444. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

SUBJECT

  • Deteriorating situation in Malaya

REFERENCE

  • My memorandum of June 16 on the same subject2

Discussion:

1.
I had a long and interesting discussion on June 23 with Walt Butterworth and Outer Horsey of BNA on the situation in Malaya, and we agreed to approach the British informally in London on the subject. I have, therefore, asked Art Ringwalt by letter to seek UK views and estimates on Malaya and Singapore from both the Foreign and the Colonial Office: and, if possible, gain some idea of UK plans [Page 739] in sufficient detail to guide U.S. policies and courses of action suitably.3
2.
It became very clear from my discussion with EUR that it does not share FE’s concern over the situation in Malaya and, in general, deprecates the significance of events going on there.
3.
Chuck Baldwin, and Sax Bradford of USIA, have recently returned from Malaya. Each of these senior officers has separately corroborated in all important aspects the reporting of our mission at Singapore. I think you should talk with each of them and get their impressions of the situation firsthand.
4.
A new and disturbing move has been made by the Communists in the Federation. The terrorists, who have been in open revolt there for the past eight years, have at this particular time offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the British authorities in order to achieve “a peaceful democratic and independent Malaya”. The Communists propose to end the war, abolish the emergency regulations, hold a round-table conference of all political parties to be followed by general elections in a “democratic, peaceful atmosphere”.
5.
This offer is admirably timed by the Communists in an attempt to divide the Federation before the elections scheduled for July 27. The Communists expect and have received a British rebuff to this offer and hope thereby to create additional anti-British and anti-Colonial feeling. It is my opinion that the Communists are determined to bring an end to the emergency regulations now enforced by the British in the Federation. These emergency regulations hamper Communists’ attempts to organize and infiltrate student and labor organizations in the Federation. If the Communists are to bring to the Federation civil disorder similar to that experienced in Singapore, they must create for themselves the opportunity to do their work in a complacent and unregulated atmosphere.
6.
The British in the Federation have reacted with encouraging imagination and firmness to this offer although they so far appear to be without special retaliatory program. They are attempting to twist this Communist offer psychologically into a sign of weakness, knowing that Communist communication in the jungle, particularly at subordinate levels, is slow and unreliable. British voice aircraft are now circling the jungle broadcasting the theme that the Communist leaders wish to quit and have admitted defeat. They are exhorting the rank and file terrorists in the jungle to surrender now.

In addition, the Government has announced the establishment of a joint military and civil organization to counter Communist subversion. [Page 740] This organization will place responsibility for anti-Communist operations not only on the British military, but also on Malayan civilians who will be elected to the new Legislative Council in July.

Conclusion:

1.
Very little more can be done at present until the approach to the British in London reveals British attitude and estimates.
2.
EUR is hesitant to permit U.S. pressures upon the British for action in Malaya.
3.
Singapore and the Federation are the fulcrum upon which British policy and power in Asia depends. This British force is the strongest real backing for the Manila Pact4 outside of U.S. capabilities. Substantial turmoil and disorder in Malaya at the focus of British power in Asia cannot but weaken confidence in the Free World position in Asia and further strengthen the prestige of Chou En-lai.
4.
Our Consul General in Kuala Lumpur has also been sending in reports on the increasingly disturbing developments in the Federation.
5.
It might be useful for the Secretary to raise the Singapore and Malaya situation informally with Eden and Macmillan to sound them out at Geneva.5
  1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Malaya. Secret. Drafted by Foster. Also sent to Sebald.
  2. See footnote 5, supra.
  3. Letter from Kenneth T. Young to Arthur R. Ringwalt, June 23, not printed. (Department of State, SEA Files: Lot 58 D 207, London Correspondence (1949–1955)) Ringwalt was First Secretary and Counselor of Embassy in London.
  4. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed in Manila on September 8, 1954. (6 UST 85)
  5. Dulles did not raise the issue with senior British officials until the EdenLloyd visit to Washington, January 31–February 1, 1956. For a report of Dulles’conversation with Lloyd on that occasion, see Document 452.