Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

91. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)¹

Washington, April 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Regarding the Netherlands New Guinea Question

The pending revision of the NSC paper on Indonesia² has raised the question of what policy the Department should recommend to the NSC on the New Guinea question. The draft revision of the NSC paper prepared in FE³ recommends the continuation of our policy of neutrality. However, EUR has concluded that this policy should be changed to support the Dutch and Australian positions.

Attached is a memorandum which I have just sent to Mr. Robertson⁴ together with a paper setting forth EUR’s views on this subject (copy also attached). I believe it should be possible to resolve this question without the necessity of taking it to the Secretary and, for this purpose, suggest that you call a meeting of the interested parties.

[Enclosure]

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs⁵

Washington, April 5, 1955.

U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA QUESTION

[Here follow sections (A) Present Policy Situation and (B) Considerations and Conclusions.]

C. Recommendations

It is recommended that, in private, the U.S.:

1. Explain to the Indonesian Government our view that the Netherlands New Guinea question is not now, nor will it be in the foreseeable future, a soluble problem (as they themselves recognize) and that sustaining it as an issue will continue to work to the disadvantage of Indonesia, the U.S., the Netherlands and the UN;

2. Express our concern that, if current efforts are maintained to keep the Netherlands New Guinea question alive, these efforts may ultimately create conditions which the Indonesian Government will feel oblige it to renew its request for further UN consideration of this question—even though we all recognize that the problem is not now soluble and that further UN consideration will only work to the disadvantage of all concerned.

3. Endeavor, therefore, to persuade the Indonesian Government to curtail, if not drop, its efforts to keep the Netherlands New Guinea question alive;

4. Suggest to both the Dutch and Indonesian Governments that they seek to resolve, through negotiations, ancillary aspects of the problem—such as the Dutch Government’s concern regarding Indonesian threats to use force against Netherlands New Guinea, and the fear of the Indonesian Government that Netherlands New Guinea is being used as a base for efforts to revive the South Molucca Republic;

5. If, despite these confidential representations, the Indonesian Government remains firm in its present attitude and continues, unabated, its current efforts to press the Netherlands New Guinea question, the U.S. should put it on notice that we will be obliged to oppose the Indonesian claim to sovereignty and any further attempt to refer the matter to the UN.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/4–555. Top Secret.
2. NSC 171/1, see Document 81.
3. The FE draft was not found in Department of State files, but, according to a memorandum of April 8 from Robertson to Merchant, the paragraph in question, which is identical with paragraph 25 of NSC 171/1, reads: “While for the present maintaining neutrality in the New Guinea dispute in our relations with other governments, explore within the U.S. Government solutions to this problem compatible with over-all U.S. objectives, for possible discussion with other interested governments.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/4–855)
4. Not printed.
5. Top Secret.