521. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Political Situation in Thailand
Both domestic and foreign policy considerations in Thailand contribute to recent developments in that country favorable to the Chinese Communists and unfavorable to free world interests. The following material, which briefly explores these considerations, is submitted for your information.
Domestic Developments
As early as 1955 Prime Minister Phibun instituted a number of democratic reforms in Thailand. As part of this reform program, he submitted to public election for the first time by running in the February 1957 Parliamentary election, and required a number of his Cabinet Ministers to do likewise. He apparently hoped that an all-out political campaign, led by Police General Phao, would result in a landslide. Instead, there was a large vote for the conservative opposition and Phao found it necessary to rig the Bangkok election to give Phibun a substantial lead over his chief opponent and to ensure the election of most of the Cabinet Ministers running at Bangkok. This, as well as the Government Party’s relatively poor showing in the country-wide elections, discredited Phao, and to some extent Phibun, in the eyes of their followers and the public.
To head off anticipated public demonstrations the Government declared an emergency, and appointed Field Marshal Sarit supreme commander for a number of days. As a result of his moderation and frank admission of election irregularities, he became highly popular. This, plus the military preeminence he derives from command of the Army, gave him a commanding lead in domestic politics. He is now courting leftist and neutralist support and seeking popularity by opposing policies which the U.S. favors. He may attempt to take power by Parliamentary means, but violence cannot be ruled out.
In an attempt to restore the relative balance between Sarit and Phao upon which Phibun’s position and Thailand’s stability depend, Phibun threw his support to Phao after the elections, preventing his complete eclipse. Phao has some parliamentary support and apparently hopes to gain more by courting leftists. To this end he has encouraged proposals for the return of ex-Premier Pridi from Communist [Page 929] China and has apparently maintained covert liaison with Pridi. He has also sought other contacts in Communist China, probably largely for profit.
Phibun’s position seems somewhat equivocal. He has tacitly permitted Phao to make contacts in Communist China and to encourage others to promote sentiment for Pridi’s return. In addition, one of Phibun’s chief confidants, believed to be pro-Communist, publishes a violently anti-U.S., pro-Chinese Communist newspaper. However, Phibun continues publicly to support close U.S.-Thai relations and to oppose closer relations with Communist China. We continue to believe that he is the most reliable and constructive of the triumvirate and hope that he can preserve the balance of power and retain his leadership.
Foreign Policy Position
While the political maneuverings described above have contributed to the pressures which have been developing within Thailand during the past year for a softer policy toward Communist China and greater independence from U.S. foreign policy, they are not the chief cause of these pressures. One of the basic reasons for development of these pressures is that the Thai, with a large Chinese minority, are concerned at the growing strength and prestige of nearby Communist China, and are doubtful of the firmness of U.N. policy toward China. As a result, Thai leaders have permitted or encouraged measures amounting to marginal accommodation to Communist China. An anti-U.S., anti-SEATO press campaign, for example, has been permitted to develop unhindered and without effective counter-measures. Furthermore, more than a year ago the Government began permitting Thai to travel to Communist China, and recently a labor delegation, a basketball team, and some 48 entertainers went to mainland China with appropriate Chinese Communist propaganda exploitation. Finally, beginning last year the Government permitted the showing of relatively innocuous Chinese Communist films under official auspices. Now, virulent Chinese Communist propaganda films are being distributed commercially.
Conclusion
Although we believe that Thailand will remain pro-free world at least for some years we are concerned regarding its marginal accommodation to Communist China, and wish to stop, or at the very least retard, this development. To this end, I have made our concern known several times to the Thai Ambassador here and Ambassador Bishop has also spoken to Phibun and other Government leaders. These oral approaches are not so effective as they might be because of several developments which have led the Thai to doubt the firmness [Page 930] of our China policy, including the Geneva talks and indications of increasing U.S. interest in trade with the Chinese Communists. Our chances of slowing Thailand’s movement toward a more neutralist position would be considerably improved if the Thai could be convinced that the United States is making no change in its total embargo on trade and its ban on travel to Communist China. To this effect we shall continue to take every opportunity to impress upon the Thai the constancy of our basic policy toward China as outlined in your splendid address at San Francisco last week.2 As a next step, we are ascertaining that Congressmen are visiting Thailand this summer and will suggest that one or more of them meet with Phibun and other Thai officials to impress them with the overwhelming sentiment in Congress against Red China.