397. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Far East (Lemnitzer), to the Department of State1
FE 802058. Sent SecState, Secretary Defense, repeated information PACFLT, AmEmb Manila. From Bendetsen exclusive for Robertson at SecState and exclusive for Robertson and Gray at SecDef; exclusive for Admiral Stump; exclusive for Nufer.
Have just received by hand from General Lemnitzer following message from Radford dispatched by him following both his meeting with Magsaysay at Cubi Point commissioning ceremony:
“The situation here insofar as your mission is concerned is not as good as I had hoped it would be. The opposition has successfully generated a great deal of public interest. There seems to be a feeling that the coming negotiations offer a great opportunity to get a lot more out of us and at the same time an opportunity to whittle down Uncle’s2 freedom of action in the future. It is a manifestation of the inferiority complex spurred on largely by the Chronicle crowd in order to embarrass the President. He unfortunately seems to be somewhat boxed in. This is gratuitous information and probably not news to you. I send it as a personal observation in the hope that it will be of help to you. I certainly do not like the atmosphere here. It is my feeling that the quietest arrival you can make will be best and the less you can say or do publicly until you get a feel of the situation for yourself the better off you will be. Good luck and best regards.”
In view of Radford’s pessimistic appraisal of situation Philippine Republic and comment regarding publicity, I am taking under immediate and urgent advisement our fully developed plans for featuring news story concerning arrival aboard my plane of title documents. For your information this plan which matured at Pearl in consultation with CINCPAC and in telecon with COMNAVPHIL and I had thought with tacit concurrence of Nufer contemplated deplaning of documents on my arrival Manila International Airport with press photo coverage and press conference emphasizing careful handling of documents to State plus essential processing work yet to be done at Sangley Point in preparation for the ultimate transfer to Philippine Republic. Two-fold objective this plan has been, first, to feature US follow-through in consonance with joint Nixon–Magsaysay statements; and second, to prepare plausible reason for resisting inevitable Philippine Republic pressure to transfer documents earlier rather than later.
Not being in Manila and not having the feel of the place yet, it is difficult to make snap decisions on this public relations problem. I [Page 661] am presently thinking about going to Manila without documents and having them flown in a few days later specially. This would give us an opportunity to discuss the situation on the ground with Nufer and decide whether to exploit their arrival as planned or secret their arrival as would now seem to have been suggested.
My thinking is conditioned by the conviction that what we face is much more of a public relations than it is a negotiating problem. With the right kind of imaginative, effective, aggressive though dignified public relation effort, the negotiating problem should become somewhat less complex. Without this effort, the negotiating problem becomes not only difficult but hazardous.