43. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT:
- Far East Command Views on Japanese Defense
I have attached as Tab A a copy of CINCFE radio C–73761 of August 24,2 which you requested Mr. Gray to make available to the [Page 89] Department. General Lemnitzer’s views as outlined in the attached radio are essentially that Hatoyama has authorized the release of much important information on Japanese defense planning in order to help Shigemitsu in Washington and that this attitude indicates that the time is propitious for the United States to press the Japanese for two important understandings: (1) Assurance that Japan will continue to develop its ground forces beyond the 180,000 level now planned including sufficient supporting forces and (2) recognition by Japan that the United States must retain air, naval and ground-logistical bases in Japan on a long-term basis.
The favorable developments cited by General Lemnitzer are Hatoyama’s declaration that he hopes Shigemitsu can gain the confidence of the United States regarding Japan’s long-term defense program and a number of statements by Japan’s new Minister in Charge of Defense, Sunada, to the effect that a six-year defense plan calling for build-up of ground forces to 180,000 within three years on condition of “withdrawal of United States Security Forces in Japan” has been approved, that Japan should spend about 15 billion yen more each year on defense, and that the Defense Agency should be elevated to the level of a Ministry.
My comments on General Lemnitzer’s radio are:
- 1)
- I do not agree with paragraph three of General Lemnitzer’s radio that Sunada’s statements have generated practically no adverse public or political reaction. I have attached as Tab B Embassy Tokyo’s telegram 5363 stating that Sunada has been asked by the Cabinet to tone down his statements since they were embarrassing to the Government. There is a very considerable furor over introduction of Honest John rocket launchers into Japan and over efforts of the Japanese Government to obtain land for airfield extensions.
- 2)
- A ground force of 180,000 is the optimum effort Japan appears willing to make at this time. To get a Japanese assurance now that it will develop beyond 180,000 is highly unrealistic, although I believe we may be able to get such an assurance in several years if the climate in Japan continues to improve.
- 3)
- Japan’s six-year plan is being formulated largely on the assumption that it will pave the way for withdrawal first of our ground forces and later of our air and naval forces. It will, therefore, be difficult to persuade the Japanese of the necessity of our retaining air, naval and particularly ground-logistical bases on a long-term basis. Our long-term needs in Japan, especially for ground force installations, require careful study.
- 4)
- Our policy as expressed in the NSC paper is not to prejudice Japan’s political and economic stability by pressure for military increase. I think this policy is already paying off and that we should allow the climate in Japan to continue to improve before we press for a better Japanese effort.