Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, January 26, 1957—Noon.

1626. Deptels 1525² and 1526.³ Release January 18 State–Defense denial quieted for moment Japanese press speculation on atomic task force. However, it was resumed following UP January 23 despatch from Washington stating that, according to authoritative sources, stationing of atomic task forces in Japan probably to be discussed at high level US-Japanese talks during Ishibashi Kishi visit in May. (Chief Cabinet secretary commented to press GOJ knew nothing about such intent of USG and had taken no steps on visit.) UP story attibutes lack of final US decision on atomic task force to differences between State and Defense; while “military officials” contend they should be permitted defend with “smaller atomic weapons”. State Department “is opposed to sending task force to Japan at least at this time.”

AP Washington January 24 story apparently based on discussion with “US defense officials” puts matter in better perspective by taking account of Japanese opinion and control over decision but nevertheless serves to keep issue alive.

Initially Japanese had tended scoff at Soviet threat and Cabinet Secretary had labeled it “bluff” and denied Japan supplying atomic bases to US. Combined with repetition of Soviet threat of retaliatory Soviet atomic attacks on US bases in Japan, net effect of press discussion will now be to harden attitudes and still further postpone time when really profitable discussion of these issues could be held with GOJ. Trust that press discussion of issue can now be closed off.

Problem further complicated by informal Foreign Office inquiry at “working level” on State–Defense release just prior to publication UP story. Inquiry ostensibly motivated by desire prepare for anticipated Diet inquiries on staging atomic task force in Japan, but nature of questions suggests that Foreign Office testing our willingness actually consult on this matter. Four specific questions were raised: (1) what are actual US plans with respect First Cavalry withdrawal and deployment atomic units to Japan; (2) does US intend full consultation as press release states or in fact continuation past practice of providing GOJ with “advance information”; (3) does US statement mean we now willing give assurance of advance consultation on storage of atomic weapons. Foreign Office official referred in this connection to position taken confidentially by Embassy in June 1955 that no “mutual understanding”—as claimed publicly by Shigemitsu—existed on advance consultations on nuclear storage. He anticipated Kishi would be pressed by Diet to confirm this “understanding”; (4) how are atomic task forces organized.

AP story noted above attributes to “authoritative sources” statement that “whole policy” on placing atomic weapons in Japan “rests with the Japanese for a decision”. This is of course not a direct statement of official US policy but it goes considerably further than we have yet gone officially and it may make difficult if not impossible adherence to our 1955 position.

While recognizing difficulties posed by Foreign Office questions, we would appreciate guidance on what may be said to Foreign Office at this time.⁴

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/1–2657. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Telegram 1525 to Tokyo, January 18, alerted the Embassy to the release of the press statement quoted in footnote 3 below. (Ibid., 794.5–MSP/1–1857)
3. Telegram 1526 to Tokyo, January 18, contained the following joint State–Defense announcement released that day: “In the past several days there have been a number of press reports, attributed to sources in the Department of Defense, concerning the withdrawal of the First Cavalry Division from Japan and the possible assignment of an Atomic Task Force to Japan. These reports are wholly speculative. No decisions of this character have been made. The continuing Communist threat to peace and security in the Far East necessitates the most careful consideration of free world defense requirements in that area. In the future, as in the past, United States Government decisions regarding troop dispositions in Japan will only follow careful study and evaluation and will only be made after full consultation with the Japanese Government.” (Ibid., 794.5/1–1857)
4. The Department, in telegram 1590 to Tokyo, January 28, replied that it had no knowledge of the UP and AP stories described by the Embassy, which had apparently not been carried in U.S. newspapers nor been officially inspired. The Embassy was advised to tell the Foreign Office that the press release spoke for itself and should be cited without interpretation in response to any inquiries in the Diet. Concerning the organization of the “atomic task forces”, the Department was seeking information from the Department of Defense. (Ibid., 794.5/1–2657)