Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 25, 1957—1 p.m.

1322. Department telegram 1122.² Sukarno saw me for half hour early this morning prior opening National Reconstruction Conference to discuss his hoped for informal visit to US. I gave him substance reference telegram and he recognized tentative nature of agreement to see him in Washington and fact that if he went there it would have to be officially. He claimed his principal desire was to go shopping, see show or two and in general relax from official chores of visits to other countries.

I then spoke most frankly to Sukarno about the embarrassment to US Government if there were untoward developments in Dutch-Indonesian relations prior his visit and I pled with him to exercise his powers of leadership to divert Indonesian emotion over West Irian question into constructive channels. I particularly stressed necessity of avoiding violence. He said if Indonesian national desires not recognized in any manner by either UN or Dutch, the government would have to take some action. However, he said this would take form of “moral violence perhaps economic violence but not physical violence.” He did not expand other than to refer to resolution approved at mass meeting, November 18 (Embassy telegram 1272 to Department repeated The Hague 29, Canberra 21³). I stated that any economic steps taken against Dutch could do as much damage to Indonesia as to Dutch and he nodded agreement but implied this would be no final deterrent.

Sukarno asked what American attitude would be at UN and I told him Secretary had publicly announced we would abstain and maintain position of neutrality. Sukarno shook his head sadly and said, more in sorrow than anger: “that means America has definitely renounced leadership of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces.” I denied this and said that American people and government had amply demonstrated their anti-imperialist and anti-colonial stand but that this was question on which we had differences of opinion. I pointed out that many people in America and elsewhere charged that to vote for Indonesian case would merely be substituting one colonialism for another to which he replied that this was arguable but there was no argument that Dutch were colonial power. Others claimed, I continued, that if Indonesian desires re West Irian granted, next demand will be for British North Borneo and Portuguese Timor. President exclaimed: “Nonsense! We only want what is ours. Our relations with Portuguese most friendly—when I was in Indonesian Timor other day I had good talks with Portuguese officials from their territory and we are cooperating with them.” I said that Secretary had told press that arguments on both sides of case were strong and that being friends of both Netherlands and Indonesia we must remain neutral. I added that this stand had not been any more pleasing to the Dutch than it apparently was to him. “But,” he replied, “our resolution is such a mild one. It does not require you to take anti-Dutch action, only to approve of talks. If it were a stronger resolution, which many of our people wanted, it would be easier to explain to Indonesian people why America abstains, but now it will be impossible.” He added, “will I now really be able to relax in New York?”

At that point we were interrupted by President’s aide who said it was time to go to National Conference. As I left, President in most serious vein pled for American understanding and sympathy. I have seldom seen him in a more solemn and depressed mood than this morning. Although my last words to him were a plea for patience and against violent action, I am not at all certain that he really heard. His last words were, “only America can really help—don’t throw away the ball to the Russians”.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/11–2557. Confidential. Repeated to The Hague and Canberra.
2. Telegram 1122 to Djakarta, November 21, instructed Allison to make clear that President Eisenhower’s official duties might preclude a visit by Sukarno to Washington and that “untoward developments Dutch-Indonesian relations prior his visit would severely embarrass U.S.” It further stated, for Allison’s information: “Decision on Washington visit will depend on developments in Indonesia during intervening period.” (Ibid., 756D.11/11–2157)
3. Telegram 1272 from Djakarta, November 19, reported on a mass rally held in Djakarta on November 18 as the high point of the current West Irian campaign. A resolution acclaimed at the rally urged that if the U.N. results were unsatisfactory, the government should take various measures, including nationalization of Dutch-owned vital enterprises, restrictions on Dutch nationals, and establishment of a West Irian Liberation Fund. (Ibid., 656.56D13/11–1957)