Office of the Historian

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State1

Rangoon, October 18, 1956—7 p.m.

526. Re Deptel 4082 and Embtel 518.3 I consider preliminary conditions essential for success military aid discussions with Burmese are:

(1)
Avoidance premature disclosures here or in Washington could expose GUB to opposition attack before it is ready, and,
(2)
Avoidance any impression part Burmese that they are being pushed faster than they ready to go.

In line (1) I reiterate my hope (my telegram 518) that Erskine mission will consign [contain?] not more than 3 persons; advantages which might be gained by greater specialization (and even these doubtful in early stages since participants on Burmese side likely limited to War Office officials) more than offset by difficulty rendering larger mission inconspicuous in Rangoon. In same connection I would hope that need for preventing leak emphasized in inter-agency discussions these matters in Washington.

In line (2) I should like to emphasize that in accordance Deptel 3084 and in harmony with what Burmese apparently have in mind, I have described Erskine group as small “military” mission. At least at outset of talks and until and unless careful soundings reveal disposition of Burmese go into other, related areas, I recommend talks be confined to military matters.

Top secret Embassy despatch 2315 reports status psychological warfare talks, while ARMATT sending separate communication re status training exchange programs.6 Although need for psychological warfare occupying increasing attention upper echelons army and Minister Information, coordination at government level not yet apparent [Page 87] as to what is needed and how responsibilities to be apportioned as between military and civilian.

I consider favorable attitude thus far of GUB to our approaches presents opportunity which could lead to mutually-beneficial outcome.

I conceive most effective negotiating posture for US patient willingness to explore with them their own concept of their needs and equal patience in explaining to Burmese basic conditions governing granting this type assistance by US.

Satterthwaite
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 102.202/10–1856. Secret.↩
  2. Telegram 408 to Rangoon, October 12, described preliminary planning in Washington for the proposed Erskine mission and requested Satterthwaite’s recommendations. (Ibid., 102.202/10–1256)↩
  3. Telegram 518 from Rangoon, October 18, reported that U Ba Swe had told Satterthwaite that day that the Burmese Government and Army were “very keen” to accept the U.S. proposal of military assistance, but wanted to have very informal discussions before trying to reach a final agreement. The Prime Minister said the Erskine mission would be welcome to visit Burma in late November, and Satterthwaite assured him that the mission would be as inconspicuous as possible. (Ibid., 790B.5–MSP/10– 1756) Erskine’s visit was later postponed until February 1957.↩
  4. Supra.↩
  5. Despatch 231 from Rangoon, October 11, entitled “Progress Report on NSC 1290–d Program in Burma” (Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5/12–2056), was one of a series of despatches reporting on efforts to carry out the recommendations of the OCB paper of November 16, cited in footnote 5, Document 24.↩
  6. Not found in Department of State files.↩