416. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State1
1088. Pass Secretary of Defense as priority action. For Dulles and Robertson. Reference: Deptel 1244.2
- 1.
- Developments and progress discussion criminal jurisdiction since Bendetsen’s return fully reported Milba telegrams.
- 2.
- Deptel 1244 raises two sets of considerations: first, tactical negotiating moves designed forestall breakoff in base discussions, and, second, implications to U.S.-Phil relations of breakoff and what steps might be taken to minimize consequences here and in SE Asia.
- 3.
With regard to the first category of considerations, it has been our constant endeavor to reach agreement in principle on criminal jurisdiction with Pelaez, since we felt it would be undesirable to hold plenary panel session at which time U.S. would formally have to record its position on this issue without such prior agreement. While U.S. position on jurisdiction has been fully explained to Pelaez and Barrera in informal meetings and they undoubtedly have briefed panel a formal presentation at plenary session would require us to table specific U.S. proposals which, if rejected by Phils would probably lead to rupture in negotiations with onus on U.S. We could expect, thereafter, continued attacks in press and elsewhere by anti-U.S. elements on specific U.S. proposal, the full text of which would have doubtless been leaked by unfriendly panel elements. It is entirely probable that Recto would be forthcoming with a legal brief attacking the U.S. proposal in the same manner he attacked the Brownell opinion. The U.S. would not be in a position to respond to these attacks except through the press, and we may not wish to become embroiled in press polemic.
Since criminal jurisdiction has been major road block, we have consistently avoided, bypassing it and moving on to other less contentious matters. This approach has been governed by our feeling that we would weaken our negotiating position generally if we showed the Phils the dessert before they ate their spinach. We do believe that bypassing criminal jurisdiction would be interpreted as a sign of weakness on our part and would encourage the Phils to remain firm on any other issues which might develop. Furthermore, if we were able to agree on the rest of the package and then returned to criminal jurisdiction, we would probably be in a more disadvantageous position than we are now. The agreements reached would have been leaked to the press and the public, and, if the discussions were [Page 695] later broken off because of our firm stand on jurisdiction, the adverse effects would be worse than if discussions were broken off now.
The possibility of taking collateral actions of the type set forth in your telegram 1244, e.g., cancellation of construction, etc., was considered by the Embassy. It is our view that any action of this type would be counterproductive. The emotional Phils would, to the extent they would understand this type of subtle action, consider this to be coercion or even blackmail. The adverse consequences of such a move by us might well go beyond the bases problem and affect U.S.-Phil relations on other fronts. We are firmly convinced that we should avoid taking any measures which would appear to the Phils as an attempt force their acceptance of the U.S. position through economic or political pressure.
- 4.
We believe that an uncontrolled or unplanned breakoff of discussions would have most serious consequences not only in Phils but throughout SE Asia. As previously reported these negotiations are being carefully followed by neighboring countries particularly Indos and Thais. The collapse of these talks, particularly on the jurisdiction issue, would be the best grist for the Communist propaganda mill that they have had for a while and would be used by them to attack the U.S. throughout this area.
Locally an uncontrolled or unplanned breakoff could place U.S.-Phil relations at an all-time low. Magsaysay on the eve of elections here would be attacked from all sides by his political opponents, whether they be anti-American or pro-American. To protect himself, he would have to adopt the elements of an anti-American posture and the cloak of a great nationalist at best. We could hope that this posture would be temporary but the risk exists that in an emotional reaction he may sincerely turn against the U.S. In either situation, the very real danger faces us that he may abrogate the MBA. The jurisdiction provisions of the MBA are in the main unacceptable to Phils, and it should not be expected that, in the event these talks fail because of the inability to reach agreement on changes in Art. XIII to remove its objectionable features, the Phils would be willing to continue to operate under that article. It should be anticipated, if the talks break off in a strained atmosphere, that anti-American elements would seek to exploit the jurisdiction issue and whip up public fervor to the point where Magsaysay will feel forced to abrogate the MBA in order to preserve his position.
- 5.
It is our view that, when we reach the point where it appears to us that the continued efforts of Bendetsen and Pelaez to reach agreement on jurisdiction are stalemated, we should then go to Magsaysay using the following approach: (1) that unless he personally intercedes in a really decisive manner the talks will collapse on the [Page 696] issue of jurisdiction; (2) that the substance of the U.S. position is firm and unalterable and is based on the same arrangements we have with our NATO and other allies; (3) that anything less than the U.S. position would not be accepted by the U.S. Senate when the treaty was sent up for ratification; and (4) that the collapse of the talks was not in his interest nor in U.S. interest and would weaken the position of the Free World in the Near East.
If Magsaysay agreed to settle the jurisdiction issue in a manner satisfactory to us and to instruct the panel accordingly we would then agree to go forward with a plenary session. At that time the U.S. would make a complete presentation of its package and the panel should remain in session for this purpose as long as may be required.
- 6.
- In light our views set forth para 3 above we strongly feel that we should not mention to Magsaysay or any Phil that a breakdown or suspension will mean that U.S. must reappraise base requirements here. We should let our case rest on often repeated statement that we will keep bases here so long as they are needed for defense of Phils and U.S. and so long as Phils want them.
- 7.
- We will send separate cable setting forth our views as to possible courses of action in unfortunate event breakoff in negotiations appears likely.
- 8.
- Bendetsen concurs but will respond in separate message to your specific questions in Deptel 1244 regarding his appraisal of potentialities of breakdown.