336. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump), to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)1
270149Z. Personal for Adm Burke from Adm Stump. Further to my 130433Z2 am sending this message to you personally suggesting that you use it at your discretion in any way you see fit.
I am profoundly concerned over the rapidly deteriorating situation in Indonesia. I feel that if something imaginative and courageous is not done within the next few weeks that dire consequences may result to our entire security position Southeast Asia which would adversely affect our position throughout the rest of Asia. For example, Indonesia potentially can complement the industrial capacity of Japan [Page 568] with raw materials, food and markets. If Indonesia should fall under Communist control it can be used to manipulate Japan more and more into the Communist orbit.
Action required at the moment is largely on the political front, but I urge a comprehensive review of the situation lest in space of few short months we see this entire island chain slip into the grip of the Kremlin domination without a shot being fired. Such an eventuality would face us with the alternative of accepting the disadvantages of living with a Communist dominated barrier across the South Seas or taking very extensive military action to protect our and our allies’ position. We would be faced with a horrible dilemma and I am afraid that we would end up by accepting inaction with the hope “that everything will somehow turn out all right.”
As startling as the idea may seem, I believe that the only dramatic move which could be taken which would pull the rug out from underneath the Communist plan for takeover is to remove the unifying issue which welds all factions in Indonesia together; namely Dutch recalcitrance in refusing to sit down and arrive at a long term modus vivendi with the Indonesians. I would even go so far as to suggest that if a negotiated formula for the disposition of West New Guinea is the price that must be paid for continuing Dutch and Western influence in Indonesia, that in terms of alternatives, the price may turn out to be cheap.
If Sukarno’s departure from the scene temporarily gives us one last opportunity to capture support of remaining moderate anti-Communist forces by offering them support to establish military and economic security over a period of time in return for the quid pro quo of a commitment to oust the Communists from places of influence and allow a reasonable continuation of Dutch and other Western influence, in my opinion, it is worth it. Inasmuch as this would seem to be the only feasible solution, believe such a formula is at least worth our sober consideration. Fully realize difficulties we would face in discovering suitable formula to be acceptable to Dutch and Australians. However, [in view of] fact that their and our vital interests are at stake in support of the free world position everywhere, believe we should urge our friends to accept some hard counsel in return for whatever we can manage to salvage for them. Am certain that only the US can pull the chestnuts out of the fire at this point. I am convinced that time is of the essence and the passage of a few months may witness the last opportunity fade to salvage the situation by political action.
I am particularly concerned with the effect it will have on the Australians if we are not talking things over with them either directly or through Anzus. They are certainly interested in the situation in Indonesia and feel that this is the time when we should be getting [Page 569] together. If the above thinking has any validity I should think that it might form the basis for useful talks between Minister of External Affairs Casey and State. At least it would give him a feeling of being brought into the picture as a vitally interested ally should be if he were allowed to come to Washington as he desires. Maybe a meeting in Honolulu might be worthwhile.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–3057. Top Secret. Sent to Under Secretary Herter with a covering memorandum of December 30 from Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles. A handwritten note on Quarles’ memorandum by Max V. Krebs, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, notes that Admiral Stump’s proposal was discussed at a meeting in the Secretary’s office on January 3, 1958, at which Sprague was present.↩
- Document 323.↩