44. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State1
Mr. Secretary: I have been giving further thought to the question of economic and military aid for Burma. It seems to me that in the realm of foreign policy, we are now faced with no problem in the field of Foreign Affairs which is any more important having in mind the long-term implications of the decision we make with respect to aid for Burma. Burma, in a sense, stands at the crossroads. Our decision may well be decisive in leading Burma down the path of closer relations and orientation towards the West or forcing it into close association and dependency on the Communist bloc. (In a sense, the Burma situation is the situation of Egypt in reverse. With respect to Egypt, the Soviet Government, by its ability to act swiftly and on a sizeable scale, turned the entire Egyptian situation to its own great advantage.)
Over the past 18 months, Burma has seemed to be sliding toward closer association and dependency with the Soviet bloc. It has now recognized the dangers implicit in such a policy—and has turned toward us for assistance to prevent it from becoming dependent on the Communist bloc. If we can rapidly exploit this situation, the effect on all the uncommitted and neutralist Arab-Asian States will be tremendous. In effect, it will appear to other Asians that Burma has tried cooperation with the Communists but turned from this because it is not good for Burma. The fact that Burma is a genuine neutral will make the impact all the greater.
I feel we have an opportunity now, in terms of our struggle to hold South and Southeast Asia from Communist penetration, which we cannot afford to miss. In other words, we must find ways of giving Burma economic and military assistance because of the vital effect during the next two or three most critical years.
In my own judgment and in terms of the projection of our position in the Middle East and Asia over the next three or four years, it is infinitely more important to do something for Burma than to have such vast and unrealistic programs in certain of the other countries in Middle Eastern Asia. If, at a time when we are giving over a billion and a half dollars of military equipment and defense support to a handful of countries (i.e., South Korea, Formosa, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Turkey) we can not squeeze out by one device or another enough to at least take care of Burma’s minimum requirements, not only this year but for the next two or three years, I do not think we should be in business. I just fear that if we do not take advantage of [Page 72] this God-given opportunity which in a sense can reverse the current adverse trend which has been running against us, not only in South and Southeast Asia, but in the Middle East, we may never have another such opportunity.
I crave your indulgence for bringing this matter up again, but I feel desperately strongly that we should mobilize the best efforts of our Government to meet the challenge which the Burma situation presents us with and meet it now. Burma, in a sense, is the key to the prevention of Communist domination of Southeast Asia and we certainly don’t want to have another “Egyptian” situation on our hands in Burma in a year or two from now because we did not grasp the nettle. You have so rightly often mentioned the advantage that the Soviet Union has in being able to act swiftly. The Burmese problem is one where we should act swiftly and I earnestly believe that the amounts involved compared with what we are spending throughout the world are such that this Government has the resources and capability also to act swiftly in this case if all elements of the Government understand the opportunity with which we are now presented—an opportunity which may not re-occur if we don’t act now.
This is a personal memorandum from me to you and I have made no copies of it and I am not sending it elsewhere.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/6–1556. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Dulles.↩