227. Letter From the Ambassador in Japan (MacArthur) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)1
Dear Chris: It has been grand to have you here in Tokyo, and I only wish your visit could have been long enough to visit Kyoto and Nikko. Although I don’t want to add additional burdens as you leave Tokyo, I did want to send you this brief note about several of the matters that we have talked about.
First, I am attaching a copy of a telegram2 which I sent to Walter Robertson a few days ago about the return of a limited number of Bonin Islanders. This, as you know from what Kishi said yesterday, is an extremely sensitive issue insofar as the Japanese are concerned, particularly because of its racial discrimination aspects. While the Navy has been strongly opposed to the return of any Bonin Islanders of Japanese descent, I earnestly hope we can work out a solution involving the return of at least two to three hundred Islanders. We have many difficult issues with Japan. With respect to some of them, such as Okinawa, there is nothing we can do at this juncture to meet the Japanese view. However, with respect to the Bonin Islanders, I do feel strongly that we can, without jeopardizing our basic and fundamental interest or security, be forthcoming enough to find reasonable solutions.
This is very important, because the Bonin Island problem is a very contentious issue which has deep psychological overtones which cannot but affect our long-term relations with Japan. I place this at the top of the list of problems on which I think we are in a position to and should, act at once.
Similarly, the war criminal issue should be settled now, although I definitely rate its importance as less than the Bonin Island problems. We are in a bad posture to be the only country that has war criminals still in prison. I would hope we could find solutions for both Class A and Classes B and C along the lines of the latest Japanese proposals which I have fully reported to the Department.
Solutions to these problems are, I believe, not only in our own self-interest in our efforts to align Japan with us and the free world, but also they will strengthen Kishi’s hand domestically in Japan and [Page 485] therefore help him in putting Japan’s domestic house in order. It is particularly important at this time to do what we can to strengthen Kishi (as President Eisenhower said he wished to do), since he will be facing national elections in the coming year. And the results of these elections, just as in the case of the recent German elections, will have a vital bearing on where Japan goes in the coming critical period.
As contrasted with the immediate situation and looking at Japan in the long-term, I am convinced that whether Japan will remain solidly aligned with ourselves and the remainder of the free world depends primarily on the vital trade issue. By the very nature of the economic facts governing Japan’s life, its long-term foreign policy must in the final analysis be dictated by Japan’s over-all economic needs and whether the free world will permit her to earn her living through trade. If Japan is convinced that its economic life depends on cooperation with the free world, then other problems we have in the vital fields of security and defense will fall into line. Although we will obviously have some difficult problems in these fields, I am sure they can be adjusted on the basis of give-and-take which fully takes account of our own self-interest. The trade problem is a tough long-term issue that will have to be continuously worked on in view of the pressure of various groups in American industry. Therefore, it is all the more important that we now try to eliminate or reduce serious and major irritants in our relations with Japan where we can do so, as in the case of the Bonin Islanders and the war criminals matters.
Finally, I need not mention how very important I think it is for our whole position in Southeast Asia and Japan that we come up with some really constructive and imaginative ideas as to how we can best assist in Southeast Asian economic development. Time, I fear, will work against us in that critical part of the world unless we can do something really constructive on economic development there.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, MacArthur, Douglas, II. Personal and Confidential.↩
- Telegram 819 from Tokyo, September 17, marked “For Robertson” and “No Distribution Outside Department”. In this telegram MacArthur made a case for limited Japanese repatriation to the Bonins along lines similar to those above. He indicated that the telegram was stimulated by news reports from Washington stating that the United States had decided to turn down the Japanese request. (Ibid., Central Files, 294.94C22/9–1757)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩