create the impression that they were putting their nose into other people’s affairs. Actually they were cooperating fully and wholeheartedly with the Foreign Minister in his mission. It was true they had not received full cooperation from Ambassador Kase and some other members of the Foreign Minister’s party. For example, papers prepared for the discussions had not been made available to them until some time after the discussions had been completed. However, he could assure us that Mr. Kono, Mr. Kishi and himself had every intention of cooperating fully with the Foreign Minister.

Mr. Kono, who had occasionally nodded in agreement but otherwise had not participated in the discussions while Mr. Kishi was present, now began to express his own views. He said first of all that he intended to be even more frank than Mr. Kishi had been. He had long been handicapped in seeking to understand the United States and United States views because of his inability to speak English and until coming to Washington had not had any clear ideas as to United States thinking. This ignorance regarding United States policies and intentions was a great handicap to a Japanese political leader. If he really knew what the United States’ precise ideas and objectives really were, his task as a Japanese political leader was much easier. Mr. Kono said that as a result of his visit to the United States he had learned a great deal about United States objectives and views regarding Japan and would be in a position to work for our mutual goals more effectively than in the past. In this connection he remarked that if Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Ogata (who were actually on much closer terms than we might imagine) were well informed regarding United States thinking, they would no longer be groping in the dark and their task would be much easier.

Mr. Kono said that he believed the Foreign Minister in his talk with the Secretary had overdone the danger of the Communist threat in Japan. The Foreign Minister had perhaps done so because he misunderstood the United States views on the Communist threat and how to combat it. If Japanese leaders knew precisely what United States views were regarding the internal and external Communist threat to Japan, their task would be much easier. The same was true of Japan’s defense program: if Japanese leaders had United States views thoroughly in mind they would not have to operate by trial and error. Mr. Kono thought much of the difficulty arose from the fact that diplomats and petty officials were in the habit of bargaining over minor issues and missed the significant points which in any event were not accurately conveyed to Japan’s real leaders. Once clear and mutual understanding had been reached on objectives, Mr. Kono and his colleagues would know what tactical course to follow in order to achieve them in Japan—e.g., shaping public opinion, etc.

Turning to the domestic political situation in Japan, Mr. Kono said that in last February’s elections the conservatives had been working under severe handicaps: the Liberals had been badly hurt by the scandals, and the newly formed Democratic Party had not had sufficient time to prepare for the campaign. If there was time to prepare, Mr. Kono was confident that when elections are held again the conservatives could easily win a two-thirds Diet majority, then amend the constitution and carry out other essential neasures. Here again, though, a great source of difficulty was the fact that Japan’s political leaders did not clearly understand the United States views regarding Japan’s political situation (Mr. Kono said that Bukichi Miki shared his concern in this regard). Mr. Kono remarked that yesterday’s “argument” between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister was the result of such misunderstanding. Mr. Kono himself actually had found that the Secretary’s presentation was much more logical and reasonable than that of the Foreign Minister. In this connection he was confident that the formula proposed by the Secretary would be agreeable to Prime Minister Hatoyama.

Mr. Sebald at this point referred briefly to the joint consultative committee which had been proposed at yesterday’s meeting and said that the United States thought of the committee as a high level group which would thrash out various problems arising between our two countries. Mr. Kono said there had been at first some misunderstanding on his part as to the nature of the joint committee. He had originally understood that the committee, which he himself had first proposed, was to be at the technical level. Then he had heard that it was to be at the highest level, which would create the impression in Japan that the United States was interfering in Japan’s internal affairs. Now it appeared that the committee was to be at a somewhat lower level.

Mr. Sebald pointed out that many problems which arose were not wholly military or political in character. For this reason it had been proposed that both the Ambassador and CINCFE be on the committee. Ambassador Allison said that of course it was not our intention that the committee would make policy decisions; rather the United States representatives would discuss problems with such representatives from Defense, Finance, and the Foreign Ministry as the Japanese Government might designate. The committee would make recommendations, but final decisions would of course be left to the two governments.

Mr. Kono said that he did not believe the committee should be at too high a level or that it should include cabinet ministers. Perhaps representation at the vice-minister level would be satisfactory. If really important problems arose, Ambassador Allison could talk to him directly, and he could see that satisfactory cabinet action was taken. Ambassador Allison agreed that representation at the cabinet level perhaps was not necessary; he did believe however that Japanese representatives should be at a sufficiently high level to reflect accurately the Japanese Government’s views.

Mr. Kono said that he had been at a loss to understand why the Foreign Minister had been so interested in establishing the consultative committee, and at first had thought that the Foreign Minister was using the proposal as a bargaining weapon to bring about the revison of the Security Treaty. Mr. Kono said he agreed that the time was not yet ripe for the revision of the Treaty.

In conclusion Mr. Kono emphasized that when problems of major importance arose it would be well to take them up directly with Mr. Kishi, Bukichi Miki, or himself. They were the three men who presently control the Japanese Government and they all had Prime Minister Hatoyama’s full confidence. If necessary one of the three could be sent back to Washington or Ambassador Allison could approach them in Tokyo. Ambassador Allison suggested that after Mr. Kono and his colleagues had returned to Tokyo and after they had reviewed the situation it might be well to get together with him for further discussions. Mr. Kono appeared to agree. As a final example of the importance of frank, direct discussion at the highest level, Mr. Kono said the difficulties arising over Japan’s purchase of surplus agricultural products could have been easily avoided if the matter had been taken up with him directly rather than with lesser officials. Mr. Sebald agreed that the important thing was to understand each other fully and to recognize each other’s problems.

Mr. Kono indicated he would like to have further talks with Mr. Sebald. However, Mr. Matsumoto would probably be leaving and there was no other interpreter whom he could fully trust.

In a brief conversation with Mr. Lamb immediately following the meeting with Mr. Sebald, Mr. Matsumoto said that Mr. Kono, Mr. Kishi, and himself had been greatly disturbed at the Foreign Minister’s presentation in his discussion with the Secretary on August 30. The Foreign Minister’s approach, his exaggeration of the Communist threat, had been all wrong; it had certainly not been worthy of a professional diplomat. Mr. Matsumoto and his colleagues were at a loss to know why the Foreign Minister had taken this approach, concerning which they had no knowledge. At first Mr. Matsumoto had suspected that the Foreign Minister had some special motive. He was now inclined to believe however that the Foreign Minister had simply been “boxed in” and said things he had not intended to.

Mr. Matsumoto also said that Prime Minister Hatoyama had instructed him to see that Mr. Kono and Mr. Kishi were brought fully into discussions with United States leaders, and that they were given an opportunity to gain a thorough understanding of United States views and overall thinking regarding Japan.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/8–3155. Secret. Drafted by Lamb.
2. An adviser to Prime Minister Hatoyama.
3. In telegram 467 to Tokyo, August 31, the Department summarized this conversation. In the telegram Kono was described as being “especially buoyant during meeting.” (Department of State, Central Files, 411.9441/8–3155)