27. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 1

2559. Pass Defense. At Prime Minister’s request, General Taylor and I called on him and had hour’s conversation yesterday morning. During first part of conversation Hatoyama stressed his deep friendship for US and his desire to work closely and in complete accord with US. He recalled his many public statements in the past as well as his private statement to Secretary Dulles in 1951 that he sincerely believed in necessity for Japan to rearm and to this end for the Japanese Constitution to be amended. He had hoped that in the recent election the conservatives would get two-thirds of Diet seats thus making possible an amendment of the Constitution. However, this had not come to pass and instead Socialists had strengthened their position. Since election, according to Hatoyama, Socialists have increased their popularity among the people and are taking much more intransigent stand than had been anticipated. To date Liberal Party has apppeared more interested in embarrassing Hatoyama government, even if this means working with Socialists, than working for true best interests of Japan. Hatoyama’s policy and his many public statements have been designed to cut ground from under Socialists by appearing to embrace many of their objectives particularly in field of social welfare. It is essential, according to Prime Minister, for his government to get through present situation of Diet and this cannot take place if they fail to pass the budget. If it is impossible to secure US agreement to reduction in Japan’s defense contribution or to a sufficient reduction, it will be impossible to pass the budget and the government will probably fall. Should this happen it can benefit no one but the left wing. On the other hand, if US will understand Japan’s position, have faith in Hatoyama, and make such concessions as necessary to get budget through Diet, Hatoyama maintains he will then be able to begin to achieve his objectives of increased armament and close cooperation with U.S. One of first steps will be effort to achieve amendment of [Page 50] election law providing for smaller one-man districts as it is believed this will ensure at least two-thirds conservative majority next Diet. Hatoyama also said that if government succeeded in getting budget through Diet and surviving present session it would then be possible to work for conservative merger and he would do all in his power to bring this about. At present Prime Minister claimed that the government is in an extremely shaky position and he stated action of Foreign Affairs Committee of Lower House (see Embtel 2546)2 in passing admonishing resolution against government over failure of proposed Shigemitsu trip was most unfortunate and was an indication of weakness of government’s position. I intervened at this juncture to point out that if government had prevented premature publicity of decision to send Shigemitsu to Washington, problem would not have arisen. At least in same degree. Hatoyama then explained that he greatly regretted this premature publicity and that he had assumed from what Shigemitsu had said in Cabinet meeting that groundwork for trip had already been laid. It had come as surprise to him that first notice Embassy had had to [of] trip was less than 24 hours prior to newspaper stories. Hatoyama’s original intent had been to send Matsumoto as an informal envoy to U.S. for purpose of talking with his many friends there and endeavoring to explain Hatoyama’s true intentions with regard to U.S.

[1 paragraph (131/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

During the course of the above remarks by Hatoyama both General Taylor and I intervened at several points to explain the American position. We stressed several times the two basic principles (1) that U.S. could not agree to reduction in Japan’s contribution to U.S. forces Japan except on the basis of an effective increase in Japan’s own defense effort, and (2) that while U.S would share cost of any increase it would not pay the whole cost of such increase.

Hatoyama apparently was under the impression that mere increase in numbers was what we wanted but General Taylor pointed out that such an increase meant nothing unless there were funds available for the equipping and training of increased personnel. It was made clear that a soldier without a uniform or a gun was not of much use. General Taylor also made clear that the only sound basis upon which we could judge whether or not there was an increase in Japan’s [Page 51] defense effort was the budgetary criterion. It was pointed out that last year Japan spent on its own forces approximately 74 billion yen and that therefore proposals which had so far been made to us by the Japanese did not indicate, in our opinion, an increase of 20 billion yen but at most an increase of some 6 billion yen.

I also took occasion to point out to the Prime Minister as I had previously to Foreign Minister and Finance Minister, that it is important to consider what Japan is doing defense-wise in overall context of American-Japan relations and that looked at from this point of view Japan’s record was not good. I referred to delay on GARIOA negotiations, treatment of American traders and investors, Japan’s attitude on civil air agreement, as well as several other items. Hatoyama expressed surprise at this and said he had not realized what the situation was! I therefore left with Matsumoto, who was interpreting, an informal statement on these problems.3 In closing Hatoyama again pleaded for our patience and understanding and said that if we could only go along with him this year every thing would be all right next year. I pointed out that the U.S. had agreed to a reduction last year in Japan’s defense contribution on the basis of certain promises as to future performances but that the Japanese Government had unilaterally defaulted on these promises and it was therefore most difficult for us to agree now to anything based on future performance. I said that we would of course give most careful consideration to the problem confronting the Japanese Cabinet but that in my opinion it would be most unlikely that the U.S. could agree to any solution which did not correspond with the two principles mentioned above. While we had now come to realize that there could not be a large increase in Japan’s defense effort this year, we could find it extremely difficult to agree to no increase of any sort.

Apparently our conversation has had some slight effect inasmuch as this morning’s press stories about our interview imply for the first time that government’s original hopes for cutback of 20 billion yen in Japan’s defense contribution might be impossible and that not more than between 6 and 10 billion yen could be expected.

However, at same time government is doing everything possible to impress upon Embassy shakiness of its position and probability that if we do not make great concessions Cabinet will fall. At Prime Minister’s garden party for ECAFE delegation yesterday afternoon not only Tani but also former Career Diplomat Amau who now has no official position in government, took me aside and spoke of seriousness of Cabinet’s position and what a tragedy it would be if U.S. action should cause fall of government. Because of crowds present it was not possible [Page 52] for me to make any considered reply to these observations. I therefore contented myself with listening. However, in my opinion if government should fall it has only itself to blame.

We are now preparing further analysis of situation which I hope to forward shortly.4

Allison
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–855. Secret.
  2. According to telegram 2546, April 7, the Committee had on April 6 passed a resolution reading in translation as follows:

    “The Hatoyama Cabinet in diplomatic activities has lacked a unanimity of opinion within the Cabinet.

    “Besides, its careless handling of diplomatic affairs has greatly soiled the prestige of Japan in the world community.

    “Thus, the government has made a serious blunder. This Committee demands that the government reflect sincerely upon its own conduct so that same mistake will not be repeated.” (Ibid., 794.13/4–755)

  3. Not found.
  4. Not further identified; no such analysis has been found.