259. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
569. During forty-five minute talk with Dr. Hatta this morning he gave me his ideas about Communist situation here and forthcoming national roundtable conference.
Dr. Hatta says there is no immediate danger of a Communist take-over but that situation would become critical if non-Communist parties and leaders fail to understand situation. Hatta gives three reasons why he believes there is no immediate threat. In the first place he maintains that there is but little likelihood of Communists being able to take over Central Government through parliamentary means as outer islands plus provinces outside Central and East Java will provide non-Communist majorities for Parliament. In second place if Communists should attempt to use extra-legal means to take over government, army would prevent it. While Hatta admitted there [Page 433] were divisions in army over many questions, he is confident that on question of Communist take-over army would unite with exception of a few individual officers. Same opinion has been expressed to me recently by both Subandrio and Pringgodigdo.2 In third place Hatta believes Communists would have great difficulty in any attempted take-over because of the lack of strong individual leaders in PKI. He said that if Musso3 were alive situation would be different but he characterized present head of party Aidit as “playboy”.
Hatta therefore believes there is still time for steps to be taken to reduce Communist influence. This will require, in his opinion, considerable improvement in economic situation in Central and East Java and there should be more land given to the peasants. Also something should be done to cause older leaders of PNI to realize danger of continued cooperation with the PKI. Hatta says that younger leaders of PNI are convinced of danger and ready to change but that the elders, such as Suwirjo are reluctant to admit they have made mistakes in the past.
Hatta agrees with Sukarno’s statement to me that probably not more than one percent of those who voted PKI are ideological Communists, but he recognizes, as Sukarno did not, that this one percent can be extremely dangerous and can control the activities of the party. Contrary to opinion expressed to me by Subandrio, Hatta believes that PKI looks more toward Moscow than Peking. In explaining this belief it was apparent that Hatta, in common with many other non-Communist leaders not only in Indonesia but elsewhere in Asia view Chinese Communists in different light than Russian Communists. Hatta expressed belief that whereas Russians were first Communists and secondly Russians, Chinese were first Chinese and secondly Communists. In talking about Communist China, Hatta said he anticipated increasing difficulties for the Peking regime as they make more clear to Chinese peasants their ideas on collectivization of agriculture. Hatta hopes that his forthcoming visit to Communist China will give him an opportunity to check this belief. He also hopes to visit the Muslim areas in Communist China to see just exactly how much freedom they are being allowed.
Reverting to Indonesian Communist situation, Hatta said that reason for great upsurge in Communist voting was (1) superior organization of PKI to other parties, (2) unlimited promises made by PKI which uneducated masses are unable to evaluate correctly, and (3) activities of Sukarno. He says Sukarno’s actions stem primarily from his intense emotional conviction that Indonesian revolution will not [Page 434] be finished until West Irian becomes part of Indonesia and his belief that in order to achieve this great mass of Indonesian people must be united back of this aim. Sukarno’s flirtation with PKI is therefore explained by his desire to keep the masses on his side not for Communist purposes as such but as an aid in achieving President’s aim of getting West Irian for Indonesia.
With respect to coming national roundtable conference, Hatta stated it is a step in the right direction. He believes it will give an opportunity for the outlying regions to bring their point of view to bear directly on Central Government and Sukarno but he cautions that we should not expect too much from the conference. He appears to believe that if it creates a better atmosphere between the Central Government and the outlying regions it will have done well and that with the creation of such an atmosphere it will be possible to work out in time solution to the many practical problems confronting the regions and the Central Government. Hatta seemed to be somewhat hazy about his exact role in this conference but said that he had agreed to participate on Djuanda’s request because he felt everything possible should be done to eliminate the distrust and suspicion which has been governing the relations with the outer regions. Hatta said that his activity in the conference would to some extent be conditioned upon attitude taken by Sukarno and that if the President maintained too uncompromising a position he would probably not actively participate though he might not necessarily walk out. He gave no indication that he would acquiesce in any face-saving compromises unless he believed they were necessary prelude to future accomplishment. During whole conversation Hatta showed no evidence of any undue concern as to possibility of violent action by dissident groups. He did say that there were younger men both in and outside the military who were inclined to be impatient and who sometimes advocated extreme action, but in his opinion these individuals were not unified and did not represent a serious immediate danger. He said that from his knowledge of the Sumatran leaders he knew their aim was not separatism but autonomy and the achievement of recognition by the Central Government of their local problems. Hatta said he would be glad to see me at any time and would give me his opinions on the local situation again after the meeting of the national conference.