305. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
1393. Steeves2 and I called on Djuanda 7:30 this morning and had most discouraging session I have ever experienced with this usually hopeful man. From Prime Minister’s statements it is obvious that assassination attempt on Sukarno has only harmed the cause of those who were hoping and working for more middle of the road government which would be able to hold loyalty of the dissident elements in the regions and the non-Communist forces generally.
Djuanda confirmed press reports that participants in the plot had been caught and had confessed and without revealing names or details made it clear that they represented extreme Moslem groups, young Sundanese officers and others allied in one way or another with the regional dissidents. He confessed to not having taken seriously enough warnings he had received of the extreme action these groups would take. “I just didn’t believe Indonesians would act that way,” he said with almost a note of despair. The result will be a stiffer stand against the opposition groups in Java and the regions.
As a first step in this direction Djuanda revealed that all preparations, including text of government announcement, was ready for issuance tonight granting amnesty to officers already arrested, but that this was now to be indefinitely postponed. This decision had been taken yesterday afternoon, on Djuanda’s recommendation, by the committee of seven, and it had the full approval of Doctor Hatta.
One of most depressing aspects of “The Tjikini Affair”, as it is now being called,3 is probability that its repercussions will make it more difficult, if not impossible, for Hatta to continue his strong stand against Sukarno’s policies and actions. In the name of patriotism and as a good Indonesian, Hatta may very well find himself deprived of much of his former leverage. Our talk with Djuanda has caused both Steeves and me to consider that first possibility discussed by Doctor Roem yesterday (Embtel 13894), namely that Sukarno [Page 526] would retaliate against political forces out of sympathy with his present policy, is a real likelihood. The possibility of the grave results of such action as forecast by Roem cannot be ignored.
What America should do is the question. For the time being and until we have more definite indication of the trend of events, I strongly urge that, at least publicly, we keep very quiet about what is happening here. Privately we can and should counsel caution both by Embassy in Djakarta and by Department to Indonesian Embassy in Washington, but I certain any public statements would only be counter productive.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/12–357. Secret; Priority.↩
- John M. Steeves, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, who was visiting Indonesia.↩
- The assassination attempt had taken place in the Tjikini area of Djakarta.↩
- Telegram 1389 from Djakarta, December 2, reported a conversation between Allison and Steeves and Masjumi leader Mohammad Roem. The latter commented that Sukarno might react to the assassination attempt in two possible ways: (1) he might retaliate against the political forces out of sympathy with his present policy, which, Roem said, “would bring terrible trouble to Indonesia,” or (2) the incident might “bring him to his senses to realize how far the country had deteriorated” and lead him to try to unite the country by bringing Hatta into the government and repudiating the Communists. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/12–257)↩
- Telegram 1214 to Djakarta, December 4, stated: “Concur that at appropriate opportunity both Djakarta Washington we should privately counsel caution and moderation as in long range Indonesian best interest.” (Ibid., 756D.11/12–357)↩