72. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State1
252. I had first substantive conversation with Nu August 28. Meeting was at his request, pursuant to understanding at my initial formal call August 22 that he would let me know when he was ready to talk assistance. I covered with him entire area of requested US assistance—economic development, internal security and military aid. I endeavored draw him out on relationship and relative priority of these fields in light his July [June?] 8 speech, emphasizing strong US sympathy with Burmese requirements but at same time carefully avoiding any intimation of what US might or might not be able do outside $25 million loan. I cautioned re time required for allocation after aid legislation enacted, assuring him that unavoidable delay should not be construed as sign lack of US sympathy.
Prime Minister emphatically reaffirmed decision subordinate government economic development expenditures to requirement law and order campaign. Said only projects already started which cannot be cancelled without serious loss and few others considered indispensable will not be deferred. He confirmed US loan agreement will be ratified in current session Parliament and expenditure of US $25 million loan will not be affected by retrenchment plan.
He placed highest priority on police equipment required for law and order program (Embtel 1442). He feels prompt US action on this request is key to suppression insurgency. Says spirit of insurgents beginning to flag and now is psychological moment to strike hard. Says decision definitely taken gradually transfer responsibility for law and order campaign from army to police. Suppression of lawlessness considered not proper army function. Police must be reorganized, expanded and morale built up. Favorable US action on request for police equipment would greatly boost police morale. Lawless elements well armed and success campaign will depend on adequate equipment of police. He said Burmese Government would have no objection to police equipment being provided as part of GUB request for arms made to General Erskine if this would expedite matters. If entire shopping list can not be provided promptly, any portion welcome. Prime Minister apparently anticipated (until I disabused him of notion) that Under Secretary Herter probably would bring definitive US reply when he visits here next week.
[Page 116]In response to my oblique probing (without implying any US commitment) on matter of possible visit of US internal security team of perhaps three experts to survey situation and make recommendations, he displayed receptive attitude provided experts on technical level only. He indicated if they came government would expect give full publicity to nature of mission since in his view there would be nothing to conceal. Said would want discuss matter further with Defense and Prime [Home?] Ministries before making request for such team. If visit materialized, he hoped team would remain for some months. He felt he could say authoritatively that internal security is proper field for technical assistance on same basis as in other fields related to the welfare of Burma. He showed distaste for anything suggesting confidential operations stating that everything could and should be open and above board. Said he did not want team which would “snoop” on use made of any equipment provided by US, adding mutual confidence is essential in any aid program.
He said US experts on level above technical would not be welcome since any appearance top-level reorganization of police structure on basis of foreign government recommendations would seem be reflection on capacity of GUB and would alienate support of people which essential to success of law and order campaign. I assured him it would not occur to us to suggest sending experts with any such high level mandate.
Comment: I believe we may have made some progress toward inducing neutralists GUB to request US technical assistance in sensitive security field where Soviets and ChiComs automatically excluded.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/8–3157. Secret; Limited Distribution.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 70.↩