Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 28, 1957—1 p.m.

1354. Department pass Secretaries Army, Navy, Air. Reference: Department’s 1142.² All three Service Attachés on their own initiative came to me in a body yesterday to request me urgently to recommend to Washington reconsideration of point of view expressed in reference telegram. Following points in numbered paragraphs were made by the Attachés without discussion with myself or other Embassy officers. I concur fully with them although with reference to their point 5 on West Irian I am afraid we have been overtaken by events.

1. If nothing is done about furnishing military equipment, Attaches believe PKI will be the winner and probability of their eventual takeover Java and central government will be increased. However, Attachés believe public statement (after coordination with Indonesian Government) that equipment is forthcoming would have nearly as good effect as actual beginning of delivery. It would have major favorable impact on present political situation and Sukarno, who is reported to have told Nasution that “Americans are just playing with us, we will get nothing.” Also furnishing military equipment will logistically tie Indonesian armed forces to United States.

2. Attachés believe facts given in Department’s 1142 are not major considerations which would outweigh above factors. In this connection Army Attaché has just learned that, as indication of how military equipment might be distributed, every army unit, including those of dissidents such as Hussein and Sumual, have received their equal share of Soviet jeeps. Assistant Army Attaché who has recently returned from travel in East Indonesia area reports that in Moluccas command there are only total of 2500 troops in that area and he was assured by local army commanders that no preparations of any sort had been made for any military action against West Irian.

3. Pro-western officers in armed forces who are in definite majority need strong moral support at this time. Announcement of forthcoming equipment even though actual deliveries were far in future would be big help.

4. Attachés believe calculated risk of sending equipment is small since delivery may be stopped at any time. If we don’t send equipment it will be obtained from bloc countries.

5. Service Attachés expressed strong approval of Embassy position on West Irian as set forth in Embtel 1336.³ In addition they would like to reemphasize relative strategic importance of Indonesia and Netherlands in future war plans with reference to such items as population, geographical situation and potential wealth.

For time being we are refraining from carrying out instructions in last paragraph Department’s 1142 as both Djuanda and Nasution are fully occupied with national reconstruction conference. We will, of course, proceed to do as instructed at appropriate time next week unless Washington agencies wish to reconsider in view above considerations.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.56/11–2857. Secret.
2. Document 298.
3. Telegram 1336 from Djakarta, November 26, urged reconsideration of U.S. policy on the West Irian issue. It urged the United States “to support discussions, under UN auspices, between Indonesians and Dutch on Irian issue.” It also passed along an unofficial suggestion by a British Embassy officer for a U.N. resolution calling on the Dutch and Indonesians to negotiate their mutual outstanding problems. The Embassy commented, however, that “it may be increasingly difficult retain mild vein of present Indonesian resolution and favorable attitude now foreseen toward this or similar substitute.” In conclusion, the telegram stated that this change of policy “would have possibility of re-establishing our waning influence as positive force in interest of all free world, certainly including Dutch and Australians. To maintain our present neutrality is, as we see it, merely to sit back helplessly and await the fateful explosion, an attitude which we believe is neither necessary nor wise for our best interests and those of all of our friends as well.” (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–2657)