Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

134. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, May 15, 1957.

SUBJECT

• My Meeting with Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin on the Ryukyus

In accordance with your instructions, I met with Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin on the afternoon of May 6 to determine the areas of disagreement between State and Defense on the Ryukyus.

Mr. Irwin raised for discussion and presented a Defense position on the following subjects. I countered wherever possible with a State position.

1. Executive Order.

a. Defense would like to have it promulgated as soon as possible. I explained that we would prefer to hold up promulgation until after the Kishi visit as this would give us a chance to talk to Mr. Kishi and explain our position in the Ryukyus as a part of our overall military position in the Pacific.

b. Defense would like the promulgation to be well publicized. I explained that while we would not want to draw excessive attention to it we would agree that it should be made well known to the Ryukyuans.

2. Governor.

a. Defense has agreed with our position that the Governor should reside in the Ryukyu Islands. He will be the military commander of the Ryukyu Islands Command and a lieutenant general. We agreed with Defense that it would be better to call him Governor rather than Governor General or High Commissioner. (I understand that the Budget Bureau, however, will not agree to the name Governor”.)

b. Defense believes that the Governor should communicate with Washington through USARPAC, Honolulu, on all matters—including civil affairs. I explained our position that we would like to see the Governor directly under the Department of Defense on civil affairs matters as this would provide for prompt and immediate consideration of civil affairs problems by Washington. We decided that we could not reach agreement on this issue. It seems apparent that Defense wishes to keep civil affairs subordinate to the military chain of command which will insure that, as has been the case in the past, immediate military considerations receive primary attention. It would, furthermore, continue to downgrade civilian matters.

c. Defense suggested and we agreed that as the Governor would reside in the islands there would no longer be a need for a permanent Deputy Governor and that therefore the office should be abolished. When the Governor is absent from the islands the Deputy Military Commander will act as Governor.

3. Standing Committee.

Defense suggested that, rather than to establish a new advisory committee on Ryukyuan affairs, greater participation by the civilian agencies could be obtained by perfecting the existing system of liaison. I explained that we were interested in the committee only as a means of guaranteeing that all phases of Ryukyuan problems be fully considered when decisions are being made. We agreed that a compromise might be reached by designating specific individuals or positions in the interested agencies who would receive all pertinent communications and be consulted on all significant developments.

4. USCAR and the GRI.

a. Defense stated that less than 17% of the Civil Administration are military people and that the number of military personnel could hardly be reduced any farther. I explained that we are not interested in the actual number of military people in USCAR but rather in the complexion and attitudes of USCAR—that USCAR needs to be keenly aware of civilian problems.

b. Defense believes that combining USCAR and the Executive Branch of the GRI would not advance the development of political responsibility and knowledge in the Ryukyuans. I explained that in our view United States interests can best be served by working toward maximum Ryukyuan participation in their own government. This will not only work toward relieving our burden of running the Islands but also instill a greater feeling of responsibility on the part of the Ryukyuans. Even more important, we need to develop a greater Ryukyuan consciousness that the Islanders are benefitting from our administration; their participation in their own government should help this.

At the end of the discussion we decided that major disagreement existed only on two of the subjects which we had discussed: the time of the issuance of the Executive Order (1a) and the civil affairs channel of communications for the Governor (2b). I believe it is important that we hold out for our position on these two matters.

It will be far easier for the Japanese to accept the Executive Order for what it is and represents—i.e., merely a statement of the existing administration—and not see in it a new departure (which would revive, with vigor, the Japanese clamor for reversion of the Islands) if we discuss the Executive Order with them before issuance. An opportunity of discussing with Mr. Kishi and his advisors our military role in the Pacific and the part that Okinawa plays before the Executive Order is made public should decrease the likelihood of undesirable Japanese reactions.

If we are to avoid a perpetuation of the present situation, which John Steeves finds extremely unsatisfactory, in which all civil affairs matters are screened and interpreted by one or several military headquarters before they are referred to Washington, we must establish the standard practice of direct communication with the Department of Defense (with information copies to the military headquarters concerned).

Mr. Irwin listed several other topics which he thought ought to be discussed at some subsequent meeting:

5. N.S.C. Defense believes that the Ryukyus should continue as just a paragraph in the Japanese paper. (I continue to feel, however, that the benefit of our recent review, between Defense and State, of the Ryukyuan situation should be shared with higher officials of the United States Government through some mechanism.)

6. Organic Act. There is general agreement that we should have an Organic Act providing Congressional authority for Ryukyuan administration but disagreement as to the contents.

7. Economic Planning. State and Defense agree that planning is essential. There are differences, however, in methods.

8. Wages.

9. Land Reclamation.

10. Housing.

11. Foreign Investment.

12. Currency. State and Defense agree that something must be done about the present currency which is an occupation fiat currency. Defense wants to replace it with United States dollars. We would like to back the existing currency with dollars or replace it with a new Ryukyuan currency backed with dollars.

13. Foreign Representation. Defense is not happy about our sharing representation functions for Ryukyuans abroad with the Japanese.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/5–1557. Secret. Drafted in NA on May 10. The May 15 date appears on the source text, but is in the same handwriting as the file number, indicating that it may have been added some time later. Neither Parsons nor Robertson initialed the memorandum, indicating that it was probably not sent.