Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

66. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 26, 1957, Noon¹

Washington, April 26, 1957, Noon

SUBJECT

• Courtesy Call on the Secretary by U Ba Swe²

PARTICIPANTS

• U Ba Swe, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Union of Burma
• Ambassador U Win, Burmese Embassy
• U Than Hla, Counselor, Burmese Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Lewis M. Purnell, Burma Desk Officer, FE/SEA

U Ba Swe expressed his appreciation to the Secretary for receiving him despite the Secretary’s heavy schedule. The Secretary, in reply, commented that the Middle East situation had required a lot of attention and he stressed the importance of preserving the integrity of Jordan against subversion from Syria and Egypt and at the same time preventing the conflicting interests of Syria and Egypt on the one hand and Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other from developing into a friction which would affect the whole area.

The Secretary recounted his trip to Rangoon in March 1955 and U Ba Swe expressed regret he unfortunately had been detained away from Rangoon during the Secretary’s visit.

To the Secretary’s queries U Ba Swe explained that Burma’s internal security had improved as had the economic situation and that he thought Burma’s border problem with Communist China would be successfully resolved. U Ba Swe expressed the hope that the Secretary understood Burma’s neutrality and friendliness with Communist China was motivated by the necessity to get along with Communist China in view of a thousand mile common border.

The Secretary said that he could appreciate Burma’s position and cited Finland as an example of a country which through friendliness and firmness had maintained its independence in an extraordinary way. He said Finland is perhaps one of the greatest examples of how a small nation with firm resolution can maintain itself when faced with danger. The Secretary commented that the satellites, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for example, would be more satisfactory to both the USSR and others if they were like Finland. He said Ambassador Bohlen³ believes the Soviet leaders would like to see the satellites develop like Finland because the present trend is producing regimes and attitudes unfriendly to the USSR. The Secretary noted that the problem now is that the Soviets may have gone too far to change their relationships with the satellites.

The Secretary inquired about U Nu and asked how Burma’s relations with Japan were developing. U Ba Swe commented that Burma’s cooperation with Japan is beginning on a small scale but developing satisfactorily. The Secretary spoke of Japan’s impressive economic recovery but noted Japan’s dependence on outside markets and raw materials and commented that the uncertainty of those markets and raw materials as well as Japan’s population pressures make her nervous.

Ambassador Win asked the Secretary to comment on U Nu’s suggestion for a meeting between President Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukov.⁴ The Secretary apologized for not having replied to U Nu’s latest letter on the subject and commented that it is very difficult to give satisfactory comment in writing and that he therefore welcomed the opportunity to discuss the problem with U Ba Swe because he had discussed U Nu’s proposal with the President on several occasions and at great length. The Secretary said the President doubts Marshal Zhukov would be allowed to enter into any discussions where he would be a free agent. When the President met privately with Marshal Zhukov at the Summit Conference in 1955,⁵ the President felt Zhukov was grinding out the official Kremlin line and was not speaking with any freedom or independence. The President found Zhukov’s attitude very different from that the President had known in Berlin at the end of the war when Zhukov spoke with an air of authority and at times contempt for the civilian leaders in the USSR. The Secretary noted that Zhukov reportedly had commented that he thought President Eisenhower had changed; President Eisenhower also thinks Zhukov is different.

The Secretary said the President would welcome talks with any Russian where there could be a real exchange of ideas but from the Summit experience the President doubts Marshal Zhukov could be anything but an automatic mouthpiece of the Kremlin leaders Molotov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, and that if he were otherwise he would not be permitted to talk to the President. The Secretary noted that such being the case, it probably would be better for the President to speak with the leaders themselves.

The Secretary emphasized that the President shares the concern which Zhukov expressed at the likely use of atomic weapons in future wars. The Secretary explained that no one abhors that possibility more than the President, who in private conversations with him, constantly remarks how terrible an atomic war would be and reiterates the necessity to prevent such a development.

The Secretary expressed the hope that something might develop from current disarmament talks but noted we will not disarm ourselves merely on the USSR’s promise which cannot be checked; from our experience such a course of action would be dangerous.

The Secretary reviewed his recent conversations with a Japanese delegation concerning the value of Soviet promises. The Secretary said he told the Japanese that the USSR had declared war on Japan at the end of the war⁶ and only for the purpose of getting in on the booty and spoils. The Japanese prisoners of war which the USSR agreed to return only now are beginning to be released. As an aside, the Secretary recalled the London Foreign Ministers’ Conference in 1945⁷ where Secretary Byrnes⁸ raised the question of the USSR’s returning Japanese prisoners of war. Molotov⁹ commented at that time that the USSR had agreed to repatriation only to get Japan to accept the surrender terms and that having achieved that, the USSR was not concerned about implementing the repatriation promises.

The Secretary commented that the stakes now are too great for the U.S. to disarm until we can get reliable assurances that the Soviets will do likewise. Referring to the President’s proposal for overflight inspection,¹⁰ the Secretary noted that this is an example of our willingness to live up to our promises. He said the USSR seems to be edging closer to some form of disarmament and that from the London disarmament conference may come the beginning of inspection and controls—not adequate, but a start from which we may be able to develop something effective.

The Secretary expressed the need to prevent the spread of atomic weapons throughout the world and noted that so far the U.S., USSR, and to a lesser extent the U.K., were the only countries which possess such weapons; all of whom have a stake in peace and are not likely to wish war. Elaborating, the Secretary commented that the USSR now has an economic plant which they certainly do not want to see destroyed. The Secretary emphasized that atomic weapons must not be permitted in the hands of those who do not have such a stake and who may use such weapons recklessly. He noted in this connection our proposal at London to prohibit the use of new fissionable material for weapons. He said such a plan would stop the spread of atomic weapons throughout the world and added that we now are awaiting the USSR’s reply to our proposal. The Secretary commented that we do not believe it would be wise for us to disarm unilaterally because the USSR might not subsequently disarm but rather detonate a war. The Secretary reiterated our objective in preventing a war which might obliterate all of humanity.

Comment:

After leaving the Secretary, U Ba Swe expressed great pleasure in the Secretary’s having given forty-five minutes of his valuable time and volunteered the comment that the Secretary was a great statesman.

At U Ba Swe’s instruction U Than Hla later asked Burma Desk Officer to call to the attention of the Secretary and Mr. Robertson an additional point which U Ba Swe wished to make to the effect that before leaving the prime ministership U Ba Swe had set forth in writing to Chou En-lai Burma’s firm position on a border settlement and that U Nu’s subsequent talks with the Chinese Communists would not alter that position.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90B/4–2657. Confidential. Drafted by Purnell.
2. U Ba Swe was on an unofficial visit to the United States.
3. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen.
4. U Nu initially made this suggestion in a conversation with Marshal Zhukov during the latter’s visit to Burma, before U Nu resumed the position of Prime Minister. (February 16 telegram from U Nu to Ambassador Win, filed with Sebald’s memorandum of the conversation, February 25; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles–U Nu Correspondence)
5. For documentation on the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.
6. August 9, 1945.
7. For documentation on the conference, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. II, pp. 99 ff.
8. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.
9. Molotov, at that time, was Soviet Foreign Minister.
10. For text of the President’s proposal, made at Geneva on July 21, 1955, see Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1955, pp. 173–174.