Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

290. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 18, 1957¹

Washington, November 18, 1957

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Subandrio, Foreign Minister of Indonesia
• Mr. Moekarto, Indonesian Ambassador at Washington
• The Secretary
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Walmsley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for IO
• Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs

Dr. Subandrio, after an exchange of amenities, said that he had asked to see the Secretary again because he wanted to ask for the understanding and assistance of the United States in the West New Guinea problem and the deteriorating Indonesian-Netherlands relations. He said that relations with the Netherlands are more strained now than ever before. Among the contributing factors he mentioned 1) the increase in the Communist votes in the recent elections in Java; 2) the position of President Sukarno on the West New Guinea issue; and 3) extension of the cold war to Asia as a result of increased activities of the Soviet Bloc in that area. He said that not only was his Government concerned with the increased activities of the Soviet Union in Asia but that President Nasser also shared this concern, as indicated to him by the President during his recent visit to Cairo.

Discussing each of these factors separately, Minister Subandrio commented:

1. The West New Guinea issue has been taken by the PKI as a subject for agitation. If Indonesia cannot get the UN to approve a resolution on West New Guinea, as seems likely at the present time, the Government wants to prevent the issue being used by the Communists for their purposes. It is therefore taking some of the initiative at the present time to avoid the Communists’capitalizing on this issue.

2. Referring to the Secretary’s remark when he called on October 4 to the effect that as a result of Sukarno’s visit the two countries had not drawn closer as we had hoped, Dr. Subandrio said that President Sukarno had asked him to convey to the Secretary and to President Eisenhower the statement that he is not a Communist. He said this is also his own estimate of the man. The President’s one obsession is West New Guinea and his aloofness to the U.S. is not related in any way to communism or his thinking on communism but to the West New Guinea issue. The President’s speeches are extremely effective in Indonesia, and although the President regrets that he has to go as far as he does in his public utterances, he does so because he wants to have the West New Guinea issue removed from the scene.

3. The Soviet Union is increasing its activities in the area daily. The Indonesian Government wishes to remove the West New Guinea issue before it becomes an issue in the cold war. As a result of the strained Indonesian-Netherlands relations the West is in a weak position in Indonesia. Until this issue is removed the position of the West cannot be strengthened.

The Minister said that Indonesia was anxious to get out of the present impasse in its relations with the Netherlands, which it considers dangerous. The policy of the Indonesian Government is to seek a way out of this impasse through negotiations with the Netherlands. Such negotiations, he said, would not necessarily mean a transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea now and might in fact last for several months, a year, or longer. The West New Guinea issue could be discussed in the context of negotiations on all phases of Indonesian-Netherlands relations. What is at stake is no longer just West New Guinea but the future of Indonesia. The Minister said that a defeat of the Indonesian resolution in the UN might be followed by the breaking of relations with the Netherlands. What the Indonesian Government asks of the United States is not that we make a choice between Indonesia and the Netherlands but that we assist in bringing about these negotiations since other matters than just West New Guinea are at stake.

The Secretary said that if the issues in this matter were clear we would not hesitate to act, just as we did not hesitate to act against our friends the British and the French last year in the Suez crisis and recently against the French on the question of supplying arms to Tunisia. We do not hesitate to act even contrary to the interests of our own friends if the issues are clear. In the present case, for example, there is the question of interpretation of agreements, with reference to which the suggestion has been made that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. There is also the question of who should have responsibility for leading the people of this area to independence, which is not clear. The Secretary said that we are under the greatest pressure from the Netherlands and Australia to come out on their side but we have not done so because in our opinion the issues are not clear. The Secretary added that he does not feel that we are justified in taking the drastic action which would be involved should we take either side and that until the issues have been clarified we do not believe we can make a clear case of support for either side. He said he realizes this does not please either side but that such is our position.

The Secretary commented that the Soviet Union does not face a similar problem because they support whatever side is in their interest on any given issue, changing their position when they find it necessary, not having any principle in these matters. The Secretary regretted that the issue had become so inflammatory in Indonesia.

The Secretary then read to Dr. Subandrio a UP report that President Sukarno in a speech in Djakarta today had said that Indonesia would resort to force if the UN failed to settle the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over possession of the area. The Secretary pointed out to Dr. Subandrio that Indonesia has agreed under the UN Charter not to use force to settle its disputes; that it is not made easier for us to support the Indonesian case when it looks as though we were doing so under threat of force. The Secretary said that Indonesia should be satisfied that we are not supporting the Netherlands, especially in view of the great pressure from them to obtain our support. The Secretary reiterated his previous statement that the issues were not clear and that we will therefore continue to maintain our policy of neutrality. He said that it is our decision to adopt a neutral position in the United Nations although our position may change in light of the form of the resolution to be presented. If we thought that legally and morally the issues were entirely clear we would not hesitate in offending one side by supporting the other. We have not hesitated to do this in the past. In the main, he said, we plan to continue our position, always depending of course on the form of the resolution.

Mr. Walmsley mentioned that a draft resolution had been circulated and that it differed from previous resolutions in that there was no request for the good offices of the UN. The draft resolution recommends that the two parties negotiate their differences and that the President of the General Assembly assist them in this and report back to the 13th General Assembly.² The Secretary commented that the position of the Netherlands Government was that support for the resolution implied support for the Indonesian position.

Dr. Subandrio commenting on the legality of the Indonesian claim said that Indonesia and the Netherlands have held negotiations on the West New Guinea issue since the Round Table Conference in 1949 and that even as late as 1952 the Netherlands Government had agreed to the appointment of a joint commission to study the problem and to report back to the two governments. The commission had not carried out its work, however, because of the resignation of the Indonesian Government during the negotiations. He said he cited this as an indication that the Dutch even as late as 1952 were prepared to negotiate on this issue. The Secretary commented that it was his understanding that the Dutch took the position that they had complied with the provisions of the RTC Agreement for negotiations within one year.

As to the use of force, Dr. Subandrio said that he agrees that Sukarno’s speeches are strong and forceful but that the Indonesian Government must take the initiative from the PKI. He said that as to the use of force, they do not mean the use of armed forces but of strong action in their relations with the Netherlands. Dr. Subandrio said it would be very painful to take any drastic action vis-à-vis the Netherlands but the alternative would be easier than the present situation.

Concerning the Australian position on West New Guinea and their statements that the races there are different from those in Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio said that the people of West New Guinea are close racially to the Ambonese. He said that as he had pointed out to Foreign Minister Casey, he thought that Indonesia as a whole was of greater importance to the security of Australia than West New Guinea. He said his government had not thought in terms of a military alliance with Australia but that this does not mean that Indonesia is not prepared to ally itself with Australia if there is a threat from the north. Dr. Subandrio said that Indonesians have been concentrating on domestic problems and for that reason have not entered into any military pacts. Indonesia wishes to improve its relations with Australia but the recent joint Australian-Netherlands statement is not conducive to good relations. With reference to the joint statement he said he had suggested that the Australians state that it does not imply a military pact, which in his opinion would be very bad. The Indonesian position on alliances, although it has not joined any of them, has been consistently that they are intended to be against the Communists. If the Australian-Netherlands statement implies a military pact against Indonesia this will weaken the position taken by the Indonesian Government so far and play into the hands of the Communists.

The Minister reiterated his statement that there are many problems in Indonesian-Dutch relations which need to be settled and that all Indonesia wants is to negotiate the question of West New Guinea in the context of these problems. Maybe in a year or so, he said, as a result of negotiations it might appear that West New Guinea is after all not the most important problem between the two countries. The Indonesian Government, however, is anxious to make sure that the issue is not seized upon by the Communists. Dr. Subandrio, in referring to the tactics of the Communists mentioned the use being made of two telegrams reportedly picked up during the Taipei riots³ and published about a month ago by Blitz magazine in Bombay.⁴ Mr. Robertson explained to the Secretary what the telegrams were and there was no further discussion of this issue.

The Secretary told Dr. Subandrio that Indonesia was not going to get West New Guinea by going Communist and that such a development is one thing that will make it certain that Indonesia will not get West New Guinea. Indonesia’s best chance to get West New Guinea, he said, is not to go Communist.

Dr. Subandrio said that he was not implying that Indonesia could get West New Guinea by going Communist, but was merely saying that they would like to find some way to deprive the Communists of this issue. Indonesia is anxious to put its relations with the Netherlands on a clear footing and that is what makes the matter so urgent at the present time.

The Secretary commented that clarification of relations between a former colony and the former mother country was never easy. He cited our own experience, referring to our Canadian border problem as a case in point. He said we hope that the day when force is used or threatened in such cases is past and that the divisive issues can be worked out.

The Secretary inquired whether the resolution in referring to a “political dispute” had been so worded to get away from the idea of a “legal dispute”. Mr. Walmsley referred to the explanatory memorandum circulated with the draft resolution which makes mention only of a “political dispute” and no reference to a “legal dispute”.⁵

Dr. Subandrio stated that he understood the dilemma we are in. The Secretary commented that he should be very happy that a country such as ours, which has such close ties with Australia and the Netherlands, is not voting on their side. Consideration of both sides’ cases shows that the arguments are well balanced.

Dr. Subandrio stated that in his opinion something bigger than just West New Guinea is at stake. The Government is afraid of Communist advances in Indonesia, and all parties are now preparing for the battle against PKI. In preparation they wish to remove all issues which are potential irritants. Referring to the Secretary’s comment at their last meeting that “fear is the beginning of wisdom”, Dr. Subandrio said that some fear is now present and that is why the situation is urgent. The Indonesian desire, he said, is to sit down with the Netherlands and settle their differences.

In parting the Secretary commented on Dr. Subandrio’s presentation of the Indonesian case, complimented him on his persuasiveness, and said he had convinced the Secretary that we should not vote against the resolution. Dr. Subandrio in parting said that he wished it were possible for us to use our influence with some of the countries which might oppose the Indonesian resolution. There was no comment on this point.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756C.022/11–1857. Confidential. Drafted by Mein. The source text bears the handwritten notation by Joseph N. Greene, Jr., “OK as changed. JG”, and the typed notation that the last page (containing the last six paragraphs) was retyped in the Executive Secretariat.
2. The text of the draft resolution, given to the U.S. Delegation by the Indonesian Delegation, was sent to the Department in Delga 429, November 14. (Ibid., 656.56013/11–1457)
3. Rioters had broken into the U.S. Embassy in Taipei on May 23.
4. The purported telegrams, allegedly sent from the Embassy in Djakarta to the Embassy in Taipei in March 1957 and requesting arms and the transfer of units from Formosa to assist the Darul Islam and regional dissidents, had appeared in the September 28 issue of Blitz. Telegram 916 from Djakarta, October 9, reported that the Acting Foreign Minister had shown the issue to Allison, who pointed out that they were numbered 473 and 490, whereas the Embassy had sent “probably less than a dozen” messages to Taipei, and “categorically denied that I had sent any such messages or that I agreed with recommendations in the alleged messages.” (Department of State, Central Files, 121.93/10–957) Telegram 1255 from Djakarta, November 16, reported that a story based on the alleged telegrams had appeared that day in three left-wing newspapers in Djakarta. (Ibid., 121.93/11–1657) Telegram 1283 from Djakarta, November 20, reported that Djuanda had told Allison that “he did not think any responsible officer in the government placed any credence” in the stories. (Ibid., 121.56D/11–2057) Blitz had previously published purported telegrams from the Embassy in Taipei, also allegedly stolen during the May 1957 riot. Telegram 339 from Taipei, October 7, commented that they contained several features establishing them as forgeries, and noted that the Embassy’s Top Secret files had not been compromised during the riot. (Ibid., 121.93/10–757)
5. Delga 429 (see footnote 2 above) made no reference to an explanatory memorandum, but the text of the draft resolution which it transmitted referred to a “political dispute”.