Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

515. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, May 12, 1957—5 p.m.

3389. Reference Deptel 3708.² As indicated Embtel 3275,³ Embassy shares Department concern over impetus recent contacts Communist China and agrees nature arrangements for departure cultural troupe most provocative of series similar events. Question, however, whether TG as such by this means seeking “increased flexibility in foreign policy”. Since TG publicly committed recognition Communist China if that regime admitted UN, it would appear no greater flexibility toward ChiComs needed. These ChiCom contacts do bring Thailand more in line with other US allies (Japan, France, et cetera) who do not recognize ChiComs, and ease her sense isolation from Asian neighbors.

Embassy inclined view this development (despite its effect on local Chinese community indicated Embtel 3275) as motivated primarily by domestic political considerations and only secondarily by TG desire cast foreign policy anchor to windward. Evidence indicates police Colonel Phut Buranasaphop, Chief Foreign Affairs Division, CID, more deeply involved in arrangements than previously known. Since Phut one of Phao’s close subordinates, may reasonably assume he obtained prior consent if not instructions from Phao. This assumption reinforced by knowledge that nearly all Communist China contacts, both covert and public during past 2 years made under Phao regime.

Both Phao and Sarit in their jockeying for support diverse political elements Thailand have catered to growing leftist groups, particularly Bangkok and northeast. Sarit, however, has so far as Embassy aware, confined maneuvers to local scene while Phao has allowed himself become associated with gestures toward Pridi and ChiComs.

Pibul position more than ever depends on maintaining delicate balance between these two ambitious powers who think he cannot effectively inhibit either at this juncture, regardless personal feelings in matter. Sarit recently indicated concern to Embassy over Phao gestures toward ChiComs and sources indicate King deeply disturbed over Phao leftward maneuvers, contemplating bringing about return Pridi and possibly even threatening monarchy.

Developments described Embtel 3275 not sole factors in creating belief in Chinese community TG planning change in China Policy. Knowledge that ChiCom recognition will inevitably follow UN admission is fundamental. There is among local Chinese increasing awareness. ChiCom prestige has been rising throughout world. There is also belief that US, which has been sole opponent to Communist China with significant power in world affairs, is prepared acquiesce without veto to Communist China admission UN and does not hinder development ChiCom relations with our close allies, or contacts with Japan, et cetera. Moreover, facts that TG has not in past year obstructed leftist trend in press, that blatantly subversive ChiCom films now freely shown in Thailand, that many TG officials state publicly they see no reason why Thailand alone should deny herself share in blessings ChiCom trade, all tend inhibit any anti-ChiCom manifestation among local Chinese. We hope TG leaders can be induced understand threat their own security from subverted Chinese minority and from playing with ChiComs and left wing in pursuance domestic political ambitions. In spite our patient educational efforts only Pibul has consistently demonstrated that he understands nature and danger international Communism.

While Embassy agrees broad gauge discussion with Prime Minister and renewed approach Thai Ambassador Washington fully called for, doubtful whether long-range improvement can be effected at this time in view Prime Minister’s present weak position and domestic political considerations cited above which affect TG stability. Such approach to Prime Minister would perhaps be more likely produce desired results after departure Phao and Sarit (if they do proceed to US). Embassy also suggests Department consider approach to Phao and State–Defense approach to Sarit on our home ground.

Until factors causing present political turmoil are more clearly identified and personalities reveal more definite course of action they plan take, Embassy recommends US take no action beyond talks suggested above. We believe counter-action will be feasible in due course but not while situation in present fluid state.

Bishop

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 592.93/5–1257. Secret. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 2, supra.