Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

70. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State¹

Rangoon, August 13, 1957—4 p.m.

174. Re Embtels 144² and 162.³ Country Team strongly urges every effort be made provide substantial assistance to Burma in response request for military aid made to General Erskine and recent approach through Walinsky for assistance in new internal security program. Recommend specifically Embassy be authorized soonest make clear statement willingness supply substantial portion of requirements presented to Erskine expanded to include to extent possible items for police which appear in requirements furnished by Walinsky (despatch 101, August 8⁴).

This recommendation based team’s conviction that in US interest provide this aid as expeditiously as possible in order:

(1) Demonstrate to GUB our willingness assist in supplying at low cost and on favorable terms military supplies needed for external defense and internal security and, conversely, avoid prejudice to our relations GUB likely arise from further delay on military request.

(2) Promote restoration internal security in Burma with resulting political and economic benefits, both immediately and through increased possibilities implementation economic development plans.

(3) Sustain AFPFL government, which only visible alternative to rule by Communist-dominated NUF.

Embassy understands government determined carry out substantial army equipment program as well as internal security program at cost curtailment other activities, notably economic development. Assistance by US in either or both of these sectors will ease total burden on budget.

Assume that some progress has been made towards determination possibility supplying GUB with items on list given Erskine. Would regret any significant delay imposed on that program by introduction new element of internal security needs. Most desirable solution would be consideration latter needs as component of $10 million military assistance availability even if this should require greater mark-down on individual items in order bring total with $10 million ceiling. If this impossible would be better make immediate favorable response on military assistance request without prejudice to subsequent action on internal security requirements, especially inasmuch as army already participating in internal security activities. Vital element this whole picture is ability US Government respond quickly. We should not allow this favorable atmosphere be dissipated through delay. Likely Ambassador McConaughy will be making first call on Prime Minister twentieth or twenty-first. In view (1) possibility Prime Minister may raise question, and (2) undoubted benefit to inauguration Ambassador’s mission if Ambassador himself authorized raise issue by indicating prospect favorable response, urge guidance soonest.

Braddock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/8–1357. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. Telegram 144 from Rangoon, August 7, reported a conversation with Walinsky concerning an informal Burmese approach made through him for U.S. assistance for the Burmese internal security program. (Ibid., 790B.5–MSP/8–757)
3. Telegram 162 from Rangoon, August 10, reported information available to the Embassy concerning the Burmese Government’s budget, then in preparation, for the coming fiscal year. Increased expenditures for internal security were to be financed in part by reductions in the economic development program and in part by printing new currency, which would have an inflationary impact. (Ibid., 890B.10/8–1057)
4. Despatch 101 enclosed copies of documents given to Braddock by Walinsky that set forth Burmese requirements for the internal security program. (Ibid., 790B.00/8–857)