Office of the Historian

375. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State1

Manila, January 9, 1956—6 p.m.

1865. Eyes only for Robertson. Your 2331.2 Although there is no question of competence of both Radford and Romulo discuss problem to mutual satisfaction both governments, I agree with your evaluation (3rd paragraph, reftel) regarding unwisdom holding bases conversations Washington. Such move could be interpreted as “running away” from political question on which Philippine press and certain segments of Philippine officialdom hold strong views.

It should be borne in mind that bases question is a hot, crucial issue and that any agreement on the Romulo–Radford level would have to be implemented here. If the resultant agreement were to be unpalatable to some Philippine politicos: (1) it probably would not be confirmed by the Philippine Senate; and (2) there is every probability that Romulo would be disavowed by the President on the ground that Romulo did not carry out the President’s instructions [Page 629] which, from the very nature of the subject matter, could hardly be given in minutest detail.

. . . . . . .

In the final analysis Magsaysay, reluctant though he is to tackle the problem, is the only one in a position to make commitments for the Philippine Government on this issue. I believe the reason Magsaysay seized Radford’s suggestion might have been that this was a means of ridding himself of a “hot potato”.

Assume you will discuss question with Radford.

I would be happy to have assistance Admiral Stump for formal talks here.

I am so anxious that we successfully complete these negotiations that I ask you to consider Admiral Radford’s suggestion, not withstanding my comments, for if he can do the job I want him to do it.

Ferguson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/1–956. Secret.↩
  2. In telegram 2331, January 7, Robertson referred to Radford’s December 29 conversation with Magsaysay during which the Admiral suggested holding the military base negotiations in Washington. (See the editorial note, Supra) Robertson informed Ferguson that the Department of State urgently needed his “frank assessment” of Radford’s proposal before making any decision on it. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/1–756)↩