Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

447. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington , December 5, 1955 .

SUBJECT

• OCB Consideration of Subversion in Malaya

Background:

Last week the OCB directed that we undertake, on an urgent basis and in cooperation with USIA, ICA,CIA, and Defense, preparation of a study of subversion in Malaya and of recommended courses of action for OCB consideration. FE already had under way an interdepartmental policy paper.

Discussion:

Attached is a copy of the paper which has been completed² and is now being reproduced by the OCB Staff for consideration at the next Board meeting. It expresses the complete agreement of the interested agencies that the situation in Malaya, particularly in Singapore, is grave and that urgent action is required. It points out that if Malaya were to fall to communist control the results would be a serious blow to our position in Southeast Asia and the Far East generally, incalculable and irreparable damage to the SEATO concept, and communist command of a very important strategic position.

The paper has the tentative concurrence of all the drafting agencies with the exception of USIA, which takes exception to two of the recommended courses of action. USIA does not agree to provide increased assistance to the British information effort in Malaya nor to expansion of its own program. We understand USIA’s objections are (1) partly budgetary but are also based on (2) a belief that the British should further develop their own resources and (3) a fear of placing the U.S. in the position of appearing to support colonialism.³ However, we believe that:

(1) the gravity of the communist threat requires a continuation of USIA activities in Malaya at least at their present level and that, in fact, expansion is called for even if it means USIS reductions elsewhere;

(2) The British should increase their own information effort but that we cannot press them to do so unless we stand ready to assist them on projects where we have special competence or facilities; and

(3) British and U.S. interests in Malaya coincide sufficiently to justify our sympathetic consideration of any request they may have for our assistance in the information field.

We understand, further, that USIA is reluctant to agree to any change in its Malaya program because in the past Mr. Streibert has expressed the view that the program should be reduced there. (He is out of the country and will not return until later this month.)

Recommendation:

It is recommended that when the Malaya paper comes before the Board you concur in the recommended courses of action and press for full USIA concurrence. If it should appear necessary you may wish to suggest that the issues be put to Mr. Streibert by telegraph.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Singapore and Malaya, General. Secret. Drafted by Smith.
2. Not attached; presumably a draft of the Staff Study, infra.
3. A U.S. Information Agency position paper, circulated to the Board Assistants of the Operations Coordinating Board under cover of a memorandum from Acting Board Assistant J. M. Gerrety, December 6, confirmed that these were the principal objections of the agency to the program outlined in the OCB Staff Study. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Singapore and Malaya, General)
4. There is no record of a telegram to Streibert on the matter, but according to a letter from Kenneth Young to Consul General Elbridge Durbrow at Singapore, December 19, Hoover successfully pressed the arguments advanced by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs when the Operations Coordinating Board took up the issue on December 14. (Ibid., SEA Files: Lot 58 D 726, 350 OCB Paper and Plans)