Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

384. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Taipei, March 16, 1956—11 p.m.

Dulte 33. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary for President.²

Dear Mister President:

I found at Manila a somewhat unsatisfactory condition. Magsaysay, while he continues to enjoy immense personal popularity, allows himself to be badgered by the members of the Congress and the press. This creates a bad mental condition as he is extremely sensitive to any criticism.

The popular line of attack is that the Philippines is not getting as much from the United States as it should and it treats foreign aid as a measure of friendship and points out statistically that by this measure the Philippines, which ought to be getting the most on a “friendship” basis, is in fact getting the least of the Asian countries.

There are many detailed causes of friction relating principally to trade and commercial and monetary matters.

Magsaysay has some bad personal advisers who tell him that the way to get more from the United States is to be tough and to play up the internal Communist threat.

This was the line which he took with me when we met yesterday afternoon. Our talk was quite different in tone from prior talks which have always been most intimate and cordial.³

I was somewhat concerned as to what note he would strike at the dinner which was a very large affair attended by all the Philippine notables. However, by dinnertime, his mood seemed to have completely changed, and he made a very eulogistic speech about me stating that my stature constantly increased and that I was a main pillar of the Free World and so forth. That gave me a chance in my reply to emphasize the responsibility of the Philippines themselves to play a part in the struggle for freedom. The evening was on a note of warm cordiality.

I was able to announce while there the decision to locate the atomic reactor center at Manila.⁴ I gave Magsaysay this final decision at midnight on the phone, and he was much pleased. He particularly wanted the announcement to be made while I was there in line with his rather simple concepts of personal diplomacy. If announced while I was there, it would seem to the Filipinos that Magsaysay had won this as a personal triumph through his talk with me.

This is in line also with his reluctance to come to the United States unless he can come back bearing gifts.

We need someone who has his personal confidence and who can give him good advice. There are various possibilities which we have in mind and which will I think enable us to better the relationship. Signed Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.10–DU/3–1656. Secret.
2. A copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library bears the President’s initials, indicating that he saw it. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
3. During this conversation on March 15, Magsaysay brought up several issues affecting commercial relations between the United States and the Philippines, relating especially to tobacco, sugar, and rice. In response to Magsaysay’s critical discussion of various problems, the Secretary observed “he did not come to the Philippines or make this tour of the Asian countries in order to discuss the details of the various questions at issue.” After a period of silence, “the conversations were resumed in better spirit by the President.” (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles and Ferguson, March 15; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
4. In a conversation with Romulo on April 14, 1955, Dulles asked if the Philippines was interested in obtaining without cost a nuclear reactor for research purposes, if the Philippine Government would maintain and operate it. Romulo agreed and Dulles announced during this trip to Manila that the United States would locate a reactor in the Philippines. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, April 14, 1955; ibid.)