135. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 15, 19571
SUBJECT
- United States Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. George H. Roderick, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Army
- Mr. John N. Irwin, II, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
- Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands
- Mr. Arthur Way, Chief of Northeast Asian Division, ISA, OSD
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Richard D. Kearney, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
- Mr. Harry F. Pfeiffer, Jr., NA
Following an exchange of amenities, General Moore stated that he would like to comment on present conditions in the Ryukyu Islands. He said that the United States administration of the Ryukyus was being impeded by the fact that there was no basic law and no basis for appropriations since the issuance of the Executive Order had been repeatedly delayed in view of various developments which indicated that the time was not propitious for the issuance of this order. [15½ lines of source text not declassified] General Moore stated that we should bear in mind that another Cyprus-type situation was possible in the Ryukyus and might have developed last summer had it not been for the rather placid Ryukyuan temperament.
Mr. Robertson stated that he would like to make one thing clear—that there was no difference in opinion between the Departments of State and Defense on our basic policies in the Ryukyus. The islands are strategically essential and the United States will remain there as long as necessary. To maintain our present position was also in the interests of the Japanese and Ambassador MacArthur had been instructed to inform Prime Minister Kishi that we have no intention to return the islands to Japan in the foreseeable future. Mr. Robertson stated that the question of timing of the promulgation of the Executive Order was not a matter of black and white. Both General Lemnitzer and Ambassador MacArthur had presented good cases for their respective positions favoring prompt promulgation and delay until after Mr. Kishi’s visit. Mr. Robertson stated that we must recognize that the timing of promulgation was of great concern to the Japanese Government and said that he favored informing the Prime Minister of the content of the Executive Order and requesting his views with regard to promulgation prior to Mr. Kishi’s visit. Ambassador MacArthur should also indicate to Prime Minister Kishi at that time that our position in the Ryukyus was not negotiable in order to make it clear to the Japanese that we would not cave in when confronted with persistent pressures. General Moore expressed agreement with this point of view.
Mr. Robertson stated that while the Department of State favored a continuation of military government in the Ryukyus, political problems in Japanese-American relations which were raised by our presence in the islands were of extreme importance. It is essential that problems arising from United States administration of the Ryukyus be the subject of close coordination between the Departments of State [Page 291] and Defense. These problems should be considered in Washington, rather than in Honolulu, to insure adequate consideration at the highest levels of Government. General Moore expressed agreement noting that the channel of communications should be so organized to insure that Ryukyuan problems would receive most effective consideration regardless of personalities involved. Civil affairs problems arising in Okinawa were principally the concern of Washington agencies. It was, of course, essential to keep CINCPAC fully informed of developments in the islands.
Mr. Irwin said he thought it would be advisable for Ambassador MacArthur when seeking Prime Minister Kishi’s views on the timing of the promulgation of the Executive Order, to indicate to him at that time that the United States position on the land and education problems in the Ryukyus was not negotiable.
Mr. Robertson and Mr. Parsons stated that they thought it would be better to limit the MacArthur–Kishi discussion to the Executive Order to avoid delay. Mr. Parsons stated that it was important to communicate with Ambassador MacArthur as soon as possible in view of Prime Minister Kishi’s plans to visit Southeast Asia in the immediate future.
Mr. Robertson said that he felt strongly that there should be a separate National Security Council paper on the Ryukyu Islands. This area was now much too important to be treated only as a paragraph in the NSC paper on Japan. Mr. Parsons said that a separate NSC paper would enable the high officials in the United States Government to benefit from the recent State and Defense review of the Ryukyuan situation.
Mr. Irwin stated that the Department of Defense preferred treating the Ryukyus in the Japan paper. Defense would be pleased to review this position but it might be felt that a separate paper was not required.
Mr. Robertson replied that the persons ultimately responsible for decisions regarding the Ryukyus should not be deprived of knowledge essential to the formulation of such policies.
The meeting terminated with general agreement that State and Defense should urgently review the Executive Order in order that Ambassador MacArthur could inform Prime Minister Kishi of its contents, stressing that the United States position on the Ryukyus was not subject to negotiation. At the same time. Ambassador MacArthur could obtain the Prime Minister’s reactions as to the timing of the promulgation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.022/5–1557. Confidential. Drafted in NA on May 17.↩