42. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 24, 1955, Noon1
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- O—Mr. Henderson
- FE—Mr. Sebald
- FE—Mr. McClurkin
- FE—Mr. Hemmendinger
- FE—Mr. Finn
Arrangements
Mr. Sebald explained that the purpose of the meeting was to prepare US positions for the three business sessions with the Japanese Delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. He noted that the Japanese representation was complicated by questions of Japanese domestic politics, i.e., Mr. Kishi would in fact be a representative of the Japanese Democratic Party, Mr. Matsumoto, the personal representative of Prime Minister Hatoyama, and Mr. Kono would play a more [Page 85] independent role.2 We had, however, instructed Tokyo to inform Hatoyama that Shigemitsu as head of the delegation would decide who attended meetings.
The Secretary raised the question of the necessity of translation facilities and Mr. Sebald indicated that Mr. Shigemitsu was able to conduct negotiations in English and that in any case he would have Frank Matsumoto, fluent in English, along with him. Mr. Sebald said he wanted to avoid point-by-point translation in Japanese.
Agenda
Mr. Sebald pointed out that it had not been felt necessary to prepare briefing papers for the Secretary on the results of the Geneva meeting and on the Ambassadorial talks with the Chinese or on the October Foreign Ministers meeting.
Mr. McClurkin stated that Shigemitsu would like to receive from the Secretary a general picture of the world situation with emphasis on the Far East and in turn would give his views based particularly on his long experience in China.
Mr. Sebald stated that an informal agenda had been prepared based on several exchanges of cables with Ambassador Allison, although there was no final agreement with the Japanese on the agenda. The talks would probably afford an opportunity to draw out the Japanese on several issues including relations with the USSR and Red China trade.
The Secretary asked about Mr. Kase3 and Mr. Sebald indicated that he was the right hand man to Shigemitsu and that the Secretary had seen him recently prior to Kase’s going to New York as Japanese Observer to the UN.
Mutual Security Treaty
The Secretary posed the question of our negotiating a mutual security treaty with the Japanese, perhaps superimposing it on the present security treaty.
[Page 86]Mr. Sebald stressed the overwhelming desire of the Japanese to get American troops out of their country. He also stated that it was very doubtful that the present government had the strength to accede to a mutual defense type of agreement unless they could obtain a politically attractive quid pro quo.
The Secretary suggested that a U.S. obligation to defend Japan would meet this point.
Mr. Sebald stated that the Japanese believe that in practice they already have this, or at least do not appreciate the lack of such an obligation.
Mr. McClurkin stressed the inadvisability of unnecessarily reopening negotiations on the status of forces agreement under which we had our bases rights.
Mr. Hemmendinger noted that under this agreement we had the right to dispose an unlimited number of troops in Japan—a situation which did not obtain in Korea or in the Philippines where consultation was required. This right to consult might provide a bargaining point with the Japanese.
Mr. McClurkin noted the recent campaign by Minister of Defense Sunada, for Japanese rearmament and US withdrawal.
Mr. Finn stated that at one point (1950) there were 185,000 troops in Japan, that there were now approximately 113,000 and that the figure would be cut to 76,000 in the next twelve months. This figure included Air and Navy as well as Army.
Mr. McClurkin added that the reduction for the next twelve months did not include a cut in air and naval forces and that the Japanese envisaged our retaining air and navy bases after the departure of US land forces.
Mr. Finn stated that the Japanese probably would contemplate limiting their commitments under any mutual defense agreement to Japan and to the US territories in the West Pacific excluding Korea and Formosa.
The Secretary suggested that this was a step forward in that we at present have no commitments at all from the Japanese.
Mr. Finn indicated that the Japanese had made it clear to Embassy officials that in event of a new outbreak of hostilities in Korea or fighting on Formosa the Japanese would not consider themselves bound to afford us the use of our bases and that a new exchange of notes similar to that undertaken in 1951 would be required.4
[Page 87]The Secretary noted that the 1951 exchange of notes had to do not with US uses of Japanese bases but their use by UN forces; that the Japanese had no jurisdictional basis for questioning our use of the bases, regardless of what political interpretation they might choose to put on the agreement.
Defense Costs
Mr. Sebald stressed the importance of the defense aspects of the visit and the need to reach an understanding with the Japanese on the reduction of our forces and a concomitant reduction in the Japanese financial contribution.
The Secretary asked whether it was clear that the Japanese wanted the withdrawal of American forces in Japan, stressing the importance of these forces as a source of dollars.
Mr. Hemmendinger estimated that 500 million dollars had reached the Japanese economy by this means last year but that the sum would be smaller this year.
Mr. McClurkin noted that the Japanese have not asked for reduction in either air or naval forces.
The Secretary suggested that a basic question was whether the Hatoyama Government was strong enough that we wished, by concessions in forthcoming negotiations, to give it a political livelihood. If it was likely to fall in the near future, there was no point in using up our ammunition only to face a later government which would simply raise the ante. It might be desirable to play our cards close to the chest as we had done with Yoshida.
Mr. Sebald estimated Shigemitsu’s political future as most doubtful as well as that of Hatoyama himself. He thought there would be no harm in a commitment to sit down and talk over matters in the near future. Our real problem was the annual negotiations on the Japanese contribution to defense costs. The negotiations last year had put an unbearable strain on Japanese-US relations, almost bringing down the Japanese Government.
Mr. Hemmendinger, noting that the Hatoyama Government was following the same policies on defense as had the Yoshida Government, stated that our aim should be a three or four year schedule of payments to be negotiated between now and November. Mr. McClurkin noted that the present Japanese contribution was $105,000,000.
The Secretary asked if an agreement of this sort would be honored by subsequent Japanese Governments. He suggested that the Japanese have not made up their minds what their future role in the Far East should be and that they are presently operating on a very short term basis seeking maximum concessions on each issue.
[Page 88]Mr. McClurkin stated that an agreement similar to the Korean Minute5 would be desirable, that is, a general statement of policy and intent relating to Japanese contribution, the size of American forces and the magnitude of Japan’s own defense expenditures.
War Criminals
The Secretary asked if Mr. Shigemitsu would raise the question of war criminals. He noted that there was a split position within the Department and that the issue as presented was too complicated to decide at the briefing session.
Mr. Sebald stressed the overriding importance of political considerations and the invidious comparison between the number of Japanese still in prison and the number of Germans similarly held.
The Secretary characterized the comparison of numbers as a stick with which to beat the dog. The real political issue was not whether there were 150 or 50 prisoners still in Sugamo but whether there were any at all and the impression abroad that this constituted an example of the victor imposing his will on the vanquished. The Secretary also said he did not see why the problem of Japanese war criminals should be necessarily tied to that of the Germans.
The Secretary raised the possibility of turning the remaining prisoners over to the Japanese Government for handling on their own responsibility. The Japanese actions would thus of course be subject to judgment by world opinion.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 533. Secret. Drafted by Richard R. Selby of the Reports and Operations Staff. The source text indicates this meeting was a briefing session for Secretary Dulles for the visit of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu who was in Washington August 25–September 1. Substantive discussions began on August 29.↩
-
Allison submitted a lengthy evaluation of Shigemitsu’s political standing in telegram 409 from Tokyo, August 12. He commented on the visit as follows:
“On Japanese side, Shigemitsu visit to Washington is primarily internal political move, which he hopes will better his personal chances here, and which some other politicians support as means of bolstering position of Hatoyama and Democratic Party. This political ambition largely explains timing of visits by Kono and Kishi to overlap Shigemitsu’s. Various individuals and cliques want to keep eye on each other, prevent rivals from monopolizing any political gains which may result from Washington talks. Shigemitsu visit, however, will also of course be intended at same time to serve Japanese foreign policy purposes, which he sincerely pursues except where his personal ambitions conflict.” (Ibid., Central Files, 033.9411/8–1255)
↩ - Ambassador Toshikazu Kase, Permanent Observer at the United Nations.↩
- Reference is to the exchange of notes on September 8, 1951; see footnote 4, Document 8.↩
- For text of the Agreed Minute of Understanding signed at Seoul on November 17, 1954, by representatives of the United States and the Republic of Korea, see 6 UST (pt. 3) 3919.↩