Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

75. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State¹

Rangoon, September 18, 1957—2 p.m.

334. Since Embtel 290,² conversations with GUB officials, culminating in my call on Kyaw Nyein September 17 at his request, have clarified GUB position and tend reinforce my previous recommendations as indicated below. Kyaw Nyein indicated he has been designated by Prime Minister to coordinate negotiations re US aid with particular reference to US assistance for internal security program.

Top GUB officials beginning be seriously disturbed over police [policy?] consequences of failure achieve benefits promised by independence. Per capita consumption still below pre-war. GUB already seriously concerned over lack of progress in economic development before recent decision give top priority to internal security which has induced GUB to make further reduction in planned level of development expenditures. Despite this reduction, proposed capital expenditures (including expanded law and order program) will significantly exceed available foreign exchange.

In this situation, GUB leaders have decided seek help from US. Approaches no longer surreptitious re either military or police assistance, thus indicating willingness accept consequences for Burma’s neutrality position. GUB unwilling accept aid for internal security program from Soviet bloc and realizes US is only free world source able finance such aid to required extent. Department will realize this is significant departure for GUB and provides obvious opportunity to promote US objectives. With top officials acutely concerned serious GUB predicament, prompt response from US is required for maximum exploitation this opportunity. Kyaw Nyein said prompt response is essential.

I am convinced this opportunity would be adequately seized for time being if I were authorized to inform GUB that $10 million in military assistance will be forthcoming even if details not yet possible. GUB would find means of using such assistance to finance foreign exchange costs of internal security program. Am satisfied police survey group would be readily accepted.

Kyaw Nyein convinced GUB extremely loath to finance police equipment from $25 million US economic development loan because would mean some projects now retained in reduced four year program must be eliminated, thus increasing already serious demoralization over slight progress in economic developments.

Apparent discrepancies noted Deptel 278³ between Prime Minister’s comments and Ba Swe’s views on internal security appear resolved. During Herter–Richards visit, Ba Swe indicated he agrees internal security henceforth is primarily police responsibility (despatch 212⁴). Kyaw Nyein assured me there is agreement in Cabinet on top priority for internal security with police playing prime role. Significance of imminent shake-up in police reported despatch 213.⁵

Country team concurs this message.⁶

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/9–1857. Secret; Limited Distribution.
2. Telegram 290 from Rangoon, September 9, urged a prompt and positive response to Burma’s long-pending request for military aid and recent request for police equipment, stating that there were indications that the Burmese Government might be willing to shift closer to the free world position if it were convinced that such a shift would serve Burma’s interests and not infringe on its independence. (Ibid., 790B.5– MSP/9–957)
3. Supra.
4. Despatch 212 from Rangoon, September 11, reported on the visit of Herter and Richards to Rangoon and enclosed memoranda of their conversations with Burmese officials. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/9–1157)
5. Despatch 213 from Rangoon, September 11, reported that a pending reorganization of the Burmese police was intended to prepare the police forces to assume a larger role in the maintenance of internal security. (Ibid., 890B.501/9–1157)
6. Telegram 350 to Rangoon, September 24, reported that there was a problem in obtaining Defense clearance of military aid, apparently as a result of JCS review of the Erskine report, but that a favorable resolution of the problem was expected soon. (Ibid., 790B.5–MSP/9–957) There was a brief and inconclusive discussion of the subject at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on September 27. (Record of discussion; ibid., State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)