Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

511. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, January 2, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Courses of Action in Anticipation of Possible Return to Thailand of Pridi Phanomyong

Recent developments relating to Pridi, which are summed up in Embassy Bangkok’s despatch No. 407² (Tab B), indicate that some Thai leaders are engaged in political maneuvering with respect to Pridi. The possibility that he might be permitted to return and be released cannot be discarded. Such an event would cause a considerable change in Thai domestic conditions with concomitant effects upon Thai foreign policy.

Continuing reports … indicate Pridi is attempting to leave Communist China. During the Lao Prime Minister’s visit to Communist China, it appears that Pridi saw him and unsuccessfully requested permission to enter Laos… Pridi may also be planning an attempt to proceed to a European country. Wherever he may go immediately after leaving China, it is virtually certain that his final destination will be Thailand.

Pridi may only wish to return to Thailand to retire. (One rumor indicates he may be ill, and … reports suggest he cannot get on with other Thai in Communist China.) However, it seems more likely that he is carrying out a Chinese Communist plan, under which he might either return immediately to Thailand, hoping he can eventually join in a united front government there, or go to another country temporarily to shed his close identification with the Chinese Communists in preparation for a return to active political life in Thailand.

It is also possible that he has been posing as an agent of the Communists in order to gain their assistance for his return to political activity in Thailand, imagining that once he reaches Thailand he can follow or reject Communist advice, depending upon his own political interests.

Various developments and reports, most of them touched upon in Embassy Despatch No. 407, suggest that at least some leaders in Thailand may be willing to permit Pridi’s return. Among these developments are:

a) the return of Chiap Chaisong,³ a former associate of Pridi, from Communist China to Thailand in April this year, which would probably not have taken place without prior agreement with at least some important leaders in the Thai Government;

b) the official decision a few months after Chiap’s return, that there was “insufficient evidence” to prosecute him despite the apparent existence of considerable grounds for prosecution.

c) … both Police Director General Phao Sriyanon and Prime Minister Phibun have been in contact with Pridi through emissaries, suggesting that at the very least Thai Government leaders desire to maintain communications with Pridi;

d) … private statements by General Phao repudiating Thai Government charges against Pridi for complicity in the death of King Ananda;⁴

e) support given by General Phao and possibly by Phibun for the political party activities of Pridi followers in Thailand; and

f) unconfirmed but persistently reported statements by Pridi’s former follower Chaem Promyong,⁵ now associated with the Government’s political party, that he is running for Parliament on this party’s ticket because as an MP he can better help arrange Pridi’s return.

There are several possible explanations of the apparent willingness of Thai leaders to hold open the door to the possibility of Pridi’s return to Thailand. The most likely is that Thai contacts with Pridi represent, on the one hand, a general tactic of retaining sufficient leeway to permit Thai foreign policy to adjust to whatever new world status Communist China may assume, and on the other, a maneuver by some Thai leaders to exploit for their own political advantage Pridi’s popularity and the possibility of his return.

The Thai Government appears to rely heavily upon US support through SEATO as well as bilateral economic and military assistance to counter an expansionist Communist China. Thai leaders should recognize that the US would take apparent Thai Government acquiescence in Pridi’s return as an indication of a shift in Thai foreign policy, and that there would probably be a corresponding US reaction. It therefore seems probable, as the Embassy states, that Thai Government contacts with Pridi are conducted without official commitment and only with an eye to their future utility, and that at this juncture the Government as a whole would not undertake the risks inherent in permitting Pridi’s return.

However, the Embassy has tentatively suggested that the Department approach the Thai Ambassador to make clear that it would regard with some apprehension the return of Pridi and his participation in Thai politics. In view of the limited factual information available, and the unlikelihood that Pridi will return in the near future, we believe an informal approach to the problem is preferable to a formal one at this time. Thus we have informed Mr. K.T. Young, Jr., of the matter, suggesting that he take advantage of any opportunity which may develop at New York to convey informally to Ambassador Sarasin the Department’s concern and to mention the difficulty Pridi’s return might create for our continuing efforts to justify economic and military aid to Thailand. We intend for Mr. Young to recommend that Ambassador Sarasin pass these comments on to Prime Minister Phibun so that he will not discount the adverse US reaction which would be likely to follow a rehabilitation of Pridi.⁶ There is attached (Tab A⁷) an airmail instruction to inform the Embassy at Bangkok of our action.

Recommendation:

I recommend you sign the attached instruction to Embassy Bangkok.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/1–257. Secret. Drafted by Bushner.
2. Dated December 7, 1956, not printed. (Ibid., 792.00/12–756)
3. Chiap Chaiyasong headed Division II, CID, in the Thai Police Department before the coup d’état of November 1947. After the coup, Chiap fled with Pridi into exile.
4. After the coup d’état in 1947, Pridi and several associates were accused of complicity in the murder of King Ananda in 1946.
5. Chaem Promyong, a prominent member of the newly-established Nationalist Party.
6. Young apparently made such an informal approach to Sarasin, because on January 7 Prime Minister Pibulsonggram told Ambassador Bishop that rumors that the Thai Government was considering inviting Pridi to return to Thailand were without foundation. (Telegram 1968 from Bangkok, January 8; Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/1–857)
7. Not printed; instruction A–178 to Bangkok, January 4, was approved by Robertson. (Ibid., 792.00/12–756)