64. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State1
1248. On eve my departure domestic political situation in Burma while apparently stable governmentally, contains disquieting elements. U Nu is only government leader enjoying widespread popular support and international stature. His position in hierarchy momentarily strengthened by his feat in reassuming Prime Ministership.
Parliamentary opposition, while competently if not inspiringly led, not in position seriously challenge government prior to scheduled 1960 elections. Insurgency still remains major problem, causing Burma lag seriously in economic development and giving rise to increasing [Page 100] discouragement of population. Government processes seriously crippled by administrative inefficiency and lack of qualified personnel, while Communist control of campus student organization and lowering of scholastic standards hampering efforts build up reservoir trained younger personnel.
Sino-Soviet policy towards Burma (in which ChiComs apparently assigned major role) reemphasizes [emphasizes?] protestations of friendship, constant contact through economic and cultural missions, exchanges high level visits, selected economic aid. At same time ChiCom continuing infiltration activities and penetration overseas Chinese community. Soviet and satellite diplomatic representatives (Polish, Czech and Rumanian), have apparently been carefully chosen and are pleasant, plausible men speaking English fluently.
Government leaders aware danger but hard put to find effective means of countering without running risk offending powerful ChiCom neighbor whom they greatly fear. Sino-Soviet objectives obviously to deny Burma to free world, create economic ties to enmesh this country, and eventually draw it into Sino-Soviet sphere of influence. Attractions are obvious: Food and other raw material supplies, colonizing space, and access to Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. Two guide-lines Burmese foreign policy are neutralism and anti-colonialism. These are intertwined and mutually sustaining; they stem from early doctrinaire convictions of group which fought for and achieved Burmese independence but have since been reinforced by fear of third world war and uneasiness over presence on Burma’s long and unprotected frontier of militant, expansionist ChiCom regime. Thus far Sino-Soviets have been more successful than free world in manipulating these concepts to own advantage with result that while Burmese Government leadership basically convinced Burma has less to fear from free world, they find it easier to agree publicly with hypocritical generalizations ChiCom and Soviets about peace, freedom, democracy, et cetera, than with our more specific pronouncements and attitudes.
This situation imposes definite limits on our approaches to Burma. But we have in our favor underlying antipathy of most Burmese to communism and fear of Communist China. Our approaches must be based on patience and attitude of steadfast friendliness. We should be alert to seize whatever opportunities arise to demonstrate to Burmese that we understand problems and are willing to help in mutually acceptable ways. At same time we must continue to maintain through our information program and personal contacts constant flow of informational material and persuasive argument to demonstrate to Burmese that only real danger to their independence is from Communists. This will have to be long-range double-edged effort aimed at calming Burmese apprehensions over involvement on our [Page 101] side as well as pointing up dangers on other side. Particularly important will be our quick exploitation of special situations (like Hungarian) which strike responsive chord in Burmese and provide opportunities for directing Burmese sentiment toward side of free world. It will, of course, remain desirable to encourage friendly relations between Burma and such countries as the Philippines and the Republic of Vietnam, placing emphasis on common experience as former colonies now working out their national destinies in freedom.
US position in Burma seems as favorable at present as at any time since independence. We have gained kudos by our stand on invasion of Egypt and on suppression Hungarian independence movement. Problem Nationalist Chinese irregulars, while still smoldering, no longer source of active irritation, and Burmese do not get excited about, although they consistently deplore our position on China in UN and our espousal of SEATO.
PL 480 agreement2 is recognized by GUB as having been of great importance to Burma’s economy and aid for technicians agreement3 has also made favorable impression. Loan agreement signed March 214 could, if carefully implemented by US, prove landmark in re-establishing confidence in our intentions and good will which were damaged by grievances over previous aid frictions and Chinese Nationalist affair.
We cannot expect immediate results in terms of foreign policy orientation, but I am optimistic that we have a good base for patient, long-term effort.
Separate telegram on economic outlook follows.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.00/3–3057. Secret.↩
- For text of the agreement, signed at Rangoon on February 8, 1956, see 7 UST (pt. 1) 219. It was amended by an exchange of notes at Rangoon, December 4, 1956, to provide for a U.S. loan of $17.3 million to Burma; for texts of the notes, see 7 UST (pt. 3) 3267.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 46.↩
- For text, see 8 UST (pt. 2) 1862.↩
- Infra.↩