113. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with the Secretary on Japanese Security Arrangements2
For your background information in connection with the meeting with the Secretary tomorrow on Japanese security arrangements, I quote below pertinent portions of a recent despatch from Embassy Tokyo (No. 221 of September 7, 1956)3 commenting on the reliability of Japan as an ally during time of war: [Page 254]
“In the event of limited or localized hostilities, it is uncertain that Japan, in view of its present political attitudes, would permit the United States to use Japanese soil as a staging area and base of operations. This was done during the hostilities in Korea, but at that time Japan was an occupied country. Today as a sovereign nation, Japan has failed to develop its runways, has been reluctant to provide training areas, has protested the use of firing ranges, has trembled at the introduction of the ‘Honest John’ rocket, has indicated lack of concurrence in the storage in Japan of atomic war heads, and has failed to provide for the adequate development of its own forces. Fear of involvement might cause Japan to deny the use of its facilities to the United States. In its present temper, it would certainly be a reluctant ally whose lack of cooperation, already demonstrated in time of peace, would greatly reduce its effectiveness.
“In the event of a world conflict, the problem of supplying Japan, assuming it were a fully cooperative ally, would be one of very great magnitude. Food, cotton, wool, petroleum, iron ore and coking coal alone would amount to a minimum of 20 million tons of imports annually. Despite Japan’s large maritime fleet, shipping and convoy requirements would be enormous. Whether under such circumstances, Japan could be maintained as a dependable source of munitions appears open to question. Industrial capacity, if it could not be adequately provided with requisite raw materials, would be of little assistance to American forces. Moreover, with the present political climate, Japan in the event of a world conflict might seek to remain neutral to profit by trade wherever it could be found. Japanese recall that their country emerged from World War I as a major power, and they contrast that position with the results of World War II.”4
The despatch under reference is in support of the thesis that, in view of Japan’s strategic vulnerability, the United States should not depend upon Japan as a trustworthy source of munitions to satisfy either direct or indirect requirements of the United States in the event of hostilities. The despatch emphasizes that in pointing out the danger of over reliance upon Japan in time of hostilities, it is not intended to underplay the value to the free world of a strong non-Communist Japan, even if not allied to or dependent upon the United States.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/1–2457. Secret.↩
- This meeting apparently was not held, as no memorandum of it has been found and there is no mention of it in the Secretary’s appointment book.↩
- Entitled “U.S. Policies Designed To Assist Japan’s Defense Industries”, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/9–756)↩
- The following handwritten comment by Robertson appears in the margin next to the two quoted paragraphs: “In my opinion, much of this can be solved by telling and effective diplomacy. The Japanese are not yet convinced that the U.S. is a dependable ally, or that we are consistent in our policies. Their nightmare is to get out in front and then have the U.S. abruptly change its policy, e.g., by recognizing Red China. WSR”↩