Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

196. Memorandum of a Conversation, Pentagon, Washington, June 26, 1957¹

Washington, June 26, 1957

SUBJECT

• Japanese Defense Agency planning and negotiations with United States

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Osamu Kaihara, Chief, First Section Defense Bureau, Japan Defense Agency
• Lieutenant Colonel Masaji Takahashi, Defense Attaché, Japanese Embassy
• Mr. James V. Martin, Jr., Officer in Charge, Japanese Affairs

Mr. Kaihara is having talks this week at the Pentagon about Japan’s defense build-up plan. Mr. Kaihara went over with Mr. Martin the subjects which he has been and will be discussing with Defense.

Mr. Martin asked Mr. Kaihara if there was any likelihood that the three-year defense plan would be revised to accommodate an accelerated build-up of the air force. Mr. Kaihara expressed the conviction that the obstacles in the way of any substantial increase over the goals set by the three-year plan were practically insuperable. The defense budget this year is 101 billion yen and an annual increase of 20 billion yen is foreseen. Additional funds also are available, including carryovers from previous years. The carry-over of all funds available for disbursement was 26 per cent in JFY 1955 and in JFY 1956 it was 24 per cent. There have been five principal reasons for this large carryover:

(1) Slowness in completing specifications.

(2) Difficulty in buying land from farmers.

(3) Delay in importation of equipment (e.g. Belgian rifles which are now standard equipment for NATO countries take one and one-half years for delivery).

(4) Delay in receiving MDAP.

(5) Delay in release of United States bases (this is not a complaint, merely the fact that it was anticipated that some bases would be released at a certain time and they were not).

The Japanese Government is naturally unwilling, Mr. Kaihara explained, to raise appropriations over the present annual 20 billion increase when there is such a substantial carry-over, representing an inability to disburse previously appropriated funds.

Mr. Martin commented that Admiral Hoshina² had a plan to build up the air self-defense force to a strength of some two thousand or so planes. Mr. Kaihara said this was so and that the same figure had been recommended by the United States Air Force. (Mr. Kaihara said one of the problems for the Defense Agency has been to correlate the overly enthusiastic recommendations of each of the three American services. For example, the United States Army once recommended a strength of 300,000 for the Japanese GSDF; our Navy recommended a strength of over 300,000 tons of naval vessels for the MSDF.) Admiral Hoshina, however, Mr. Kaihara explained, fails to comprehend the practical problems. These practical problems, so far as the ASDF are concerned, consist primarily in pilot training, not in the acquisition of aircraft. There are not enough suitable applicants for pilot training. All Japanese air force pilots have to learn English well enough to understand the radio ground control which is under American management. (The Japanese sought, Mr. Kaihara stated, to institute a system whereby Japanese operators could work in the control towers using their own language or alternatively to have only the key pilots required to know English, but the United States side would not agree.) Finally, there are not enough Japanese flight instructors nor sufficient training equipment. A further obstacle to rapid build-up is the lack of adequately trained ground crews. It takes three years for mechanics to become experts.

One of the problems in equipping Japanese defense forces and looking towards the development of modern weapons is the lack of adequate security legislation in Japan. Mr. Kaihara said that he would be discussing this matter in the Pentagon this afternoon and hoped to learn the minimum the Pentagon requires for such legislation. He anticipated that there would be difficulty putting the legislation through and that is why it was necessary to know minimum requirements.

Mr. Kaihara said that the decision by the Defense Department to withdraw the eight American AAA Battalions from Japan, a decision having been made without consultation with the Japanese, had put the Defense Agency into a corner. The Defense Agency had previously decided to create eight Japanese AAA Battalions and the JDA would attempt to persuade the Japanese public that the American decision to withdraw its AAA Battalions had been made on the basis of the Japanese decision. The only other conclusion which would suggest itself to the Japanese people, as it had already suggested itself to the Finance Ministry, was that the United States Defense Department regarded antiaircraft guns as outmoded and no longer useful. If this were the case, he asked, why should the United States Army have been urging upon Japan for the past two years the creation of antiaircraft battalions? In connection with the creation of these battalions, Mr. Kaihara said that they would be a part of the Japanese ground forces rather than a part of the air forces. He also expressed the hope that in the future the United States would consult with Japan before making major decisions of this nature. He intimated that the Japanese press had become aware of the American decision to withdraw its AAA units when the various installations concerned had informed representatives of the Japanese special procurement agency that the properties were to be turned back to the Japanese Government.

Mr. Martin asked Mr. Kaihara whether it might not be possible for the Japanese to develop guided missile units to defend against air attack and pointed out that Prime Minister Kishi had stated in the Diet some six weeks ago that not all nuclear weapons need to be considered unconstitutional in Japan. This observation could apply to purely defensive guided missiles with nuclear warheads. Mr. Kaihara agreed. Mr. Martin asked him about the rocket which a Japanese scientist recently had built and tested, the Kappa. Mr. Kaihara said that a Dr. Itogawa had developed this and that he and Itogawa had gone to high school together but had had no contacts since then. At the present time the Defense Agency was unable to have any direct contact with Dr. Itogawa or his associates because these scientists, like many others, entertained leftist ideas and were totally opposed to Japanese rearmament. The Kappa was being developed only for its use in the International Geophysical Year experiments. He said, however, that following the Japanese custom, it was possible to use a go-between and obtain some information.

The Japanese Defense Agency desires to obtain from the United States, if possible, two destroyers or one guided missile cruiser in JFY 1958; Japanese funds are available. The Japanese also plan to build two destroyers this year under the OSP program. Admiral Southerland has told Mr. Kaihara that he cannot say for sure whether a cruiser can be made available. It appears that the Japanese were thinking of a 6,000-ton cruiser from which to operate guided missiles (Navy “Terrier”) but the Admiral told them that a 10,000-ton cruiser at a minimum would be required for this purpose.

The Japanese also desire to get one submarine as a practice target. They have one old American submarine at the moment but it is in bad condition. The Japanese are planning on producing one large submarine and three small ones but this will take time.

With respect to military aircraft production, the JDA has tentative plans to have the P2V–7 built in Japan by Shin Meiwa in cooperation with Lockheed. Sixty per cent of the parts will be obtained in Japan and forty per cent imported from the United States. One plane a month can be built after a lead period of one and a half years. They plan to build altogether forty-two planes in three years. Actually they need a total of sixty. Manufacture, if undertaken, would probably continue beyond three years. The United States Navy has been trying to persuade JDA that the Japanese must have a capacity to build for themselves anti-submarine aircraft.

Problems in connection with this plan are that Shin Meiwa must quadruple its stock. The company, which is a successor to the Kawanishi Aircraft Corporation, and which now overhauls United States aircraft at Itami Air Base, has been earning no dividends. The Japanese Government will therefore have to support the project.

There has been some discussion as to whether F–100 and/or F–104 aircraft should be produced in Japan. The F–100, a heavy supersonic fighter bomber (Mach 1.2), is manufactured by the North American Aviation Corporation and would be manufactured in Japan by Mitsubishi. The F–104, an interceptor aircraft of about one-half the weight of the F–100 and much faster (cruising Mach 1.5, maximum Mach 2), would be manufactured in Japan by Kawasaki in cooperation with Lockheed. The JDA, FEC, and MAAGJ all prefer the F–104. This suits Kawasaki perfectly because its manufacture of T–33 jet trainers will come to a stop in the fall of 1958. It would like to start the F–104 project by that time but needs a lead time of a year and one-half. In any event, three hundred planes in the Century class will be built by 1962. Expenses have been calculated on the basis of the F–100, the more expensive plane.

Mitsubishi is currently building the F–86–F day fighter. Problems have been encountered because of frequent failure of subcontracted items to meet specifications.

Japan wishes to obtain sixty F–86–D’s, all-weather fighter bombers, between July 1 and December 31, 1958 through MDAP. Thereafter, an additional 120 planes should be obtained by the Japanese in the opinion of MAAGJ, according to Mr. Kaihara.

The United States currently operates twenty-four early warning radar sites around the Japanese perimeter. The JDA estimates the cost of operation of these sites at 10–15 billion yen annually. This is a figure equivalent to one-tenth of the Japanese defense budget and therefore a substantial expense. The Japanese are proposing that the United States and Japan split the cost, but an effort is being made by the American military side to have Japan absorb the entire expense.

Mr. Kaihara noted that in the meeting on Thursday morning when Admiral Radford gave a briefing to Mr. Kishi and the Japanese,³ the map which the Admiral was lecturing from indicated only six Japanese divisions among its forces. Mr. Kaihara pointed out that Japan also has three combat brigades which have about the same fire power as a division though they have only one-half the personnel. One more brigade is to be created. Mr. Martin asked Mr. Kaihara what is the present actual strength of Japanese GSDF, and he answered that it was 152,000.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/6–2657. Secret. Drafted by Martin on June 28.
2. A former Vice Admiral, Zenshiro Hoshina was an LDP member of the House of Representatives and an adviser to Prime Minister Kishi on defense matters.
3. See Document 186.