Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

271. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 2, 1957.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

Discussion:

Pursuant to your directive (Tab A)² the Department has re-examined the problem of West New Guinea, raised with you in August by the Netherlands and Australian Ambassadors. IO, EUR and L have examined possible alternatives to our present “hands-off” policy and have agreed upon a set of recommendations for your consideration (Tab B). FE does not concur in these recommendations, believing very strongly that there should be no change from our past position, which has meant that we have abstained on all votes in the United Nations General Assembly, including the vote on inscription, and have been completely silent during the General Assembly discussions of the question. FE’s analysis in support of its position is attached as Tab C. An agreed statement of certain facts bearing on the problem is also attached (Tab D).³ There is some urgency attaching to the question due to the ANZUS meeting next Friday.⁴

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you meet with the representatives of the interested bureaus to decide whether a new policy on the question of West New Guinea is in the national interest. It is my own thought, after consideration of the several suggestions which have been advanced, that United States interests for the time being at least would be served best by continuance of our policy of neutrality.

[Tab B]

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs⁵

Washington, October 2, 1957.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSIS BY IO CONCURRED IN BY EUR AND L⁶

Recommendations

1. That you authorize the initiation of early consultations with Australia and the Netherlands in which the United States would propose that they give serious consideration to developing appropriate trusteeship proposals for the area, and inform them of our intention to speak at the GA in favor of trusteeship and our willingness to support a quasi-procedural resolution of the type described in Paragraph 3(b) below; and that you also authorize so informing Indonesia.

2. That, subject to possible modification in the light of the discussions envisaged in Recommendation 1 above, the US Delegation to the 12th GA be authorized to state the US position on West New Guinea in terms contemplating some form of trusteeship.

3. That the US Delegation to the 12th GA be authorized to:

(a) vote for any resolution acceptable to the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Australia;

(b) vote for any quasi-procedural resolution limited to an expression of the hope of the General Assembly that an amicable solution to all outstanding issues will be found;

(c) vote for any resolution offering good offices machinery through the UN acceptable to the parties, but vote against a good offices resolution unacceptable to one or more of the parties;

(d) vote for a resolution expressing satisfaction that the Netherlands is reporting on the territory under Chapter [Article] 11 of the Charter looking toward the eventual development of self-government in West New Guinea; or endorsing the idea of trusteeship as set forth in paragraph 3 above [below];

(e) oppose actively any resolution which is ambiguous, which prejudges the issues, or which, in our view, would tend to deprive the Papuans of the opportunity ultimately to détermine their own political future.

Discussion

1. On the basis of agreement that US interests would not be served by transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, we sought to find a US position on the West New Guinea problem that meets the need to advance the welfare and interests of the Papuans, maintains peace and security in the area, and is defensible as fair and just. Such a position would permit the US to abandon its hands-off policy in circumstances that would be politically defensible and that would be least prejudicial to continued good relations with the Dutch, Indonesians and Australians. It was agreed that it was important to arrive at such a position because of the distinct possibility that a shift in the 12th General Assembly of several votes and the support of the two new members (Ghana and Malaya) might lead to adoption of a good offices resolution. (See Tab 1 for analysis of prospective voting lineup.⁷) In these circumstances it is apparent that a hands-off policy may permit the situation to move in Indonesia’s direction.

2. It is believed that US willingness to support suitable trusteeship arrangements, and, in the 12th GA, a quasi-procedural resolution expressing the hope that a just solution will be reached in accordance with Charter principles will permit the United States to take a positive stance on this problem.

3. A trusteeship arrangement would provide a positive solution that would both serve US interests in the area and constitute a means of settlement based on agreed international principles. A joint Dutch-Australian trusteeship for all New Guinea (the present Australian trust territory, Papua, West New Guinea, or at least New Guinea less Papua) would be preferable. However, if this should not prove feasible, a Dutch trusteeship for West New Guinea alone would be satisfactory. An Indonesian trusteeship or a trusteeship under direct UN administration should be avoided.

4. Prior consultations would be essential to successful implementation of such a trusteeship proposal. Subsequent action would depend initially upon the Australian and Dutch reactions, but Indonesia should also be consulted at an appropriate stage. We would seek to persuade these three that trusteeship provides a reasonable and just solution giving due recognition to their legitimate interest. For example, the present Dutch and Australian concerns to keep Indonesia out of the territory, each for its own reasons, should be met; Indonesia, through the privileges of its UN membership, would have a role in connection with the territory (this would include the right to submit petitions to the Trusteeship Council; participation in the discussions of the Fourth Committee of the Assembly on trusteeship matters involving the territory; and participation, if elected, as a member of the TC and of UN Visiting Missions to West New Guinea); the Papuans would eventually exercise their right of self-determination; the island could be developed as a unit; trusteeship can be broadly presented as a rational, constructive step designed to accomplish and complete the tutelage of a presently non-self-governing territory in conformity with the Charter. The ideal result of such consultations would be a Dutch announcement in the 12th GA of intention to place the territory under trusteeship.

5. A US statement supporting trusteeship and expressing willingness to support a resolution expressing hope for an equitable solution could logically preface a positive stand on any other proposals that might be submitted. It would permit an affirmative pronouncement of US policy focusing primarily on the unassailable objective of the welfare of the Papuans, while at the same time recognizing without any prejudgment that a dispute does in fact exist between the Dutch and Indonesians. By inference such a policy would exclude the possibility of extension of Indonesian control to the territory and place continued Dutch administration in the Charter context of trusteeship, thereby eliminating any plausible basis for charges the United States is defending “colonialism”. Such a US statement could constructively influence the course of GA discussion.

6. It is recognized that the suggested US position—endorsement of trusteeship and willingness to support a resolution of the type described above—is unlikely to meet with favor from any of the interested parties. We anticipate that Indonesia will oppose trusteeship, and the initial Dutch and Australian reactions will probably be unfavorable. The Dutch will not like a quasi-procedural resolution, and Indonesia will feel it does not go far enough. Nevertheless we believe the whole represents a defensible and affirmative US position.

7. The United States may be faced with substantive proposals going beyond the “quasi-procedural” type or not limited to endorsement of trusteeship, which would be designed to enlist support, to greater or less degree, for the Indonesian viewpoint. For example, adoption of a good offices type resolution would be undesirable because (a) it would be rejected by the Dutch and thus would have no practical result except to intensify Indonesian demands for further GA action; (b) it implies a legitimate Indonesian claim; (c) it would lead to a further deterioration in the situation and might even furnish a pretext for direct or covert Indonesian military activities against New Guinea; (d) it would ignore the primary interests of the Papuans; (e) its failure to produce constructive results would tend to undermine the prestige of the UN. Consequently, if necessary to forestall adoption of undesirable proposals, the United States must be prepared to lobby and vote negatively.

[Tab C]

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs⁸

Washington, October 2, 1957.

RECOMMENDATION AND SUPPORTING ANALYSIS BY FE

Recommendation:

That we maintain our policy of neutrality with respect to the West Irian issue and that we abstain on all aspects of UNGA consideration of the issue.

Discussion:

The West Irian issue before the GA does not involve any decision on conflicting claims to sovereignty ‘or on the transfer of sovereignty or administration from the Dutch to the Indonesians. The issue involved is a request for a resolution looking toward the resumption of negotiations under UN auspices between the disputants. Foreign Minister Subandrio has told our Embassy in Djakarta that this is the most he hopes to obtain and that “these negotiations can go on for one or two years or more and we will be able to keep the situation under control here” in Indonesia.⁹ A similar resolution was introduced by Indonesia at the last GA.

Heretofore the US has maintained a policy of neutrality on the West Irian issue and abstained on all votes in the GA. Embassy Djakarta has now urged that we support the Indonesian position while Embassy The Hague has urged that we support the Dutch position. A major factor in the decision must be the probable impact of a departure at this time from neutrality on our relations with Indonesia, the Netherlands and Australia, and on the whole framework of our policy objectives in the Far East.

Indonesia at this time is undergoing a severe internal political and economic crisis. In the recent elections on Java the Communist party showed a substantial increase in strength, as compared to its position in 1955; some of the outer island regions have not been working with the Central Government; the Army is divided. In an effort to resolve some of these problems, representatives of the Government and of the regions recently held a National Conference in Djakarta. Although the results of the Conference are not fully known, it did succeed in bringing Sukarno and Hatta together and in adopting unanimously a resolution establishing criteria to be followed by the government in meeting some of the problems facing the country. The resolution also stated inter alia that normal relations between the regions and the Central Government have been reestablished. The Conference was described in public statements by leading participants on both sides as “successful”. It is too early to appraise the results of the Conference. Until its full implications are known, the US should take no action which might jeopardize the chances of its success in meeting the problems facing Indonesia today.

All elements in Indonesia, whatever their political, ethnic, or religious differences, are agreed on Indonesia’s “right” to West Irian. It is a national claim and an irredentist issue of universal emotional appeal. The recent National Conference adopted unanimously a resolution supporting the Indonesian Delegation to the UN in its efforts to obtain a UN resolution. There are differences on the strategy for pursuing the claim but not on its basic validity.

US abandonment of neutrality and support of the Dutch position in the UN would not weaken Sukarno but instead would tend to mobilize public opinion behind him. It would be considered as a gesture of hostility toward the entire Indonesian people, not as a rebuke to Sukarno. It would in our opinion push him perhaps irretrievably into the Communist-infiltrated anti-West camp. It would hand the Communists a propaganda windfall by confirming their charges that the US is pro-colonialist. It would also wipe out in a stroke a store of goodwill, trust and confidence developed in Indonesia with painstaking effort over the past seven years.

Passage of a resolution similar to those introduced in previous years would not be considered in Indonesia as a triumph for Sukarno. Sukarno has never actively favored reference of the problem to the UNGA. It would be rather a victory for moderate elements advocating resort to peaceful channels for settling international disputes and opposed to direct action.

Outside of Indonesia, support of the Dutch position would have adverse effects of varying intensity in the entire Asian-African bloc. It would tend to give the bloc greater cohesion and confirm the charge that US sympathies on colonial questions lie with the colonial powers.

“Free political institutions” and “self-determination” are so far in the future for the stone age Papuans as to be meaningless terms. After 129 years of formal Dutch control, over 40% of the estimated total native population have still not been brought under the Dutch administration. Except in Hollandia and a half dozen other small coastal settlements, the Papuans presently live without benefit of external governmental influence and will continue to do so under Dutch or Indonesian sovereignty.

IO and EUR propose that at this critical moment in our relations with Indonesia we should abandon our policy of neutrality in favor of a new policy. They propose first that we support a trusteeship for West Irian under Dutch (or Dutch-Australian) administration. This proposal would be as unacceptable to the Indonesians as a proposal for an Indonesian trusteeship over the area would be to the Dutch. The Dutch in 1949 and again in 1950 suggested to us a Dutch-administered trusteeship for the area and we replied that we would be agreeable “assuming it was satisfactory to the parties directly concerned”. It was not satisfactory to the Indonesians and the project was dropped. It may be noted moreover that a strategic trusteeship would require SC approval which could not be obtained over a Soviet veto, while there would seem to be no prospect that a non-strategic trusteeship could obtain the needed GA majority unless modified in a manner unacceptable to the Dutch. Ambassador Lunstold Mr. Robertson last week¹⁰ that the Dutch had recently discussed the trusteeship idea with Secretary General Hammarskjold who had advised against it.

Our espousal of a Dutch-administered trusteeship would not be regarded by UN members generally as evidence of our interest in the welfare of the inhabitants. Their primitive state of development making “self-determination” academic is too well-known in Asia. Indonesia’s experience under Dutch colonial administration has not commended that control to Asian members, while Dutch administration of New Guinea was recently criticized even by a member of the Dutch legislative mission there. US support for a Dutch trusteeship would be widely interpreted as evidence of a US desire to maintain Western control over Asian peoples or, to Asian minds, of US “colonialism”.

The IO/EUR proposal would also involve US support for a “quasi-procedural” (“pious hope”) type of resolution and US voting and lobbying against a resolution for the resumption of negotiations under UN auspices. The Dutch have argued that the change of a few votes from last year’s total might result in approval of a resolution and that we should take active steps to prevent this result. At the same time the Indonesian Government has warned its people of a possible decline in voting strength for its resolution. Whatever the voting situation, it would seem incongruous for the US, which supports the UN as a forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes, to work to bring about the defeat of a resolution looking toward the resumption of negotiations between disputants. The IO/EUR proposal would not advance the settlement of the dispute or accomplish any other constructive purpose. It would involve forfeiture of our neutral position for what would amount in practical effect to support of the Dutch position.

We have consistently maintained a neutral position on this question and now is not the time to change. In the sum total of our relations with the Netherlands and Australia, the West Irian issue is outpaced by other issues. For Indonesia, however, West Irian has become the major foreign affairs preoccupation. If we were to support the Dutch position, the Netherlands and Australia would undoubtedly be pleased and, we believe, surprised. Their reaction would not, however, bring any advantage to the US commensurate with the loss the US would suffer with respect to Indonesia. There is no single step within reason which we could now take that would be better calculated to drive Indonesians closer to the Communists and to undercut our friends in Indonesia, or which would have a stronger adverse effect on the attainment of US and Free World objectives there, with repercussions on US prestige throughout Asia. If we are not to sacrifice all chance of influencing future developments in Indonesia, it is essential for us to continue to maintain a neutral position on the West Irian issue.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/10–257. Secret.
2. Document 251.
3. Entitled “The Problem of West New Guinea”, not printed.
4. A meeting of the ANZUS Council was to be held in Washington on October 4.
5. Secret.

6. The L concurrence is directed solely to the two following legal points:

   1. L does not agree with the Indonesian contention that Indonesia obtain [obtained] sovereignty over West Irian under the terms of the settlement with the Dutch

   2. L believes that it would be legally proper to establish a trusteeship, provided that this is done with the consent of the Dutch. [Footnote in the source text.]

7. Entitled “Analysis of Voting Probability on Indonesian-type Resolution”, not printed.
8. Secret.
9. Subandrio made this statement in a conversation with Allison on September 5, reported in telegram 621 from Djakarta, September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/9–557)
10. Reference is to a conversation of September 25 between Luns and Robertson concerning the New Guinea question. According to Mein’s memorandum of the conversation, Foreign Minister Luns stated that the Secretary-General had indicated that a trusteeship would only give rise to further Netherlands-Indonesian disputes which would occupy additional time of the United Nations. (Ibid., 656.56D13/9–2557)